Showing posts with label Nuclear. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Nuclear. Show all posts

Tuesday, February 12, 2008

IMPROPER SITING OF NUCLEAR PLANT AT KOODANKULAM

Prof.T.Shivaji Rao,

Director, Centre for Environmental Studies,

Gitam University, Visakhapatnam-530 045

1. Reactors at Koodankulam:

As part of their expansion program in Nuclear Energy, the Atomic Energy Commission purpose to establish at Koodankulam a 2 x 1000MWe plant, with pressurized water-cooled reactors which like high powered racing cars are temperamental and demand constant attention. The nuclear fission occurs in 100 tonnes of Uranium Oxide fuel in 50,000 closed packed fuel rods, the Zirconium alloy tubes of half inch diameter. These fuel bundles the reactor-core sits in a thick steel pressure vessel through which cooling water is pumped at 18 tonnes per second to carry away the heat generated during nuclear fission and use it to produce steam and electricity through a turbo generator. The fuel gets yellow-hot at its core, attaining a temperature of 4100oF (2250oC) while the metal casing around the fuel is kept at 650oF (350oC) by the cooling water. If due to an accident the coolant water gets interrupted far just a few seconds the fuel temperature rises rapidly and the Zirconium casing begins to break at 1800oF (1000oC) and melts at 3370oF (1850oC). The actual danger comes when the hot fuel begins to lump together in a molten mass that can explode the containment or seep into the ground through what is known as Chinese syndrome and release massive quantities of radioactivity into the air, water and soil environment.

In order to avoid the core melt-down, the experts have provides a series of safety devices. One major line of defence is Emergency Core cooling system which Provides instantaneous water supply that keeps the core from melting. Another line of defence is the concrete containment that surrounds the core and the pressure vessel so that even during a loss-of-coolant accident, no radioactivity will escape into the outside environment. Such Engineered safety measures also fail sometimes.

2. Places to be evacuated during accident at Koodankulam:

http://envfor.nic.in/legis/hsm/gsr347.htm [ Notification on Emergency Response by Govt.of India]

http://www2.oecd.org/guidingprinciples/toc_index.asp [Chemical Accidents]

http://hazmat.dot.gov/pubs/erg/erg2004.pdf [Emergency Response system,pages.270-281]

When an accident at the nuclear plant releases enormous quantities of radio-activity into the air, water and soil environment, there will be immediate fatalities and long term genetic damage among the exposed populations. All the people within the zone of influence from the reactors must be evacuated.

Evacuation must be completed within:

6 hours for 2 to 5 km

12 hours for 5 to 25 km

24 hours for 25 to 75 km

48 hours for distances beyond 75km; downwind from Koodankulam as per the British accident scenario for the 100 MW. Size-well reactor, based on a wind-sped of 5 m/sec rain-fall of 1mm per hour and neutral stability conditions of the atmosphere.

After through scrubbing and decontamination of lands equipment and residences due to radio-active pollution from an accident, people may be permitted to return to their original residences along with their cattle and other properties after about 3 weeks upto 170km, one year upto 140km, 5 years upto 115km, 10 years upto 98km and 20 years upto 77km distance from Koodankulam nuclear plant. Depending upon the weather conditions during the accident, certain places will be more affected than others. The villages, towns and cities that will be effected during an accident are indicated in the figure.

Many villages of Ramanathapuram, Tirunelveli and Kanyakumari of Tamil Nadu and Trivandrum and Quilon districts of Kerala will be affected seriously. Killakkarai, Sattirakudi, Abiramam, Virudunagar and Watrap of Tamilnadu and Gudalur, Thekkadi, Vengamala, Patalam and Karunagpalli of Kerala lie within 170km. Sayalkudi, Nattakkadu Sivakasi and Settur of Tamilnad, Edathora, Kundara and Quilon lie within 140km Kamudi, Aruppukottai, Srivilliputtur and Rajapaliyam lie in between 140km and 170km. Karilgatti, Kalugumala and Puliyangudi of Tamil Nadu Tenmala, Kadakkal, Attingal and Kadinamkulam of Kerala lie within 115km. Taruvaikulam, Kadambur, Tirumalapuram and Tenkasi of Tamil Nadu and Palad and Attipara lie in between 98km and 77km, Sayarpuram Pudukkottai, Tirunelveli, Ambasamudram lie in between 98km. Tuticorin, Kayattar and Trivandrum lie inbetween 98 km and 77km, Sayarpuram Pudukkottai, Tirunelveli, Ambasamudram, Munnar, Balarampuram, Neyyattinkara, Nanguneri, Panakudi, Kolachel, Nagercoil and cape comorin lie within 77km from the Nuclear plant site.

(Based on the book "Nuclear Plants- The Silent Killers" published by the author in April 1989)


IMPROPER SITING OF NUCLEAR PLANT AT KAIGA

Prof.T.Shivaji Rao,

Director, Centre for Environmental Studies,

Gitam University, Visakhapatnam-530 045

I) Reactors at Kaiga: It is proposed to establish a nuclear plant (PHWR) at Kaiga in Karnataka with an initial capacity of 2 x 235 MW and an ultimate capacity of 2000 MW . In the proposed pressurized heavy water reactors the core is located in a steel vessel known as Calandria that is filled with heavy water and kept at atmospheric pressure. Low pressure heavy water is used as a coolant, permitting natural uranium as fuel. The fuel rods separated laterally by spacers consist of natural uranium dioxide pellets clad with Zircaloy. Without reactor shut down one machine inserts fuel bundle into pressure tube at one end while spent fuel bundle is discharged at the other end. As in a pressurized water reactor, the primary circuit of PHWR consists of several loops. For each loop a number of pipes emanating from individual pressure tubes feed into an outlet header that is connected to a steam generator main coolant pumps and inlet header that again feeds individual pressure tubes. The coolant temperature and void coefficients are positive. Primary shut-down is provided by vertical absorber rods immersed between the pressure tubes with secondary shut down, if necessary by injection of chemicals under pressure into the moderator. Double containment is provided for more safety.

II) Reactor Safety Problem: Although pressure tube design has positive and negative points from a safety point, the possibility of uncontained fuel melting accidents is not eliminated in this design. Even if pressure tube design precludes the chances of massive pressure vessel failure, the long length, surface area and complexity of the primary system piping results in greater possibilities for loss of coolant accidents. On-line refueling provides additional means by which loss of coolant accidents can be initiated. As the pressure tubes are exposed to the full neutron flux, they experience the consequential weakening effects. Due to deuterium-zirconium interact ion, delayed hydride-cracking occurs in the piping system. Moreover the natural uranium heavy water void co-efficient of reactivity is positive and any loss of coolant accident leads to power execursion. A loss of coolant accident coupled with scram failure leads to rapid melting of fuel and possible common mode breach of the containment. While heavy water results in large and hazardous tritium inventories, extensive use of zirconium in the core provides for a large zirconium-system reaction potential. The multi unit station design may ultimately result in common mode failures which have not been studied in depth in safety analysis in the Indian environment with considerable degree of emphasis on indigenization.

III. Alternate Sites: As practiced in some European states, Tunnels can be driven in one of the mountains on the Karwar Coast for accommodating the reactors; Other infrastructure facilities can be provided on the land, since service water supply forms 5% to 10% of the project cost. Sea water can be used for condenser cooling as in Madras and Tarapore plants. The low summer storages in the reservoirs on Kali river are bound to exacerbate the radioactive pollution though biological magnification of radioactivity in the food-chains and food webs of the aquatic eco-systems. Extensive deforestation will cause siltation of the reservoirs soon. Alternate sites on the islands around Karwar, Basavarajdurg, Muredeswar, Bhatkal and Udipi can be considered if pollution of inland water is to be avoided. Similarly the coastal sites at Kokarn, Bailur, Kumata may be considered for locating the reactors underground on the beaches or in the tunnels to be formed in the mountains. Many other sites on the west cost near the mouths of the rivers may be chosen on considerations similar to those followed in selecting the sites for the reactors at Kalpakkam and Tarapore.

By siting the proposed nuclear platn at Kaiga in close proximity to a major population centre at Karwar Naval base, the nuclear experts are deliberately violating the norms even if public health and environmental safety will be in jeopardy. Even the defence forces and personnel of the “Sea-Bird” project may be adversely affected. The dense and natural forests of the tropics need not be destroyed. In case of power failure the reactors are always provided with alternate sources of energy from a few independent power generators that go into action within a few seconds or minutes. Hence the special facilities or secondary importance such as power-lines, rocky foundations and reservoir storage on kali river cannot over-ride the crucial aspects of environmental protection in Karwar district and its vicinity.

IV. Places to be evacuated during accident at Kaiga: After thorough scrubbing and decontamination of the land sand equipment due to radioactive pollution from an accident people can return to their original houses along with their cattle after one year upto 140km after 5 years upto 115km and after 20 years upto 77 km distance from the nuclear plant. Depending upon the weather conditions during the accident, certain areas will be more affected than others. The villages, towns and cities that lie within the zone of influence of an accident in the rectors at Kaiga are marked in the figure. While Karwar, Yellapur, Londa, Honavar, Kumta and Ankola of Karnataka, Chavil, Quepem and Madgoan of Goa lie within 77km. Bhatkal, Siddapur, Sirsi, Hangal, Mundgod, Kalghatgi, Haliyal, Khanapur, Hubli and Dnarwar of Karnataka and Panaji, Ponda Bicholim and Mapuca of Goa fall within 115km distance from the proposed nuclear plnt. While Bainduru, Sagar, Sorab, Haveri, Shiggaon, Savanur, Kundgol and Belgaum of Karnataka and Chandgad, Amboli and Santvadi of Maharashtra lie within 140km, Coondapur, Byadgi, Ranibennur, Shirhatti, Gadag, Nargund, Gokak and other places close by lie within 170km from Kaiga. Evacuation must be completed within 6 hours for 2 to 5km; 12 hours for 5 to 25km; 24 hours for 25 to 75km and 48 hours for distances beyond 75km from Kaiga as per the British accident scenario based on a wind speed of 5m/sec; rainfall of 1 millimeter per hour and neutral stability conditions.

(This article is based on the Book "Nuclear Plants-The Silent Killers" published in April 1989)

HAZARDOUS SITING OF NUCLEAR PLANT AT NAGARJUNA SAGAR RESERVOIR

Prof.T.Shivaji Rao,

Director, Centre for Environmental Studies,

Gitam University, Visakhapatnam-530 045

http://hazmat.dot.gov/pubs/erg/erg2004.pdf (Emergency Response System)

NAGARJUNA SAGAR NUCLEAR PLANT

The Vengurlekar Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission having considered the impact of low flows in summer into rivers and lakes and increasing need for water to cool the condensers suggested that the reactors must be located on the sea coast. The location of the Tarapur and Kalpakkam reactors are in tune with the stipulated siting criteria. Experts criticized that Kota was not a suitable location for he Rajasthan Atomic Power Plant and the fish culture in Rana Pratap Sagar is reported to suffer from high levels of radiation whose long-term consequences on environment will be more clearly seen in the next few years. To avoid these problems the reactors are generally located on the coastal sites in Britain, Sweden and Norway. By violating all these norms why should the proposed nuclear plant be sited at Nagarjuna Sagar?

For a design basis accident in a pressurized water reactor, a core-melt down is accompanied by a steam explosion due to the contact of the molten fuel with the water that remains in the reactor vessel. Even if such an accident were to occur once in a million years, the radioactive substances are expected to get released into the atmosphere about 2.30hours after the accident. Although the population is likely to be moved radially away from the reactor upto about 30km. the adverse health impact causes 3300 early fatalities. 45,000 early illnesses and 1400 cancers per year. In Chernobyl people were evacuated upto 30km around the nuclear plant. In addition to loss of life, damage to public health and properties estimated at $5,000 deformed off-spring will be borne to humans and animals. Under the circumstances, opinions of experts must be taken into account before making a proper environmental assessment of the proposed reactor.

Nagarjuna Sagar:

Dr.David E Lilienthal, the first Chairman of the US Atomic Energy Commission in his book “Atomic Energy – A New Start” has admitted belatedly that “nuclear technology is not really so advanced as was assumed in 1950’s. It is not dependable enough. It is not safe enough”. And he rightly questioned “the moral right to promote and sell such a complicated, immature and fundamentally unsafe nuclear system particularly to societies whose technology is far less developed”.

In fact, public acceptance of nuclear plants today and that too in the aftermath of Chernobyl, is a coin with two sides. On the one side, the safety of the reactors has to be ensured through proper understanding and application of the scientific principles of physics, technology, engineering quality control and non-destructive testing and inspection. On the other side the nuclear industry after making the greatest efforts to achieve the safety and reliability of the plant have to still promote the acceptability of nuclear plants not only to political leaders and officials but also to the public by pointing to the golden balance to be struck between the energy, economic, ecological and public health objectives of the project. In short, the Atomic Energy Commission must prove to the public that it has not only good physicists, technologists, safety engineers, quality inspectors and dedicated workers but also human experts who recognize that there is more to perpetuate civilization than bare technology.

These radiation safety criteria require the establishment of an exclusion zone around the plant without access to the public and a sterilised zone around the exclusion zone within which only natural growth of population is permitted. The population distribution upto 30kms around the plant is kept in view to ensure that in the unlikely event of a serious accident, effective emergency actions, including evacuation of population can be taken up immediately. The sterilized zone is often called as a low population zone with very few people who can be evacuated should the need arise. According to the siting criteria approved by the experts in 1963, the population upto 16km around the reactor should be within 10,000 and upto 40km it should be below one lakh. The Russian stipulated long ago that the distance between a major town and the reactor should be 35km. According to the US standards that within 20km distance from the reactor, the population should not exceed 25,000.

By stating there is no township with a population exceeding one lakh within 30kms from the proposed site of the reactor at Nagarjuna Sagar Dam, the Atomic Energy officials cannot deny the violation of safety norms and environmental protection guidelines as Vijayapuri township with about 40,000 population lies within 16km of the site. Moreover the tiger sanctuary, the historical museum of ancient Buddhistic monuments, tourist centre and the major Sagar lake with abundant fishery resources lie within close proximity of the reactor site. Vijayapuri town does not possess a road lay-out with connections in different directions and the existing mountainous tract with many curves becomes an obstacle for evacuation the population during accidents.

Since the waters intended for drinking, food fisheries and animal husbandry will get polluted public health in coastal districts as also Nalgonda and Khammam districts is bound to suffer.

If the socio-economic consequences scenario of he SIZE-WELL reactor of UK for an accident is super imposed over Nagarjuna Sagar, people upto Vijayawada will have to be evacuated during the Monsoon period (June to September) and people upto Hyderabad will have to be evacuated during the winter season. The procedures for evacuation, rehabilitation and the consequences of an accident will be similar to those already predicted for Koodankulam Nuclear Plant.

All the people within the zone of influence from the reactors proposed at Nagarjuna Sagar must be evacuated. Evacuation must be completed within 6 hours for 2 to 5km, 12 hours for 5 to 25km; 24 hours for 25 to 75km and 48 hours for distance beyond 75km down wind from Nagarjuna Sagar as per the British accident scenario for the 1100MW. Size-Well reactor based on a wind speed of 5 meters per second.; rainfall of 1 milli-meter per hour and neutral stability conditions of the atmosphere.

After thorough scrubbing and decontamination of lands, equipment, roads and residences due to radioactive pollution from an accident people may be permitted to return to their original homes along with their properties and cattle after about 3 weeks upto 170km one year upto 140 km, 5 years upto 115km, 10 years upto 98km and 20 years upto 77km distances from the Nuclear Plant site at Nagarjuna sagar. Depending upon the weather conditions during the accident, some places will be more affected than others. The villages, towns and cities that will be affected during an accident are shown in the figure.

While Vijayapuri, Devarakonda, Miryalguda, Nalgonda, Suryapet, Huzurnagar, Macherla, Gurazala lie within 77km, Hyderbad, Bhngir, Jangaon, Kodada, Khammam, Jaggayyapet, Nandigama, Sattenapalli, Narasaraopet, Chilakaluripet fall within 115km distance from the proposed nuclear plant site. While Wanaparti, Kolhapur, Guntur and Vijayawada lie within 140km, Sangareddi, Tiruvur, Nuzvid,Gannavaram, Vuyyuru, Tenali Nidubrolu and other important towns and villages in the districts of Medak, Nalgonda, Warangal, Khammam, West Godavari, Krishna, Guntur and Prakasm districts lie within 170km distance from Nagarjuna Sagar.

Without placing the risk and environmental impact analysis reports before the people of Andhra Pradesh, the atomic energy experts are denying them their right to healthy living. Without sincre efforts to explain the levels of air and water pollution expected from the nuclear power plants and its waste treatment systems and their immediate short-term and long-term impact on health and environment they cannot force the State Pollution Control Board to grant permission and thereby sign the death warrant of the people.

In the light of the bombing of nuclear reactors in Iraq and Iran and the terrorist attacks on reactor sites in Spain and pilferage and theft of plutonium from some plants, how can any expert rule out any nuclear accidents due to bombing, terrorism, sabotage or human failure at Nagarjuna Sagar? Under the circumstances, the people of Andhra Pradesh should not blindly believe the atomic energy experts on their assurances of safety but must organize mass movements for locating the proposed reactor underground or in rock caverns at a safer place on the East coast around Gudur, Nellore, Machilipatnam or Visakhapatnam. They must demand for inherently safe reactors in place of the proposed unsafe ones.


WHY PREFER UN-SAFE REACTORS INSTEAD OF SAFER MODELS?

Prof.T.Shivaji Rao,

Director, Centre for Environmental Studies,

Gitam University, Visakhapatnam-530 045
American experts have recently developed such safe reactors for which the probability of a serious accident is zero, that is, a reactor whose safety depends not on the active intervention of safety systems (which with some degree of probability can fail) but on physical principles that insure the reactors safety without mechanical or human intervention but upon immutable physical principles that even in an emergency could not be abrogated.

Enlightened nuclear and environmental experts have been warning the industry and the Governments to renounce the current generation of reactors stating that no matter how extensive the safety measures are the reactor machines are disasters “waiting in the wings”. In fact General Atomics, an American firm is building a modular high-temperature gas-cooled reactor in Idaho-falls to produce tritium for nuclear weapons and to serve as a basis for a civilian reactor that would generate electricity. In the case of this new reactor proposed in Idaho for ensuring full safety, the designers deliberately restrict the core size and reactor out-put to 140 Mega-watts

In fact a large reactor built in Colorado before the advent of the modular-designs has utterly failed as its Helium circulator has broken down frequently. The secret of the safe reactor lies in its sand-grain sized fuel particles encapsulated in multi-layered glassy carbon spheres that trap radio-active fission products but transmit heat while remaining intact upto 3300oF. Since the maximum temperature that the fuel grains can attain in the spheres is limited to about 3000oF , the Uranium fuel cannot melt through the spheres under any kind of an accident. But the pressurized water reactors proposed to be built at Koodankulam in Tirunelveli district of Tamil Nadu are inherently unsafe. In these reactors fuel rods of about half-inch thickness attain temperature of 4100oF at the core while the casing temperature is maintained at 650oF by the cooling water. If the pipe breaks and water supply fails for just a few seconds, the hot fuel can destroy the metal casing which begins to break at 1800oF and melts at 3370oF. Although back up systems such as the emergency core cooling system and concrete containment are expected to ensure that no radio-activity will escape into the outside environment during an accident, still core-melt accidents did occur at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl plants. While the maximum fuel temperature of 3000oF is less than the fuel casing failure temperature of 3300oF in a safe reactor, the maximum fuel temperature of 4100oF is more than twice the fuel casing failure temperature of 1800oF in an inherently unsafe reactor.

Why Absolute Safety of Nuclear Reactors is impossible?

When the Swiss Government wanted to buy the US Reactors in 1973 , they demanded experimental proof that the dome containment would retain the radioactive pollutants released during a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) Besides being expensive, since an actual test would be more dangerous than nuclear bomb testing, assurances on reactor safety are entirely based on tests on paper using simulated mathematical models. As such test results can not take into account the different permutations and combinations of malfunctions from defective materials, mechanical or human errors, sabotage, bombing, terrorism, missile hits, aero-plane crashes etc. they become invalid.

In other words, nobody can do all the necessary testing nor even anticipate what kind of tests are needed. At best, the experts may be able to simulate and estimate the answers to some of the questions asked by the people but do the people know all the questions that are yet to be asked for making the reactors absolutely safe for all time? Hence the proof of reactor safety could not be given and still has not been demonstrated.

But when the tests on the Emergency core cooling system designed to flood the core during a loss of coolant Accident were run at the National Reactor Testing Station in Idaho, mechanical failures occurred. When the tests were run during 1970-71 all the six tests conducted by the Aero-jet Nuclear Company failed. Subsequent experiments at Oak-ridge National Laboratoreis indicated that the Zircaloy-clad fuel rods of the Light water reactors may swell, rupture nd block the cooling channels, and thereby obstruct the emergency cooling water from reaching the core and such obstruction which holds back the emergency core cooling water leads to a catastrophe sometime or the other. Thus reactor safety is most often a myth!

Accidents in Atomic Waste Storage Tanks!

As a temporary measure most countries are storing highly radioactive wastes in steel and concrete tanks on the surface of he earth. The fuming nuclear wastes produce 9 kilo-watts of energy by radioactive disintegration per cubic meter and hence must be cooled all the time. However accidents occur in the storage tanks as detailed below.

1) The chemicals in the radioactive liquid wastes often cause corrosion of the containers. As a consequence of such corrosion, nearly half a million liters of radioactive waste seeped into the ground from the storage facility at Hanford Washington (USA).

2) If the refrigeration systems that cool the storage tanks fail due to power shortage, floods, earthquakes, human or mechanical failures or sabotage, the contents of the storage tanks would heat upto about 1000oC (1832oF) and cause an accident that would render an area double the size of Switzerland uninhabitable for many decades.

3) The water molecules in the storage tanks are split into Oxygen and Hydrogen due to radiation. If the ventilation system of the tanks were to fail and Hydrogen reaches the lower limit for explosion of 4% in the air, an explosion that can destroy the tanks along with refrigeration systems may occur.

Thus the location of he atomic waste storage tanks on ground surface is beset with substantial risks due to accidents that may cause serious radioactive pollution of air, water and the soil resources in the nearby and distant environments.

MYTHS OF NUCLEAR SAFETY DOSE AND ECONOMICS

People are exposed to a background Natural radiation of 130 milli rems per year. Man made pollution adds 5 milli rems. Exposures due to luminous watches and teleivision screens are each equal to 2 to 3 percent of the back ground radiation. Some atomic energy officials feel that exposure of workers to ionizing radiation of 5 rems per year will not cause any harm. In the USA while the Environmental protection Agency reduced the annual limit of exposure from 500 milli rems to 25 milli rems for residential zones around the Nuclear plants, the Energy Research Agency recommended a limit of only 5 milli rems for the general public. Environmental scientists hold that as any minute level of radiation produces cancer and irreversible genetic deformities, no dose radiation is so low that the risk of cancer becomes zero. Unfortunately while the above limits to what is locally released from the plant into the environment are carefully regulated the cumulative impact of radioactive pollutants from all nuclear activities and their grave consequences of their biological magnification and slow poisoning effects on plants, animal and human populations even in the remote areas are not studied on scientific lines.

Only 400 Reactors in the World

It is estimated by the International Nuclear power commission that by the end of the Century 4500 Nuclear Power Reactors with a capacity of 1000 MWe each Reactor, will be working. But as two thirds of world population are agitating against the Nuclear power only 400 Reactors are working at Present not even 10% of the target.

APPENDIX-I

HARMFUL EFFECTS OF RADIATION

A) Dosage and damage to public health:

Dose in rems

Effects

0-50

No visible symptoms except changes in blood

80-220

Vomiting and Nausea for one day plus symptoms of radiation sickness in 10% upto 120 rems: 25% upto 170 rems: 50% upto 220 rems

270-500

Vomiting and Nausea on first day plus sickness among all people with 20% deaths within 6 weeks upto 330 rems and 50% deaths in 1 month upto 500 rems

550-750

Vomiting and Nausea within 4 hours and deaths upto100%

B) Single High Dose-Late-Effects

Cancer

Blood, nervous system, thyroid. In excess of 100 rems, Leukaemia rises correspondingly

Cataracts

Lenses of eyes become increasingly opaque, 200 rems

Fertility

Brief sterility at 150 rems

Degeneration

Impairment of organ functions

Mutations

Rate doubled between 20 and 200 rems

Life-shortening

Radiologists have 5 years lowered lifespan

c) Chronic Low-doses

Cancer, immune deficiency, mutations, still-births, abortions etc.

Cumulative effects of Radioactive Pollutants in Nature

Element

Freshwater

Sea water

Fishes

Plants

Fishes

Plants

H

1

1

1

1

K

4,400

--

16

13

Ca

70

350

2

10

Mn

81

1,50,000

363

5,230

Co

1,615

6,670

650

553

Zn

1,744

3,155

3,400

900

Sr

14

200

04

21

Cs

3,680

907

48

51

Ce

81

3,180

99

1,610

(From: Environmental Radioactivity: Eisenbund) Zn-65 of 25,000ths of a Pico-Curie in Columbia river showed up in Man at 4,000 Pico-Curies indicating high accumulation!

APPENDIX- II

SOME OF THE ISOTOPES PRESENT IN SPENT FUEL

Element

Half-Life

Implication

Tritium 3H

2 Years

Emits beta rays – absorbed internally

Krypton 85Kr

44 Hours

Radiates beta rays inert gas

Strontium 90Sr

28 Years

Emits-beta rays- bones, lungs absorb

Iodine 131I

8 Days

Emits beta rays – Thyroid absorbs

Xenon 133Xe

5 Days

An inert radioactive gas

Cesium 137Ce

30 years

Irradiates body absorbed internally

Plutonium 239Pu

24,300 Years

Hazard to health- body organs - absorb

(Source: Peat, David, The Nuclear Book: What happened at Harrisburg? And can it happen here? (1979) P.47

APPENDIX-III

Comparative Costs of Nuclear, Hydel and Thermal Power

I.

Hydel-Power Schemes

Cost/Unit

i) Tanakpur Banbasa Hydel-Scheme on river Sarada, 00 MW

35 Paise

ii) Katakther Hydel Scheme on River Yamuna

39 Paise

iii) Lakhwar Vyasi Multi-purpose scheme

26 Paise

II

Thermal Power Plants

i) Annapara (3 x 500 MW) revised 8/83, Mirzapur District.

37 Paise

ii) Raoli T.P.S. Project (4 x 210 MW) 6/82, Bijnor District

40 Paise

iii) Partabpur TPS Project 8/82 (4 x 500 MW) Allahabad District

38 Paise

III

Diesel Power Plants

i) 50 KW Bagheswar Power Station Almora (964)

200 Paise

ii) 150 KW Dharchula Power Station Pithorgarh District (1975)

85 Paise

iii) 1.5 MW at Riki, Distt.Kinnar (1979)

96 Paise

Source: Indian Journal of Power & River Valley Development Sept-Oct.1984)

IV. Cost of Electricity from a 2 x 235 MWe Nuclear Plant to be Commissioned during the 1990s

Basis

Project Cost

Rs. 530 Crores (Rs/11,300 per KWe)

Heavy Water Cost

Rs. 6635 per kg

Uranium fuel cost

Rs. 4545 per kg

Project construction time

8 years

Economic operating life

25 years

Energy sales

2780 Million Units per year

Interest during construction

6.9% per annum

Heavy water lease charges

8% per annum

Return on Capital employed

12% per annum

Rate of depreciation

3.6% per annum

Methodology

Return on Investment method

Break-up of Cost of electricity(Paise per Kilo Watt –hour)

Return on Capital - 28

Fixed charges = 47 Paise

Operating expenses = 18 Paise

Total cost = 65 Paise

Heavy water lease charges - 10

Depreciation - 8

Decommissioning expenses - 1

Fuel Consumption - 11

Heavy Water Consumption - 4

Operation & Maintenance - 3

(Source: Indian Journal of Power& River Valley Development, Nov., Dec., 1984)

VOICE OF THE WORLD

After Chernobyl Disaster, almost all the European countries have stopped the construction of Nuclear power plants, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland and Netherlands decided not to have Nuclear power.

In USSR because of the people’s anti-Nuclear agitation, 6 Nuclear power projects have been closed down.

After the accident in Three mile Island, America has not started even a single Nuclear power Reactor, 108 proposed projects have been cancelled.

Austria closed its only Nuclear power plant within few months after Chernobyl Disaster

Sweden is going to close down all the Nuclear power Reactors by 2010 year. This is in consequence of the Judgement of the court.

(News from New Delhi October 11, 1988)


NUCLEAR POWER UNSAFE?

According to Dr.Hannes Alfven, Nobel Laureate in Physics, “Fission energy is safe only:-

- if a number of critical devices work as they should

- if a number of people in key positions follow all their instructions,

- if there is no sabotage, no hijacking of the transports,

- if no reactor fuel processing plant or reprocessing plant or repository any where in the world is situated in a region of riots or guerilla activity, and no revolution or war – even a conventional one –takes place in these regions.

The enormous quantities of extremely dangerous material must not get into the hands of ignorant people or desperados. No acts of God can be permitted”-

(From “Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,” May 1972)

DISASTER MANAGEMENT AT CHERNOBYL

The explosion that shattered Chernobyl reactor-4 occurred at 1-23 am on April 26, 1986.

In keeping with the Contingency plan, residents of the town of Pripayat were evacuated on April 27, 1986. As the radiation situation was being assessed , it was decided to evacuate a 30km zone around the reactor site.

…Much credit is due to the Special army units which have cleaned up, in complicatd radiation condition, an area of some 5 million sq.m including the plants including the plants interior, and shipped some 500 thousand cu.m. of contaminated soil and debris for burial.

…More than 600 population centres, including Chernobyl and Pripayat were cleaned up and whenever necessary the cleaning was repeated (in certain villages, regional centres and some of the buildings in Pripayat). Simultaneously machinery and equipment were clearned repeatedly and dust settlement and other measures were carried out.

- BScherbin, Djy.Prime Minister, USSR

(From the bi-monthly “Science in the USSR, Jan 1989)

LESSONS FROM CHERNOBYL!

We must learn one major lesson from Chernobyl

…No amount of Safety precautions can rule out an unfortunate combination of mechanical failures or human errors.

…In future, therefore, we must pay equal attention to nuclear plant safety and to effective ways of dealing with nuclear plant accidents.

…The tragedy of Chernobyl must stimulate research into what should be a fundamentally new generation of advanced reactors with built in self protection systems.

- B.Scherbin, Deputy Prime Minister, USSR

(From the bi-monthly Science in the USSR Jan, 1989)

CHERNOBYL

The Soviets estimated that the Chernobyl disaster released the fission product (excluding the noble gases like Xenon and Krypton) of 3.5 percent of the core material amounting to 6 to 7 tonnes of material with 50 million curies of radioactivity. The inert gases might account for other 50 million curies. Among the toxic radioactive pollutants released are: Xenon, Krypton, Iodine, Caesium, Strontium and Plutonium

POOR DISASTER MANAGEMENT DURING ACCIDENTS!

According to Indian atomic experts, sheltering and distribution of Iodine tablets to protect people during accidents is taken up at radiation levels of 10 milli-sieverts and 100 milli sieverts (1 sievert = 100 rems) for whole body and thyroid, whereas for evacuation dose levels of 100 milli sieverts and 1000 milli-sieverts to the whole body and thyroid are considered appropriate! Evacuation for a design basis accident is limited upto 3 km around the reactor. Moreover the experts state that planning of detailed counter-measure is carried out at the stage of commissioning of the Nuclear Plant?

ARE THE LIVES OF INDIANS WORTHWHILE?

The report prepared by the experts of Brookhaven Laboratories on “Theoretical possibilities and consequences of Major accidents in large Nuclear Power Plants” (WASH 740) predicted in 1956 that an accident with a 50% release of the Core Inventory from a 200MW reactor would produce 3,400 deaths, 43,000 injuries and property damage of 7000 million dollars. One important consequence this report was the passage in 1957 by the US Congress of the Price-Anderson Act designed to protect the Nuclear industry from liability in the event of major accidents. Out of 560 million dollars to be paid as compensation for an accident , 500 million dollars was to be provided by the Government while the remaining 60 million dollars had to be covered through insurance policies purchased by the nuclear industry.

A bill to extend the life of this Act was approved by the US Senate on 19th March 1988. The liability for off-site damages during an accident was raised from 700 million dollars to 7000 million dollars – a ten fold increase. The victims of nuclear accident have to merely prove that they suffered damages to draw on the pool of funds, thus avoiding the possibility of lengthy court proceedings over liability.

If the value of the life of an Indian is considered to be as precious as that of an American, the Nuclear experts, the members of the local bodies, legislatures and the Parliament must pressurize the state and central Governments to pass legislation similar to the Price-Anderson Act with a financial provision of Rs.10,000 crores towards compensation for victims of nuclear accidents. Unless such a law is enacted, the state and central Governments have no moral right to permit the establishment and operation of Nuclear power plants any where in the country.

300 Radiation Leakage Cases

As many as 300 “incidents” of serious nature have occurred causing radiation leaks and physical damage to workers in the nuclear plants. The Tarapur Atomic Power Station, for example, was the scene of several mishaps and at least three persons died in the inert chamber inside the station and more than 3,000 workers and engineers were exposed to non-permissible doses of radiation. In another case, a reprocessing plant had to be scrapped because of high contamination costing the country crores of rupees in unaccounted secret public funds. In August 1981, RAPS Unit-I was shut down following the detection of leakage from one of its end shields. As the damage was in a highly radioactive area, about 2,000 workers suffered from unusually high levels of radiation and about 300 workers were hospitalized.

-- Dhirendra Sharma, HINDU, 14th Marhch ‘89

PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENT HAVE NO INFORMATION OF THE ACCIDENTS

The public and Parliament have no access to the details of these accidents while the Minister claimed on the floor of the Lok Sabha that India’s record of safety is “very high” and is “Satisfactory”. But there is no independent competent agency in the country which can look into the safety records of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and under the secrecy provisions of the Atomic Energy Act 1962 the Government refuses the public access to critical information.

One does not question the high caliber of Indian scientists and engineers engaged in the nuclear programme. But there is no fail-safe reactor system which can guarantee absolute safety to life and the environment. All assessments of risk are probabilistic,” because none can simulate an atomic accident of melt down at 3000oC hat and since the atomic fission process falls within human engineering, it suffers from fallibility.

-- Dhirendra Sharma, HINDU, 14th March ‘89

NUCLEAR POWER UNSAFE?

According to Dr.Hannes Alfven, Nobel Laureate in Physics, “Fission energy is safe only:-

- if a number of critical devices work as they should

- if a number of people in key positions follow all their instructions,

- if there is no sabotage, no hijacking of the transports,

- if no reactor fuel processing plant or reprocessing plant or repository any where in the world is situated in a region of riots or guerilla activity, and no revolution or war – even a conventional one –takes place in these regions.

The enormous quantities of extremely dangerous material must not get into the hands of ignorant people or desperados. No acts of God can be permitted”-

(From “Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,” May 1972)


About Me

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Born in 1932 at Mudinepalli, near Gudivada, Krishna Dist. Andhra Pradesh, received Bachelors degree in Civil Engg., from Viswesaraiah Engineering College, Banglore (1956) and Masters Degree in Environmental Engineering from Rice university, Houston, Texas, (USA) (1962), Ph.D (Hony). Former Head of the Department of Civil Engineering and principal of College of Engineering, Andhra university.Formerly Hony.Professor in Andhra University,Manonmanian Sundarnar University,JNT University. Fellow of the Institution of Engineers,India Recipient of the University Grants Commissions National Award "Swami Pranavananda Award on Ecology and Environmental Sciences" for the year 1991. Recipient of Sivananda Eminent Citizen Award for 2002 by Sanathana Dharma Charitable Trust, Andhra Pradesh state. Presently Working as Director, centre for Environmental Studies, GITAM University, http://www.geocities.com/prof_shivajirao/resume.html http://www.eoearth.org/contributor/Shivaji.rao