IS KUDANKULAM PLANT A STATE SPONSORED DISASTER?

Prof.T.Shivaji Rao,
http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/indianpoint/files/NRDC-1336_Indian_Point_FSr8medium.pdf[explosion]

Director, Center for Environmental Studies, GITAM University, Visakhapatnam.

shivajirao1932@hotmail.com

1.HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS:  The Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project (KKNPP) is an Indo-Russian joint venture to set up 2 units of 1000MWe pressurized light water reactors of VVER design and is covered by IAEA safeguards similar to the reactors at Tarapur and Rajasthan built in collaboration with USA and Canada respectively.  While Rajiv Gandhi  who was linked with the Bofors deals involving corruption allegations also signed an agreement with USSR in 1988 for importing the VVER reactors. While insisting on export of nuclear fuel wastes to Russia the Janata Dal Government represented by its foreign Minister Mr.I.K.Gujral renewed the above agreement with the newly formed state of Russia in 1997.  This renewal was done although India knows that nuclear power was 3 times more costly than hydro-power and twice more costly than thermal power and still making a negligible contribution for National power needs.  People were objecting to nuclear reactors since 1988 itself in the wake of the harrowing Chernobyl disaster of 1986 and yet without caring for public health and safety, the central and state Governments being misled on economic and safety considerations by the nuclear industry were pushing ahead with their plans which were perceived as man-made disasters waiting in the wings, threatening the right to life and the right to livelihood of millions of poor people.

http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?203718#comments

http://www.converge.org.nz/pma/inkood.htm  

2. SELECTION ON THE BASIS OF WRONG DATA: 

http://www.aerb.gov.in/T/PUBLICATIONS/CODESGUIDES/SG-G-1.pdf

The site selected at Kudankulam does not satisfy the siting criteria prescribed by the AERB for several reasons.  For instance the NPCIL has not prepared the disaster management plan for a maximum credible accident in the nuclear reactors and they did not examine the feasibility of emergency evacuation although it was known that the Shoreham nuclear reactor in USA was abandoned for the same reason.

Site Clearance for Kudankulam-1&2 (KK-1&2)

The sites offered by the states for setting up nuclear power projects are evaluated by the Site Selection Committee (SSC) of the Government. The SSC evaluates the sites in line with the criteria laid down in the AERB Code of Practice on Safety in Nuclear Power Plant Siting, which inter alia, gives the mandatory and desirable requirements of the site from safety considerations. These include assessment of seismicity, location of faults, geology, foundation conditions, meteorology, potential of flooding (from tsunami, storm surge, etc. at coastal sites and from rain, upstream dam break, etc. at inland sites), proximity to airports, military installations, facilities storing explosive and toxic substances, etc.

Detailed studies comprising Geo-technical examination, Seismo-tectonic, Safe grade level, meteorological and other studies were carried out by the expert agencies of organizations specializing in these. Based on these studies, the detailed site evaluation report was submitted to Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), who after a detailed review, accorded site clearance for Kudankulam site. The project financial sanction based on the Detailed Project Report (DPR) prepared was obtained in February 2001 and the work on the project was started after obtaining necessary clearances by following the due processes in place at that time.

Exclusion Zone and Sterilized Zone According to the AERB code an area in the radius of 1.5 km, called exclusion zone, around the reactors is established, where no human habitation is permitted. This area forms the part of the project and is included in the land acquired. The AERB Code of Practice on Safety in Nuclear Power Plant Siting states: An exclusion area of appropriate size (at least 1.5 km radius from the reactor centre) shall be established around the reactor and entry to this is to be restricted to authorized personnel only. Thus the population falling within the exclusion zone, if any, is only resettled. The sterilized zone is the annulus between the exclusion zone and an area up to 5 km from the plant. The AERB code states in this regard: “A sterilised area up to 5 km around the plant shall be established by administrative measures where the growth of population will be restricted for effective implementation of emergency measures. Natural growth, however, is allowed in this zone”.

Thus, there is no displacement involved in the sterilized zone. In fact, there are no restrictions on natural growth of population in the sterilized zone. The administrative  measures are put in place to ensure that there is no large increase in the population due to say setting up of an industry involving large labour force, etc.

3 Population Distribution The AERB Code of Practice on Safety in Nuclear Power Plant Siting lays down desirable criteria for population for selection of a site as follows: “Other desirable population distribution characteristics in plain terrain are: i) Population centers greater than 10000 should not be within 10 km of the plant. ii) The population density within a radius of 10 km of the plant should be less than 2/3 of the state average. iii) There should be no population centres more than 100000 within 30 km from the plant. iv) The total population in the sterilised area should be small, preferably less than 20000.” It may be reiterated that these are only desirable criteria and are prescribed to enable easy emergency planning.

For the purpose of planning for serious accidents, if any, an area of 16 km around the plant is considered as the Emergency Planning Zone. The AERB Code of Practice on Safety in Nuclear Power Plant Siting states: During emergency, availability of transportation network means of communication, etc. which are of significance during emergency condition shall be checked. A radial distance of 16 km from the plant may be considered for this purpose.

It may be, however, noted that in the KK reactors design, many advanced safety features are deployed. These include the passive heat removal system (PHRS), which will ensure cooling of the fuel under the most stressed condition of non-availability of power supply and cooling water and further also there is the provision of core catcher to contain the molten material and the radioactivity within the reactor, even under the most severe accident resulting into the fuel meltdown. Such and other safety provisions strengthen the plant such that the intervention in the public domain beyond exclusion zone will not be required even in case of a severe accident.    http://www.npcil.nic.in/pdf/news_28sep2011_02.pdf

3. GOVERNMENT MISLED BY PLANT AUTHORITIES ON KUDANKULAM SAFETY: Although Chernobyl accident proved that major explosions occur sometime or the other due to human failures or other reasons and hence nuclear safety is a myth.  But the authorities mislead the Prime Minister of India and the Tamil Nadu state Government that nuclear power is absolutely safe and economical and thereby forced them to propagate among the people that nuclear power is absolutely safe and public need not be afraid of it.   But  in the wake of the Fukushima accident the Chancellor of Germany and the Prime Ministes of Japan have consulted Internatinal experts on nuclear safety in detail and confirmed that nuclear safety is a myth and thereby decided  to phase out all the nuclear plants in their countries by 2022 and 2030.  But Indian Prime Minister and Tamilnadu Chief Ministers are ignoring the old saying “Fools rush in where angels fear to tread” and hence are violating all the rules and regulations under different acts like the Environmental Protection Act and AERB guidelines on safety of nuclear plants and also the National Disaster Management authority (NDMA) guidelines on radiological safety.  The Prime Minister as the Chairman of the NDMA is demanding the nuclear plant authorities to see that absolute safety is maintained for the nuclear plants while simultaneously is constructing nuclear plants at different places in India by violating the laws of the land and  as unsafe and uneconomical projects which not only are silent killers but also lead the states and the country into the trap of economic bankruptcy.  Japan is going to spent Rs.3 to 5  lakh crores towards compensating the victims of Fukushima nuclear explosion for the present and this cost will go up in due course of time to cover decontamination of polluted houses and infrastructure in the downstream side of Fukushima Since Kudankulam reactors cost only Rs.14,000 crores it is better and cheaper to abandon the Kudankulam reactors instead of attempting to pay 20times its original cost as a penalty in the form of compensation to the victims of radioactive explosion at Kudankulam which may occur for one reason or the other and sooner than later. 

http://tshivajirao.blogspot.in/2012/05/why-kudankulam-reactors-are-killers-of.html

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13408055

4. ALTERNATIVES TO NUCLEAR POWER IGNORED:  There are several alternative sources to nuclear power which should have been discussed while presenting the Environmental Impact Assessment Report to the Union Ministry of Environment and Forests for instance from the abundant stocks of lignite coal in Tamil Nadu the state should have used this fuel to produce electricity at Kudankulam plant by making necessary modifications.  Even natural gas or imported crude could have been a better and a safer alternative to Kudankulam nuclear reactors. The details on the alternative energies for nuclear power are presented below.

http://tshivajirao.blogspot.in/2012/02/kudankulam-nuclear-bomb-over-tamilnadu.html

http://www.erec.org/fileadmin/erec_docs/Documents/Publications/EREC-Technoloy_Roadmap_def1.pdf

5. IMPROPER ENVIRONMENTAL CLEARANCES:  The Union Ministry of Environment on the basis of unethical pressure exerted over it by the Nuclear plant authorities blindly accorded Environmental clearance initially on 9-5-1989 and it was renewed without a fresh EIA report on 6-9-2001 on the basis of a wrong inspection report furnished by one of the senior officials of the Union Ministry of Environment. The environmental clearance by the Union Ministry of Environment was renewed in September,2001  is illegal because the basis for grant of clearance is said to be the compliance of the nuclear plant authorities to the stipulations made in the original first clearance dated on 9-5-1989.  The conditions laid down under item-xiv of the 1989 clearance  insists on the on-site and off-site disaster management plan preparations as per guidelines stipulated by ICRP/AERB and approved by the National Emergency Response Committee of the Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India and these conditions were not fulfilled yet the license was renewed without conducting public enquiries and without making any EIA report, disaster management reports as per the rules of the Ministry of Environment in force at that time.

6. PLANT AUTHORITIES IGNORED COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR SAFETY:  Although the Prime Minister and Tamil Nadu Chief Minister are shouting from how stops that Kudankulam nuclear plants are absolutely safe. The Chancellor of Germany and the Prime Ministers of Japan confirmed that nuclear safety is a myth with the experiences gained from nuclear explosions at Fukushima in March, 2011 .  Moreover NPCIL, AERB and NDMA insists that they will be responsible only for public safety upto the level of on-site disaster management and that the District Collector concerned and Tamil Nadu state Government have to shoulder entire responsibility for nuclear safety for the off-site disaster management planning and execution, of course by obtaining the assistance of the nuclear plant.

7. AUTHORITIES IGNORED SAFETY CONDITIONS OF THEIR TASK FORCE:  With the harrowing experiences of Fukushima explosion the Prime Minister told Atomic establishment that they should not compromise with nuclear safety in the wake of Fukushima disaster in March 2011 and consequently NPCIL appointed experts as a Task Force to study Kudankulam plant and suggest additional actions to be taken in the light of the Fukushima disaster.  This Task Force recommended 17 additional measures for immediate implementation at Kudankulam plant.  But the AERB and NPCIL refused to implement these conditions in full on some pretext or the other before obtaining the clearance from AERB for commissioning the Kudankulam reactors.  AERB  has to submit  report for obtaining consents for different stages of the nuclear plant construction and operation including the grant of consents for different substages including the permission to start production of electricity. I am herewith enclosing a summary of salient points to be looked examined as contained in the below AERB wesbite:

http://www.aerb.gov.in/T/PUBLICATIONS/CODESGUIDES/SG-G-1.pdf

Para 2.2.5 (page-22): Consent for the fourth major stage called CONSENT FOR OPERATION is for producisng full power and this consent is granted after review of NPP's peformance.  The plant authorities have to submit safety an analysis report (Final).  The submissions are given in Appendix-5
Appendix-5 (Page120) : 
(i) Report on performance of the plant operation within the commissioning consenting period
(ii) Report on pending issues
(iii) Report on performance of fuel handling system
(iv) Report on status of documentation
(v) Submission of SAR (F)

Appendix-9 (Page-133): Definitionof subjects of SAR for various sub stages for clearance
                             (8) A: Radiation Hazard Controls
                             (9) A : Shielding
                             (13) Safety Analysis Report (Accident Analysis) authorised releases for normal operation and accidental condition and their basis
Page-136:               (16)Operating Aspects and Station organsation:
                                           Operating doucments
                                   Industrial Safety
                                   Security Plan
                                   Emergency Plan
Annexure-2 (Page 150): Application for commissioning consent
Annedure-3 (Page-153): Format  and content of Reporting Determenistic (Accident) Analysis

The above procedures have not been followed for obtaining the clearance for the commissioning of the project so far.

8. IMPROPER EMERGENCY EVACUATION PLAN AND UNSCIENTIFIC MOCK DRILLS:  The Emergency evacuation plans are prepared without considering adequate scientific data and it contains many errors which clearly show that the Kudankulam plant is bound to fail and it is converted by the Central and State Governments as a man made prescription for a disaster. There are  several serious mistakes made by the NPCIL the plant authorities, Tamil nadu state Government and the local District Collector in preparing the emergency disaster scenarios and also the emergency preparedness plans for evacuation of people likely to be effected in case of a major nuclear accident for one reason or the other.  In order to make a comparision the procedures followed in United States for the case of a nuclear plant known as Indiana Point Reactor near New York is presented below for comparative purposes.  Similar reports have to be submitted by the Tamil Nadu State Government and the District Collector, Tirunelveli to convince the public that they are seriously concerned with not only nuclear safety but also public safety.  The nuclear plant authorities have prepared very unscientific mock drills which have to be conducted before getting clearance from the AERB for starting the Nuclear power production.  This exercise is wrongly planned and executed with the result that the whole exercise is highly faulty and invalid as it cannot ensure protection of public health and Environmental safety in case of an incredible maximum accident like the one at Fukushima.

http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/indianpoint/files/NRDC-1336_Indian_Point_FSr8medium.pdf

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1114/ML11140A147.pdf

Indian Point Energy Center Emergency Plan

Appendix 5

EVACUATION PLANS

I. INTRODUCTION

Evacuation planning is based on the identification of both the population to be evacuated and the transportation resources required to accomplish the task. These are the essential data around which the Evacuation Time Estimate (ETE) is built. Because the population in the areas to be evacuated can vary with the time of day, the day of the week, the seasons and other factors, a set of fourteen time-based scenarios has been developed for use in the ETE. These scenarios, prepared for both fair and adverse weather conditions, address variations in the general population, employee population, transient population and special facilities (e.g., schools, nursing homes, hospitals, and recreation areas). The fourteen evacuation scenarios are:

Appendix 5

EVACUATION PLANS

The traffic demand and trip-generation rate of evacuating vehicles were estimated from the gathered data. Sources of data include the 2000 Census, New York agencies, county agencies, a telephone survey and special concern facilities. (See Sections 3 and 5 of the ETE for a complete discussion of generation time and traffic demand.) The permanent resident population figures for each of the shown in Table. Following federal guidelines, the IPEC Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) is subdivided into 40Protective Action Areas. The Protective Action Area definitions are provided in this appendix. The new Protective Action Areas have been designed so that each can be defined in terms of well known community names or boundaries. These Protective Action Areas are then grouped to conform with circular areas or "keyhole" configurations (circles plus radial sectors) that define Evacuation Regions for the ETE study. The Evacuation Regions are defined in Appendix A of the ETE Addendum.For each Protective Action Area within the EPZ, primary evacuation routes have been identified. Descriptions of the Protective Action Area and their associated evacuation routes are given in the county plan procedures. Listings and maps of reception centers for each Protective Action Area are also included: in the county procedures.

As part of the public education program associated with the implementation of the County Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP), the general public will be provided with materials to enable identification of their residential locations within a given Protective Action Area, thus identifying the recommended evacuation route and reception center as well.

II. EVACUATION ROADWAY TRAVEL TIME ESTIMATES

Evacuation travel time estimates by Region for each of the scenarios is presented in Appendix E of the ETE Addendum. An over view of evacuation time estimates for the Protective Action Areas included in the regions defined by the two-mile and five-mile rings. and for the full EPZ are provided in Tables 2-A, 2-B and 2-C. These tables also show a comparison of times for 50%, 90%, 95% and 100% of the Protective Action Areas population.

Illh DESCRIPTION OF THE EVACUATION PLAN

The evacuation plan comprises four major phases: mobilization, egress, maintenance and re-entry. As a Response Action, the first phase of evacuation--mobilization—may be initiated for an incident classified as an Alert, a Site Area Emergency or a General Emergency. The decision to proceed with the second phase of the plan--egress—will be made as the status of the incident is assessed. The final phases of the plan-- maintenance and re-entry-are applicable only after an evacuation has occurred.

Protective Action Areas

The plume exposure Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) for the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station (IPNPS) has been subdivided into 40 discrete Protective Action Areas as shown in Figure 1. 2000 US Census population estimates for each Protective Action Areas are shown in Table 1. The boundaries- of the various Protective Action Areas are described below:

PROTECTIVE ACTION AREA I  :  The Village of Briarcliff Manor.

PROTECTIVE ACTION AREA 2 : Central part of the Town of Clarkstown, bounded on the south by (west to east) West Clarkstown Road, a short segment of the Palisades Interstate Parkway (PIP), Church Road, Germonds Road, Parrott Road McCarthy Way, a short  segment of Strawtown Road, and Hillcrest Road; on the east by the western  edge of DeForest Lake; on the north by (east to west) Congers Road, Goebel Road northward, State Route 304, Squadron Boulevard, Main Street northward, West Phillips Hill Road, Old Phillips Hill Road, Buena Vista Road northward, and Conklin Road; and an eastern portion of the Town of Ramapo, east of the PIP and south of Conklin Road and a short section of State Route 45 connecting Conklin Road to the PIP.

PROTECTIVE ACTION AREA 3: The Town of Ramapo west of the Palisades Interstate Parkway and north of Viola and Eckerson Roads, including the Villages of Wesley Hills, New Hempstead and New Square and the Hamlet of Hillcrest.

PROTECTIVE ACTION AREA 4

Northeastern and Eastern-central parts of the Town of Clarkstown, excepting High Tor State Park, bounded on the south by Crusher and Christian Herald Roads and Nyack Beach State Park and on the west by Lake Deforest, including the Hamlets of Congers and Valley Cottage and Rockland Lake and Hook Mountain State Parks.

PROTECTIVE ACTION AREA 5

Northwestern part of the Town of Clarkstown, excepting High Tor State Park, bounded on the east by the western boundary of Lake De Forest, and on the south by (east to west) Congers Road, Goebel Road northward, State Route 304, Squadron Boulevard, Main Street northward, West Phillips Hill Road, Old Phillips Hill Road, Buena Vista Road northward, and Conklin Road; and the northeastern part of the Town of Ramapo, bounded on the west by the Palisades Interstate Parkway, and on the south by Conklin Road and a short section of State Route 45.

PROTECTIVE ACTION AREA 6 : The Town and Village of Ossining.

PROTECTIVE ACTION AREA 7: In the Town of Haverstraw, the Village of Haverstraw.

PROTECTIVE ACTION AREA 8: The Town of New Castle west of Hardscrabble Road.

PROTECTIVE ACTION AREA 9: In the Town of Haverstraw, the Village of West Haverstraw.

PROTECTIVE ACTION AREA 10: The unincorporated areas of the Town of Haverstraw including the Hamlets of  Thiells and Mount Ivy.

PROTECTIVE ACTION AREAS 11, 20 :The Town of Tuxedo east of the NYS Thruway from the Rockland County line to the Town of Woodbury town line (not in Harriman State Park). This PROTECTIVE ACTION AREAS consists of 2 discontinuous areas.

PROTECTIVE ACTION AREA 12: In the Towns of Haverstraw and Ramapo, the Village of Pomona and the unincorporated portions of the Hamlet of Pomona.

PROTECTIVE ACTION AREA 13 : Grassy Point east of the Penny Bridge, Minisceongo Yacht Club, Haverstraw Marina, Haverstraw Bay County Park, Bowline Park.

PROTECTIVE ACTION AREA 14:The Village of Croton-on-Hudson.

PROTECTIVE ACTION AREA 15: The Town of Stony Point east of Bear Mountain and Harriman State Parks, south of Tompkins Cove and west of Grassy Point.

PROTECTIVE ACTION AREA 16:The Hamlet of Verplanck.

PROTECTIVE ACTION AREA 17: Tompkins Cove zip code area.

PROTECTIVE ACTION AREA 18 :The Village of Buchanan.

PROTECTIVE ACTION AREA 19 : The Hamlet of Montrose.

PROTECTIVE ACTION AREA 20: See PROTECTIVE ACTION AREAS 11.

PROTECTIVE ACTION AREA 21 : Eastern part of Bear Mountain State Park and the Jones Point and Dunderberg areas, south of Salisbury Meadow and Ring Meadow and east of U.S. Route 9W/202, and including the non-park areas east and south of Dunderberg Mountain, north of the main southern boundary of Bear Mountain State Park.

PROTECTIVE ACTION AREA 22 :The Village of Harriman east of the NYS Thruway.

PROTECTIVE ACTION AREA 23 :The City of Peekskill.

PROTECTIVE ACTION AREA 24: The Town of Cortlandt excluding the Hamlets of Verplanck and Montrose, and the Villages of Buchanan and Croton-on-Hudson; including Camp Smith and the FDR VA Hospital.

PROTECTIVE ACTION AREA 25: The eastern part of Harriman State Park and Bear Mountain State Park, bounded on the west and north by the Palisades Interstate Parkway northbound and U.S. Route 6 to the Bear Mountain Bridge, and south of Salisbury Meadow and Ring Meadow, on the east by U.S. Route 9W/202 and the Park boundary, where the boundary is west of Route 9W/202.

PROTECTIVE ACTION AREAS 26, 30, 37 : The Town of Highlands excluding the Village of Highland Falls. This PROTECTIVE ACTION AREA consists of 3 discontinuous areas.

PROTECTIVE ACTION AREA 27 :Harriman State Park.

PROTECTIVE ACTION AREA 28 :The Town of Yorktown.

PROTECTIVE ACTION AREA 29 :The Town of Somers west of State Route 118 and Wood Street.

PROTECTIVE ACTION AREA 30 : See PROTECTIVE ACTION AREA 26.

PROTECTIVE ACTION AREA 31:The southwestern corner of the Town of Carmel; that is, the portion south of Lake Secor Road (County Route 30), and west of State Route 6N, including the area known as Secor.

PROTECTIVE ACTION AREA 32: The Village of Highland Falls.

PROTECTIVE ACTION AREA 33 : The most southern part of the Town of Philipstown; that is, south of Canopus Hollow Road; Old West Point Road east, east of US Route 9, south of State Route 403, Lower Station Road and a short line from Lower Station Road as it nears the river to the boat basin just south of Garrison. This part includes the area known as Continental Village.

PROTECTIVE ACTION AREA 34 : The Village of Woodbury east of the NYS Thruway from the Town of Tuxedo to the Town of Cornwall.

PROTECTIVE ACTION AREA 35 :The United States Military Academy.

PROTECTIVE ACTION AREA 36 :The southern portion of the Town of Putnam Valley; that is, the portion south of Clarence Fahnestock Memorial State Park and west of Sunken Mine Road,  south of Northshore Road, west of Lake Road (County Route 20), south of Tinker Hill Road, Peekskill Hollow Road, Bryant Pond Road and Lake Secor Road. This portion includes the areas known as Gilbert Corners, Sunnybrook, Oscawana Corners, Crofts Corners, Adams Corners, and Lake Peekskill.

PROTECTIVE ACTION AREA 37 :See PROTECTIVE ACTION AREA 26.

PROTECTIVE ACTION AREA 38 :The Hudson River.

PROTECTIVE.ACTION AREA 39: The Town of Cornwall from the Woodbury Town Line east of Route 32 and south of Angola Rd to Route 9W west of Route 9W to the Town of Highlands town line.

PROTECTIVE ACTION AREA 40 : The southern half of Philipstown, not including the area defined as Lower Philipstown; that is, the Village of Garrison and the Village of Nelsonville except for the portion of Hudson Highlands State Park, and the portion of Philipstown south of Moffett Road, Lane Gate Road, Old Albany Post Road, Indian Brook Road and south of Clarence Fahnestock Memorial State Park, and including the areas known as Nelson Corners, Garrison, Travis Corners, South Highland, Four Corners, and Forsonville.

 

EVACUATION PLANS (R-1: 2miles, R-2-5miles, R-3:10miles) (S = Scenario)

Summer Mid week

S-1

50

90

95

100

EPZ Boundary

Summer Midweek S-2

50

90

95

100

EPZ Boundary

Midday

R-1

1:45

3:50

4:15

5:00

5:30

R-1

1:55

4:10

4:35

5:20

5:50

R-2

2:05

4:30

5:00

5:50

6:20

R-2

2:15

4:55

5:30

6:20

7:10

R-3

2:30

5:20

6:00

7:40

7:40

R-3

2:45

5:50

6:40

8:30

8:30

Summer Weekend

S-3

Good Weather

S-4

Rain

Midday

R-1

1;35

3:10

3:30

4:30

4:50

R-1

1:45

3:25

3:45

4:50

5:10

R-2

1:55

4:00

4:30

6:30

6:50

R-2

2:05

4:20

4:50

7:00

7:20

R-3

2:15

4:50

5:30

8:30

8:30

R-3

2:30

5:20

6:00

9:10

9:10

Summer Midweek Weekend

S-5

Good Weather

Winter Midweek S-6

Good Weather (Midday)

Evening

R-1

1:15

2:40

3:00

3:50

4:20

R-1

1:55

3:55

4:20

5:10

6:40

R-2

1:40

3:25

3:50

4:30

4:50

R-2

2:05

4:30

5:00

5:50

6:30

R-3

1:55

4:10

4:50

6:30

6:30

R-3

2:30

5:20

6:10

7:40

7:40

Winter Midweek

S-7

Rain

Winter Midweek S-8

Snow   (Midday)

Midday

R-1

2:05

4:15

4:40

5:30

6:00

R-1

2:25

4:46

5:10

5:50

6:20

R-2

2:15

5:00

5:30

6:30

7:20

R-2

2:40

5:35

6:10

7:30

8:30

R-3

2:45

5:55

6:45

8:30

8:30

R-3

3:15

6:30

7:30

9:50

9:50

Winter Midweek

S-9

Good Weather

Winter Midweek S-10

Rain (Midday)

Midday

R-1

1:30

3:10

3:30

4:20

4:50

R-1

1:35

3:20

3:45

4:50

5:10

R-2

1:45

3:50

4:15

5:00

5:20

R-2

1:55

4:10

4:40

5:20

5:40

R-3

2:05

4:40

5:20

7:00

7:00

R-3

2:20

5:00

5:50

7:30

7:30

Winter Midweek

S-11

Snow

Winter Midweek S-12

Evening  (Midday

Midday

R-1

2:00

3:55

4:20

5:20

5:50

R-1

1:20

2:40

3:00

3:50

4:20

R-2

2:15

4:40

5:10

6:20

6:40

R-2

1:40

3:25

3:50

4:30

4:50

R-3

2:50

5:40

6:40

9:00

9:00

R-3

1:55

4:10

4:40

6:30

6:30

Autumn Weekend

S-13

Good Weather

S-14 Midday

Spring   (Good Weather)

Midday

R-1

1:30

R-1

3:30

4:20

4:50

R-1

1:55

3:55

4:20

5:10

5:40

R-2

2:00

R-2

5:10

7:50

8:30

R-2

2:10

4:15

4:40

5:50

6:00

R-3

2:20

R-3

5:30

8:40

8:40

R-3

2:30

5:05

5:50

7:40

7:40

9. THE COSTS OF NUCLEAR POWER UNBERABLE:  Government of Japan has proposed to spend for the present Rs.3 lakh crores to pay the compensation to the victims of the Fukushima accident.  In addition more funds have to be earmarked for decontamination of the polluted lands and decommissioning of the plants at the end of its life.  Kudankulam reactors cost Rs.14,000 crores and if an accident occurs compensation will have to be paid by the state and central Governments for about Rs. 3 lakh crores by levy penalties in the form of increased power costs on the present and future generations and thereby make both the state and central Governments run into some sort of economic bankruptcy.

As stated above Japan is going to spend upto Rs.5 lakh crores towards compensating the victims of Fukushima nuclear explosion for the present and this cost will go up in due course of time to cover decontamination of polluted houses and infrastructure in the downstream side of Fukushima Since Kudankulam reactors cost only Rs.14,000 crores it is better and cheaper to abandon the Kudankulam reactors instead of attempting to pay 20times its original cost as a penalty in the form of compensation to the victims of radioactive explosion at Kudankulam which may occur for one reason or the other and sooner than later. 

http://tshivajirao.blogspot.in/2012/05/why-kudankulam-reactors-are-killers-of.html

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13408055

10. LIKE SHOREHAM REACTOR OF USA, KUDANKULAM PLANT MUST BE CANCELLED:   Shoreham reactor was completed around New York in USA it was realized that it is not possible to implement the disaster management plan for evacuating the potential victims of an accident to be shifted to safer places within the prescribed duration of time. With the public agitations and support from the state Governor the Shoreham Nuclear plant was closed down even without producing any electricity and the costs of damage were covered from the people by increasing the rates for electricity consumption by all the customers.  Similarly Kudankulam nuclear plant must be closed down as a nuclear plant and the infrastructure can be used for electricity generation by using safer and economical fuels like natural gas oil, coal or Nyveli lignite coal from Tamil Nadu. Infact dozens of wrongly planned and wrongly built nuclear plants in USA have already been cancelled at different stages of their planning and construction.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cancelled_nuclear_plants_in_the_United_States

http://tshivajirao.blogspot.in/2012/10/wrongly-built-nuclear-plants-are-closed.html

11) INDIA LIKE U.S. IS UNPREPARED TO RESPOND TO NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS

http://thenationshealth.aphapublications.org/content/42/4/1.1.full ( Charlotte Tucker)

The Indian nation and its nuclear authorities are not at all prepared to resolve public health hazards resulting from nuclear incidents and nuclear accidents as proved by the mock drills conducted for proving the feasibility of emergency evacuation due to a nuclear accident at Kudankulam nuclear plant.  This exercise was conducted by the District Collector of Tirunelveli as per the procedures stipulated by the AERB in India .This exercise proved that Indian Nation has failed in providing nuclear safety just like USA failed in responding to nuclear incidents as proved by the website above Hence Kudankulam cannot be considered safe to protect public health and provide national security for the valuable  environmental assets of the nation.

The March 2011 explosion at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station in Japan left many Americans wondering how the U.S. response would fare in the event of a nuclear catastrophe. The answer, according to a recent report, is not well.

“Japan was not prepared for a meltdown,” said Ira Helfand, MD, North American vice president of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and past president of Physicians for Social Responsibility, which released the March 6 report. “The U.S. remains dangerously unprepared.” 

12) IF HUMAN FAILURES CAUSED REACTOR ACCIDENTS IN JAPAN CAN INDIANS PREVENT THEM AT KUDANKULAM NUCLEAR REACTORS?

	Plant Status of Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station (as of 2:00am March 13th)    http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11031302-e.html There is no update from the release issued at 1:00 am Unit 1 (shut down at 2:48pm on March 11th) - Reactor is shut down and reactor water level is stable. - Offsite power is available. - At 8:19am, there was an alarm indicating that one of the control rods was not properly inserted, however, at 10:43am the alarm was spontaneously called off. Other control rods has been confirmed that they are fully inserted (reactor is in subcritical status) - Status of main steam isolation valve: closed - Injection of water into the reactor is done by Make-up Water Condensate System. - At 6:08pm, we announced the increase in reactor containment vessel pressure, assumed to be due to leakage of reactor coolant. However, we do not believe there is leakage of reactor coolant in the containment vessel at this moment. - At 5:22am, the temperature of the suppression chamber exceeded 100 degrees. As the reactor pressure suppression function was lost, at 5:22am, it was determined that a specific incident stipulated in article 15, clause 1 has occurred. - We decided to prepare implementing measures to reduce the pressure of the reactor containment vessel (partial discharge of air containing radioactive materials) in order to fully secure safety. This preparation work started at around 9:43am and finished at 6:00pm. - Restoration work in reactor cooling function is in progress to achieve reactor cold shutdown. Unit 2 (shut down at 2:48pm on March 11th) - Reactor is shut down and reactor water level is stable. - Offsite power is available. - Control rods are fully inserted (reactor is in subcritical status) - Status of main steam isolation valve: closed - Injection of water into the reactor is done by Make-up Water Condensate System. - We do not believe there is leakage of reactor coolant in the containment vessel. - At 5:32am, the temperature of the suppression chamber exceeded 100 degrees. As the reactor pressure suppression function was lost, at 5:32am, it was determined that a specific incident stipulated in article 15, clause 1 has occurred. - We decided to prepare implementing measures to reduce the pressure of the reactor containment vessel (partial discharge of air containing radioactive materials) in order to fully secure safety. This preparation work started at around 10:33am and finished at 10:58pm. - Restoration work in reactor cooling function is in progress to achieve reactor cold shutdown. Unit 3 (shut down at 2:48pm on March 11th) - Reactor is shut down and reactor water level is stable. - Offsite power is available. - Control rods are fully inserted (reactor is in subcritical status) - Status of main steam isolation valve: closed - We do not believe there is leakage of reactor coolant in the containment vessel. - We decided to prepare implementing measures to reduce the pressure of the reactor containment vessel (partial discharge of air containing radioactive materials) in order to fully secure safety. The preparation woke started at around 12:08pm and finished at 12:13pm. - Reactor cold shutdown at 12:15pm Unit 4 (shut down at 2:48pm on March 11th) - Reactor is shut down and reactor water level is stable. - Offsite power is available. - Control rods are fully inserted (reactor is in subcritical status) - Status of main steam isolation valve: closed - Injection of water into the reactor is done by Make-up Water Condensate System. - We do not believe there is leakage of reactor coolant in the containment vessel. - In order to cool down the reactor, injection of water into the reactor had been done by the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System, however, At 6:07am, the temperature of the suppression chamber exceeded 100 degrees. As the reactor pressure suppression function was lost, at 6:07am, it was determined that a specific incident stipulated in article 15, clause 1 has occurred. - We decided to prepare implementing measures to reduce the pressure of the reactor containment vessel (partial discharge of air containing radioactive materials) in order to fully secure safety. The preparation woke started at around 11:44am and finished at around 11:52am. - Restoration work in reactor cooling function is in progress to achieve reactor cold shutdown. Indication from monitoring posts installed at the site boundary did not show any difference from ordinary level. No radiation impact to the external environment has been confirmed. We will continue to monitor in detail the possibility of radioactive material being discharged from exhaust stack or discharge canal.