HIGH COURT ON KUDANKULAM

HIGH COURT ON KUDANKULAM:OBSERVATIONS 

BY

Prof.T.Shivaji Rao

Director, Center for Environmental Studies, GITAM University, Visakhapatnam

http://www.aerb.gov.in/T/PUBLICATIONS/CODESGUIDES/sg-s-1.pdf 
(Air Pollution dispersion modelling for nuclear plants by AERB)
http://www.npcil.nic.in/pdf/news_28sep2011_02.pdf
(Para-5, 6 & page 17  for ESL data upto16km and upto 30km from reactor, NPCIL)  

1.       The importance and essentiality of some of the 17 conditions are explained below.

1)                  The 1st recommendation for an alternate back-up provision is required firstly for charging the water to the secondary side of the steam generators, secondly to provide for make up of borated water to the spent fuel pools and thirdly to inject borated water in the reactor coolant system for strengthening the safety systems.  AERB should not down play this crucial recommendation virtually as a 6^th finger. Infact, NPCIL proposed on 27-3-2012 to construct a water storage tank of 8000 cu.m capacity to tackle this problem and it should have been allowed to complete this work within 6 months i.e. by 27-9-2012 or atleast by now it should have been completed.  But several committees were appointed to take a final decision that resulted an undue delay and naturally the AERB must also make a corresponding delay in permitting the initial fuel loading which should not be allowed without the  implementation of the full scale safety provisions.

2)                  The 2nd recommendation pertains to increasing the emergency water storage facility for the purpose of core decay heat removal during a period of at least one week.  This is also very crucial safety measure as a second line of defense.  It is surprising that AERB justifies the existing water storage both for reactor cooling and also spent fuel and such storage is available only for a limited duration and AERB further certifies that the existing water availability for the limited duration is sufficient enough to make alternate arrangement to bring another source of water from outside the nuclear plant site.  They have never specified the exact number of days that constitute the limited period.  Further they are not sure  of the exact external sources that are available for bringing the required water for the emergency purpose of cooling the reactor and also the spent fuel pools.  The experience at Fukushima reactor proved that the inadequacy of cooling water  had caused the havoc.  Hence additional water storage amounting to one week’s requirement is a must to augment safety measures.

3)                  The 3^rd recommendation deals with mobile self powered pumping equipment for emergency use.  AERB should not underplay the urgent need to provide this mobile pumping equipment for emergency use by stating that the fire tenders presently available can be used for the purpose and that this equipment will be made available as a long term measure.  Inspite of the fact a nuclear plant at Japan recently faced an accident due to break down of sources of external electrical supply consequent to the high winds of a cyclone have damaged the power supply systems.  Hence this additional measure must be immediately installed before grant of license for the plant.

4)                  Regarding the 4^th recommendation pertaining to the facilities for  monitoring safety parameters using portable power packs, AERB should have permitted NPCIL to complete this work by October, 2012 and it should not be classified as a long term measure.

Regarding the finalization of emergency operating procedures for conditions arising  beyond the design basis accidents AERB should not have merely stated that KKNPP is provided with beyond design based accidents management and that emergency operating procedures have been prepared  and finalized. AERB further states that these procedures are for handling situations within the plant and  are not related to any off-site emergency  for which separately approved emergency plans are already in place.  It must be remembered that the Fukushima  accident has shown to the world that they failed in finalization of emergency operating  procedures for beyond design based accident conditions because  they initially  fixed a distance of only 20km. for the  emergency planning zone for evacuating the victims and it was subsequently increased to 30km. and later on upto 40km for sheltering the victims of the nuclear accident.  Hence this recommendation made by the Task Force committee should not be misinterpreted to downgrade nuclear safety and thereby compromise with public safety .

a)      The view of AERB that the approved off-site emergency plans already in place will provide public safety is completely wrong because AERB provided for an emergency planning zone extending upto 16km from the reactor location while the standards prescribed by IAEA specified the EPZ upto 50 to 100km and the NDMA of India insists that nuclear plants in India shall adopt these international standards to ensure safety.

b)       Hence AERB and NPCIL should not play with the lives of the people by promoting Nuclear plants which not only slowly ruin public health, fisheries wealth, agriculture and the national economy.  Infact Japan is planning to pay compensation amounting to about Rs.4 lakh crores to the victims Fukushima Nuclear Plant disaster for the present.  If Kudankulam nuclear reactor is subjected to a similar accident due to external threats like terrorist, bombing of the reactor by aeroplanes as was done by the terrorists on 9/11 September, 2001 indestroying a very huge structure like the world Trade Center in New York the destruction of nuclear reactors at Kudankulam is equally, if not more, likely.  Even the cyclones can disrupt the power systems with the result that the recent hurricane that hit New Jersey during November, 2012 has resulted in closing of several nuclear plants in USA.

c)        Since the present cost of KKNPP is only Rs.14,000crores and its damaging cost due to an accident will be about Rs.4 lakh crores.  It will be much cheaper and safer to abandon this KKNPP or otherwise convert the reactors to produce electricity by using alternate fuels like oil, coal and natural gas which are readily available in India and particularly since lignite is available in Tamil Nadu

5)          With regard to 5^th recommendation it deals with finalisation of Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) for beyond design basis accidents. NPCIL  replied that EOP for some post irradiation examinations (PIE) have been made and the remaining are in progress as a short term measure.  This is not correct.  Emergency preparedness plans under fifth level of nuclear safety under the defense indepth philosophy essentially requires the nuclear accident classification under the 7 grades of nuclear accidents and incidents and the relevant  source factors are accidental radioactive emissions from the chimney stack of the reactors must be used to predict ground level concentrations for taking up evacuations of people likely to be victimized and also other people who have to be sheltered and more distant people who must be administered potassium iodine tablets to protect their health.  This emergency drills which have to be conducted once before  starting production of electricity must be done before sanctioning clearance for the commencement of operations.

6)           The 6^th recommendation pertaining to assessment of the primary containment for ultimate load bearing capacity must be confirmed because the task force committee consisting of several nuclear safety experts made this strong recommendation only after realizing that there is an existing deficiency in the matter.

7)           The 7^th recommendation that the doors and barrels of airlocks have to be qualified for proof test pressure cannot be considered to have been completed by the NPCIL by merely stating that the qualification of barrel and other door of tapped anchor location has been carried out by merely the design  analysis and hence meets the requirement.  The suggestion made by the task force is very important and hence must be carried out immediately before sanctioning license for operation of the nuclear reactors.

8)         The  8^th recommendation for ensuring that the highly active water used for cooling the core catcher vessel under beyond the design basis accident shall be  contained inside the primary containment cannot be brushed aside by the NPCIL and the AERB by providing a casual statement that the required analysis is being carried out on a long-term basis.  It virtually means that the AERB and the NPCIL are indirectly promoting conditions for  easy triggering of accidents.

9)         With regard to the 9^th recommendation that demands reconfirmation of design adequacy of hydrogen management system the NPCIL without applying its mind for implementing suggested action it is simply stating that the conditions complied with by mentioning  that the design adequacy of hydrogen management system has been reviewed and all the aspects are addressed.

10)       With regard to the 10^th recommendation on the Environmental qualification of core catcher temperature monitoring system the NPCIL is stating that this requirement has been complied with as the instrumentation for the core catcher monitoring has been qualified without giving the details of how the system will work efficiently to promote environmental safety even during severe accidental conditions.

11)       The 11^th recommendation pertaining to adequacy of design provision for remote water addition to the core catcher the NPCIL replies that this recommendation is complied with by stating water addition provision through hook up point already exists and that it is adequate.  This attitude of the NPCIL that the actions already taken by them for remote water addition to the core catcher  is sufficient must be considered in the  light of the fact that the task force committee experts have examined  the issue in depth and found inadequacy conditions that interfere with absolute safety of the nuclear plant and hence they must take positive action.

12)       with regard to the 12^th recommendation that calls for adequacy of instrumentation for monitoring plant status during  a beyond the design basis accident the NPCIL  casually states that all important parameters of the plant during  the major accident will be monitored and that provisions to extend power supply to these instruments will be implemented in stages a long term measure.  This delayed action fails to provide immediate measures needed to monitor the fluctuations in performance of various instruments and equipment  that need to be controlled in time by integrating the crucial feedback from various components of the instruments and parts of the equipment that are used for preventing, controlling and management of failures that trigger nuclear accidents.  Hence  immediate action must be taken to review the adequacy of instruments for monitoring the plant status during the design basis accident.

13)       With regard to 13^th recommendation demanding that the details of margin available on the location of various safety related  structures, systems and components like the various kinds of back -up power generators above design basis flood level should be reviewed again, the NPCIL has blindly replied that this requirement is complied with because the margins have been reviewed and found adequate by different set of experts who are not at all superior to the experts of the task force and another set of experts who reviewed the report and thereby made NPCIL filed an affidavit before the court promising that all the 17 recommendations will be fully implemented by October-November, 2012.

14)       With regard to the 14^th recommendation emphasizing the need for design provision that has been deleted must be reexamined the NPCIL without  any serious application of mind blindly affirmed that this provision is complied with just because the existing design and procedures of the nuclear plant avoid the containment over-pressurisation by having long-term decay heat removal system without knowing that this system will fail for one reason or the other due to a beyond design basis accident.  Hence the containment venting provision that has been removed must be reinstalled  after thorough reexamination.

15)       With regard to the 15^th recommendation that the back-up sources for water injunction to steam generators secondary side should be seismically qualified the NPCIL submitted that a seismically qualified water storage tank of 8000cu.m  capacity will cater to this requirement as a short-term measure but this measure could have been implemented within 6 months and before October-November, 2012 and also before grant of clearance by AERB for operation of the reactors.

16)       With regard to the 16^th recommendation demands that the provisions for addition of water to core catcher required a detailed study for ensuring  that there is no possibility of any stream explosion.  But the NPCIL reports compliance with this  demand on the plea that the existing  design and procedures of nuclear plant prevent possibility of steam explosion.  But this unscientific reply cannot be accepted to ensure nuclear safety and public safety and it should be studied  indepth and remedial action must be taken before grant of clearance for operation of the reactors.

17)       With regard to the 17^th recommendation demands that provision of additional back-up power supply sources for performing essential safety functions l9ke air cooled diesel generators located at a high elevation should be considered.  But this crucial recommendation is not seriously taken by the NPCIL for ensuring  safety of the nuclear plant and the public by stating casually that the provision of a mobile diesel generator will be made for performing essential functions as a long-term measure.  This recommendation is based upon the serial serial failure of several diesel generators except the one air cooled reactor over  a small mould located at an elevation near Fukushima 6^th reactor at Fukushima which provided the back up system that proved successful even during the period of the Fukushima disaster.  Hence AERB and NPCIL shall not take these recommendations of the expert committee casually but should get them implemented fully before granting permission for starting the operations at the nuclear reactors of Kudankulam.

The affidavit filed by AERB that it satisfied itself that the said recommendations will be duly complied with cannot taken for a granted to ensure safety because the promise made cannot be true  unless it is fulfilled by taking the practical step of implementing measures immediately before the reactors are permitted to become operational. That the AERB as satisfied itself that NPCIL has taken all the necessary steps to comply with all the said recommendations made by the Task Force and the high level committee cannot be valid unless all the recommendations implemented in toto  as accepted by the NPCIL for executing the practical implementation of those measures before October-November, 2012.  Otherwise the promise becomes a pie in the sky as a catastrophic accident can occur within a short-time and the obstacles placed in the path of implementing the recommendations becomes major cause of a nuclear catastrophy like the one at Fukushima.

14)       PERMISSIONS GIVEN TO KUDANKULAM NUCLEAR PLANT ARE BASED ON WRONG INFORMATION

(From Madras High  Court Judgement on Kudankulam):

108. By taking note of the overall situation explained in detail, we are of the view that the KKNPP in respect of Units 1 and 2 do not suffer from any infirmities either for want of any clearance from any of the authorities, including the MoEF, AERB, TNPCB, and the Department of Atomic Energy, and there is absolutely no impediment for the NPCIL to proceed with the project

15)       TNPCB IN ITS AFFIDAVIT  BEFORE MADRAS HIGH COURT BLINDLY ACCEPTED NPCIL PLEADINGS:
18.4. It is stated that the Emergency Preparedness Manual has been approved by the AERB and reported in the compliance report dated 7.6.2012 and the NPCIL has also conducted a mock drill to assess the emergency preparedness, but the TNPCB is not a member in the Emergency Preparedness Manual.

16)       AFFIDAVIT FILED BY DISTRICT COLLECTOR STATES THAT STATE GOVERNMENT DECIDED ON THE PLANT:

19.1. In the counter affidavit filed by the District Collector, Tirunelveli, it is stated that action has to be taken against the protestors sensitively, since they are using children, ladies and common public as a shield.  It is stated that the Tamil Nadu State Cabinet on 19.3.2012 has decided to take immediate action on commissioning of KKNPP and has requested all people to cooperate with the decision of the Government. 

17)       ADVOCATE FOR PETITIONER OBJECTED TO CLEARING THE REACTORS WITHOUT ESTABLISHING FEASIBILITY OF EVACUATION UPTO 16KM FROM THE PLANT IN CASE OF AN ACCIDENT:

20.12. While it is the admitted case of the respondents that the recommendations of the AERB High Level Committee for review of safety of Indian power plants in the light of the Fukushima accident is being carried out by the NPCIL in a time bound manner, it is his submission  that till such compliance is made, actual fuel loading of KKNPP cannot be done and that also requires a fresh environmental clearance.

21.7. With regard to the stand of the TNPCB that two volumes of on-site and off-site preparedness plans are shown during inspection approved by AERB  and that the mock drill has been conducted to assess the emergency preparedness, it is the contention of the learned Senior Counsel that mock drill was done in a small hamlet called Nakkaneri, while the Comprehensive Environment Impact Assessment of KKNPP specifically states that the emergency preparedness operations have to be done in the monitoring zone, which is within 30 Kms. radius from the Power Plant.

 It is stated that the very condition is to create awareness among the people and, therefore, the conducting of a mock drill only in Nakkaneri is not inaccordance with the requirements.  Insofar as it relates to the off-site emergency preparedness, the District Collector must do the act as a continuing process.    He would also refer to another special condition which contemplates the regular training drills for personnel, and would submit that the TNPCB has merely chosen to state that the unit has training programmes and no records have been produced to show that actually they conducted the training

18)        NPCIL COUNSEL MISINFORMS HIGH COURT THAT PERMITS WERE GIVEN AS PER LAW:

25.1. Mr.Krishna Srinivasan, learned counsel  appearing for the NPCIL would submit that the plant has got approval from all regulatory bodies up to the present stage in which fuel loading has been started and other requirements have been scrupulously complied with.  It is his submission that the Four Expert Committees have considered the Post Fukushima accident and found that there is no possibility for any nuclear risk either in Kalpakkam or in Kudankulam and moreover, even in the year 2004 when tsunami occurred, the Kalpakkam project has not been affected.    He further submitted that the experts from AERB, Committees appointed by the Central Government and the Committees appointed by the State Government, who are all eminent persons in the field of science and technology after visiting the plant and meeting the people have given reports to the effect the KKNPP is a safe project.  He would submit that experts views have been obtained on many occasions and emergency preparedness and mock drill has been done in accordance with law.   

19)         TAMIL NADU ADVOCATE MISLEADS COURT THAT MOCK DRILL WAS DONE AS PER LAW:

 27.1. Mr.Inbadurai, learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the State Government while producing the sealed cover report of the Expert Committee  appointed by the Government of Tamil Nadu has forwarded the report dated 27.2.2012.  He would submit that in fact as per the AERB Guidelines, mock drill was conducted and emergency preparedness plan was made in Nakkaneri Village, which is near the project itself.   According to him, off-site emergency drill has been done in the manner known to law and the authorities have been educated properly so that in the event of any eventuality they will guide the people in a proper manner.

20)       The environmental clearance for the Kudankulam reactors obtained from the Union Ministry of Environment and forests is based on insufficient technical data and false information. 

a) for instance the National Environmental Engineering Research Institute (NEERI) prepared an Environmental Impact Assessment report for Kudankulam Nuclear reactors 1 &2  submitted to the NPCIL in January, 2003.  This report is entitled as a comprehensive EIA report of Nuclear Power Plant (Units 1&2) Kudnakulam.  Since the report was prepared in January 2003 it must have to taken into consideration the environmental regulations to be followed for the EIA report based on the rules of the environmental protection Act, 1986.  This report has not taken into consideration the scientific data to be provided under the items 11, 12 and 13 of the questionnaire under schedule-II of the application to be sent to the Union Ministry of Environment for obtaining the environmental clearance for the project.  These items pertain to preparation of the risk analysis report, disaster management report, environmental impact assessment report and the environmental management reports.  For the Environmental Impact Assessment report NEERI has furnished under Chapter-III – Prediction of Impacts the procedures followed for air pollution models used to predict ground level concentrations of radioactive pollutants discharge from the chimney stacks of the reactors for the summer, winter and post monsoon seasons and  the figures 3.1.1 upto 3.1.9 present the graphics of the  isodoses of radioactivity due to the nuclear plant for about 20 km from the plant and table 3.1.1 presents the radioactive pollutants released from the stacks of the reactors into the environment.  Although NEERI has the necessary software and also the experts to prepare similar ground level concentrations of radioactive pollutants due to radioactive releases from the chimney stacks during a major credible nuclear accident and thus NEERI could have predicted the radioactivity deposits for 30km from the nuclear plant to identify the levels of radioactivity that will slowly poison public health, soils, agriculture fields and the human and animal populations.  Such predictions could have been used to identify the areas to be provided with safety measures for evacuation of the victims of radioactive pollution and also to shelter lakhs of people exposed to high radioactivity and many others whose health could be protected by distributing potassium iodine tablets even beyond the distance of 30km if the exposure dose of radioactivity is going to be in excess of the stipulated standards as per ICRP and AERB guidelines. 

b) unfortunately the Union Ministry of Environment and Forests did not take into consideration these crucial factors in granting Environmental clearance for the nuclear plants at Kudankulam.  If Environemtnal clearance is given by the Union Ministry on the basis of inadequacy of data and false data the environmental clearances so far given can be cancelled.

c) As already pointed out the Environmental clearance revalidated in September,2001 is based on  false information and hence that clearance for nuclear reactors 1 and 2 at Kudankulam must be treated as illegal and hence invalid. Hence fresh environmental clearance must be given for the project.

 

CLASSIFICATION OF NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS INTO 7 GRADES (0-3 INCIDENTS)

http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/ines.pdf

Accident Grade	People and Environment	Radiological Barriers and Control	Examples
Major Accident Level 7	•Major release of radioactivity of I-131 (50,000TBq)-  widespread health effects -- planned extended countermeasures.	Sheltering and Evacuation essential	Chernobyl, 1986 — Large health effects.
Serious accident Level 6	• Significant release of radioactivity of I-131 (5000 TBq) -- planned counter measures.	Sheltering and evacuation necessary Few tens  or more individuals affected	Kyshtym, Russia, 1957- waste tank
Accident -Wider Consequences Level 5	• Limited release of radioactivity of I-131 (500 TBq) -- some planned countermeasures. -- Many deaths possible by radiation	• Severe damage to reactor core. • Release of large quantities of Radioactivity            --   probable public exposure. --probable major criticality accident or fire. 100 or more affected due to exposure ten times permissible limit for workers	Three Mile Island, USA, 1979 — Severe damage to the reactor core.
Accident- Local Consequences Level 4	• Minor release of radioactivity  of I-131 (about 100TBq)  --possible  countermeasures other than local food controls. • At least one death from radiation	10 or more workers affected	Saint Laurent - 1980  no release outside the site (small melt)
Serious Incident Level 3	• Workers exposure - 10 times the limit • Non-lethal deterministic health effect (e.g., burns) from radiation.	• Exposure over 1 Sv/h in an operating area. • Severe contamination,not expected by design,   -- low probability of significant Public exposure. Less than 10 workers affected	Vandellos, 1989 – fire accident impacted safety
Incident Level 2	• Exposure of public over  10 mSv. • Exposure of a worker in excess of the statutory annual limits.	• Radiation levels in an operating area of more than 50 mSv/h. • High pollution in area, unexpected by design Less than 10 workers affected	Cadarache, 1993 — contamination to unexpected area.
Anomaly Level 1		1 or more workers affected	Breach of operating limits at a nuclear facility.

CONTRADICTIONS ON DISASTER MANAGEMENT FOR KKNPP

1)   For the purpose of planning for serious accidents, if any, an area of 16 km around the plant is considered as the Emergency Planning Zone. The AERB Code of Practice on Safety in Nuclear Power Plant Siting states: During emergency, availability of transportation network means of communication, etc. which are of significance during emergency condition shall be checked. A radial distance of 16 km from the plant may be considered for this purpose.

2)  Radiation in the Surrounding Area

Utmost attention is given to safety of the environment and the public in all aspects of nuclear power from siting, design, construction, commissioning, and operation and up to decommissioning. The entire effort is to ensure that release of any radioactivity or radiation in the public domain affecting the public and the environment is minimized to be well within the prescribed regulatory limits. A principle of “As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA)” is adopted in this regard. The radiation dose from nuclear power plants in operation in India has been found to be a negligible fraction of the naturally existing background radiation. The details are:

An Environmental Survey Laboratory (ESL) is set up at the site before the start of operation of the reactors, which collects data of several environmental matrices like air, water, soil, vegetation, crops, fish, meat, etc. It establishes a baseline. Subsequent to start of operation of the station, the ESL monitors the environmental matrices even beyond emergency planning zone of 16 km (usually up to 30 km of the site) for radioactivity (elements like Iodine-131/133 Strontium-90 etc) and radiation levels. The experience over the last 40 years has been that at such distances no significant increase in radiation levels above the baseline data is found at Indian nuclear power plant sites.

http://www.npcil.nic.in/pdf/news_28sep2011_02.pdf

3)    AERB ADOPTS STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR NPP FOLLOWED BY IAEA

Detailed technical safety requirement developed by AERB including those for siting and design  of  NPPs  are  published  in  the  safety  Codes  and  Guides,  which  are  available  n AERB website (www.aerb.gov.in). These requirements are in line with safety standards of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other international guidelines. 

http://www.aerb.gov.in/T/documents/regprocess.pdf

4)    AERB FORMED HIGH LEVEL COMMITTEE TO REVIEW SAFETY OF NPP WITH RESTRICTED TERMS

Annexure­2  MEASURES TAKEN POST FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT IN JAPAN

Post  the  Fukushima  Nuclear  Accident  in  Japan,  AERB  has  taken  several  proactive  measures, which are as follows: 

• A  High  Level  Committee  under  the  Chairmanship  of  Shri  S.  K.  Sharma,  Former Chairman,  AERB    and  consisting  of  experts  from  Central  Water  and  Power  Research Station,  Indian  Institute of Tropical Meteorology &IIT (Madras) apart  from BARC, NPCIL & AERB was constituted to review safety of Indian NPPs in the 

light of the lessons from Fukushima. The Committee shall assess the 

– The  capability  of  Indian Nuclear  Power  Plants  to withstand  earthquakes  and other external events such as tsunamis, cyclones, floods, etc. 

– Adequacy  of provisions available  to ensure safety in case of such events,  both within and beyond design basis. 

The Committee has started functioning and has formed several working groups. 

• An  inhouse  Monitoring  Cell  has  been  constituted  to  continuously  follow  the  events  at  Fukushima  and  to  keep  a  close  vigil  on  the  radiation/contamination  levels in Japan and India. 

• Daily updates on AERB website  

– on  radiation  levels  recorded  by  Indian  Environmental  Radiation  Monitoring  Network  (IERMON)  for  9  locations  encompassing  whole  of  India  

– report of the monitoring cell 

• Press releases issued 

– March  15,  2011  (assurance  that all  the  reactors in  India are  designed  to  withstand  the  earthquake  and  tsunami  of  specific  magnitude  based  on  conservative  criteria  and  programme  to  carry  out  comprehensive  reassessment  of  safety  and  emergency mitigation measures  at  all  Indian 

NPPs) 

March 17, 2011 (information that there is no radiological impact in India from Fukushima incident as of now)

   – March 28, 2011 ( on action taken by AERB post Fukushima incident). 

– April 12, 2011 ( on revision of INES rating of Fukushima Nuclear Accident) 

• AERB  has  also  informed  to  the  Food  Safety  and  Standards  Authority  of  India (FSSAI)  that  currently  there  are  three  laboratories  in  India  which  have  been identified  for  testing  of  food  items  for  contamination.  AERB  representative  attended the Meeting organized by  FSSAI for taking a decision related to import  of Food items from Japan 

• With respect to screening of passengers coming from Japan, AERB has informed  

National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) that at present there is no such 

requirement.   

• Statements  and  responses  by  Chairman,  Vice  Chairman  and  Secretary,  AERB  to 

the  queries  from  Journalists,  Electronic  Media,  All  India  Radio  with  respect  to 

safety of Indian Nuclear Power Plants as well as effect of Japan incident on India.

5)    AERB HAS EQUAL OR SUPERIOR STANDARDS FOR EMISSIONS THAN PRESCRIBED BY IAEA                   (From Madras High  Court Judgement on Kudankulam):

(ix) AERB has prescribed limits for discharges and ensures that the radiation releases are well within the prescribed limits. The limits prescribed are based on international recommendations, and in all cases are either equal to or more stringent than these.

6)    PERMISSIONS GIVEN TO KUDANKULAM NUCLEAR PLANT ARE BASED ON WRONG INFORMATION

(From Madras High  Court Judgement on Kudankulam):

108. By taking note of the overall situation explained in detail, we are of the view that the KKNPP in respect of Units 1 and 2 do not suffer from any infirmities either for want of any clearance from any of the authorities, including the MoEF, AERB, TNPCB, and the Department of Atomic Energy, and there is absolutely no impediment for the NPCIL to proceed with the project

7)   MADRAS HIGH COURT WAS INFORMED THAT AERB DIRECTIONS WERE FOLLOWED:

17.9.2. While reiterating that the plant is most advanced one called Generation III Plus Plant, the various advanced features of the plant, as stated by the Union of India and AERB, have been emphasized.  It is also stated that even in case of severe accident, there is no need for evacuation of persons or public who may be living beyond the plant boundary, but still as a next level of defense, an emergency evacuation plan exists for evacuating the public, which is planned as per the requirement of the AERB, and as per the direction of AERB, effective mock drills at regular frequency are being arranged.

17.11.  In respect of the next issue of Emergency Preparedness Plan (EPP) and lack of resources to implement it, it is stated that the AERB can always direct and instruct the KKNPP Unit to fulfill the requirement of emergency preparedness plan, in which event the unit is legally bound to fulfill the said requirements.

17.14. In effect, the counter affidavit of the NPCIL would reiterate that all safety measures have been taken and there is absolutely no reason to apprehend any fear about the safety or otherwise.

8) TNPCB IN ITS AFFIDAVIT  BEFORE MADRAS HIGH COURT BLINDLY ACCEPTED NPCIL REMARKS:
18.3. It is stated that once again the officials of the TNPCB have inspected the KKNPP on 12.6.2012 and it was observed that the unit has furnished the compliance of the conditions appended to the consent for establishment and it was verified that the NPCIL has complied with all requirements, as stipulated in the general and special conditions and, therefore, it is stated that the allegation made by the petitioner that some of the conditions imposed by the TNPCB have not been complied with, is incorrect.   It is added that the information stated to have been obtained by the petitioner under the Right to Information Act is outdated and NPCIL has updated the latest compliance vide their letter dated 7.6.2012, which indicates that all the conditions have been complied with.

18.4. It is stated that the Emergency Preparedness Manual has been approved by the AERB and reported in the compliance report dated 7.6.2012 and the NPCIL has also conducted a mock drill to assess the emergency preparedness, but the TNPCB is not a member in the Emergency Preparedness Manual.

18.7. Insofar as it relates to the retaining of temperature of cooling water at the point of confluence in the sea as not exceeding 7oC as prescribed by the MoEF, it is stated that the TNPCB will take a decision at the time of issuing the consent to operate

9)    AFFIDAVIT FILED BY DISTRICT COLLECTOR STATES THAT STATE GOVERNMENT DECIDED ON THE PLANT:

19.1. In the counter affidavit filed by the District Collector, Tirunelveli, it is stated that action has to be taken against the protestors sensitively, since they are using children, ladies and common public as a shield.  It is stated that the Tamil Nadu State Cabinet on 19.3.2012 has decided to take immediate action on commissioning of KKNPP and has requested all people to cooperate with the decision of the Government.  However, the People's Movement against Nuclear Energy (PMANE) continued their unpermitted fast against the Government's decision at Idinthakarai seashore.  It is stated that road blockades were done by the protestors opposing the KKNPP and buses were stopped and ultimately on 19.3.201, normalcy has been restored to some extent.

19.4. It is stated that on 9.6.2012, the Shift Charge Engineer declared a plant emergency and subsequently, the Site Director reached the plant, declared start of site emergency exercise; alert messages were sent to all the relevant officials, including the NPCIL, DAE, AERB, District Collector and the Line Department officials; and based on inputs from Environmental Survey Lab Team, the District Collector declared an Off-Site Emergencyand exercise of counter measures were carried out in three stages, as prescribed in the Emergency Plan. It is stated that Nakkanery Village, which is situated at a distance of about 7 Kms. From KKNPP, was selected as locally affected area for the purpose of the said exercise and the exercise was observed by the representatives from AERB, NPCIL Head Quarters and other officials of the NPCIL.    It is also stated that all villages within 16 Kms. radius  will be covered under this exercise as one village in every two years.

10)   ADVOCATE FOR PETITIONER OBJECTED TO CLEARING THE REACTORS WITHOUT ESTABLISHING FEASIBILITY OF EVACUATION UPTO 16KM FROM THE PLANT IN CASE OF AN ACCIDENT:

20.12. While it is the admitted case of the respondents that the recommendations of the AERB High Level Committee for review of safety of Indian power plants in the light of the Fukushima accident is being carried out by the NPCIL in a time bound manner, it is his submission  that till such compliance is made, actual fuel loading of KKNPP cannot be done and that also requires a fresh environmental clearance.

21.7. With regard to the stand of the TNPCB that two volumes of on-site and off-site preparedness plans are shown during inspection approved by AERB  and that the mock drill has been conducted to assess the emergency preparedness, it is the contention of the learned Senior Counsel that mock drill was done in a small hamlet called Nakkaneri, while the Comprehensive Environment Impact Assessment of KKNPP specifically states that the emergency preparedness operations have to be done in the monitoring zone, which is within 30 Kms. radius from the Power Plant.

 It is stated that the very condition is to create awareness among the people and, therefore, the conducting of a mock drill only in Nakkaneri is not inaccordance with the requirements.  Insofar as it relates to the off-site emergency preparedness, the District Collector must do the act as a continuing process.    He would also refer to another special condition which contemplates the regular training drills for personnel, and would submit that the TNPCB has merely chosen to state that the unit has training programmes and no records have been produced to show that actually they conducted the training

11)  NPCIL COUNSEL MISINFORMS HIGH COURT THAT PERMITS WERE GIVEN AS PER LAW:

25.1. Mr.Krishna Srinivasan, learned counsel  appearing for the NPCIL would submit that the plant has got approval from all regulatory bodies up to the present stage in which fuel loading has been started and other requirements have been scrupulously complied with.  It is his submission that the Four Expert Committees have considered the Post Fukushima accident and found that there is no possibility for any nuclear risk either in Kalpakkam or in Kudankulam and moreover, even in the year 2004 when tsunami occurred, the Kalpakkam project has not been affected.    He further submitted that the experts from AERB, Committees appointed by the Central Government and the Committees appointed by the State Government, who are all eminent persons in the field of science and technology after visiting the plant and meeting the people have given reports to the effect the KKNPP is a safe project.  He would submit that experts views have been obtained on many occasions and emergency preparedness and mock drill has been done in accordance with law.   

12)   AERB ADVOCATE SURESH STATES THAT PERMISSION WILL BE GIVEN TO REACTORS ONLY AFTER FULFILLING IMPLEMENTATION OF ADDITIONAL SAFETY FEATURES AS SUGGESTED BY EXPERT COMMITTEES:

26.2. He would rely upon the various reports of the Experts Committee of AERB and state that before initial fuel loading is done, the compliance of all the requirements under Annexure VIII will be ensured by the AERB and it is only after its satisfaction any direction will be given and now it is brought to the notice of this Court after having been satisfied, the AERB has given its report giving clearance

13)  TAMIL NADU ADVOCATE MISLEADS COURT THAT MOCK DRILL WAS DONE AS PER LAW:

 27.1. Mr.Inbadurai, learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the State Government while producing the sealed cover report of the Expert Committee  appointed by the Government of Tamil Nadu has forwarded the report dated 27.2.2012.  He would submit that in fact as per the AERB Guidelines, mock drill was conducted and emergency preparedness plan was made in Nakkaneri Village, which is near the project itself.   According to him, off-site emergency drill has been done in the manner known to law and the authorities have been educated properly so that in the event of any eventuality they will guide the people in a proper manner.

14)   ADDITIONAL SOLICITOR GENERAL ADMITS ASPECTS OTHER THAN DISASTER MANAGEMENT:

29.5. It is also submitted that the project was evaluated by the Site Selection Committee of the Government as per the norms laid down by the AERB Code of Practice on Safety in Nuclear Power Plant Siting, which includes the assessment of seismicity, location of faults, geology, foundation conditions, meteorology, potential of flooding, proximity to airports, military installations, facilities storing explosive and toxic substances, etc.  and the site was also evaluated by the SSC and approved after due process on 10.11.1989.

15)  SITE EVALUATION COMMITTEE FOR KUDANKULAM ACCEPTED THAT THE SITE IS SUITABLE FROM MAJORITY OF THE CONDITIONS SUITABLE FOR LOCATING THE NUCLEAR PLANT:

44. In respect of the designs, the Committee has recommended as follows:

"3.2. Aspects related to design

1)Radiological impact should be assessed with proper source terms and relevant dispersion characteristics of the site.  Does limits prescribed should be met at a distance of 1.6 km in the event of greater exclusion radius adopted by NPC.

2)Stack height to be checked by Health Physics Division, BARC considering topography and dispersion characteristics.

3)Model studies should be taken up for intake and outfall structure for thermal pollution and recirculation.

4)Studies on Biofouling and Jelly-fish etc. that may affect the water supply should be taken up.

5)Studies on accretion/erosion rate around the plant site should be carried out. If required, proper protection should be provided.

6)Design should be engineered to meet site related design basis events.

7)Atleast two evacuation routes from plant site during an emergency should be provided"

45. Ultimately, the Committee has given its opinion that the Kudankulam site meets the major criteria for siting 2 x 1000 MWe VVER units and also recommended that the observations made and the recommendations made are to be implemented at appropriate stages.

16) TAMILNADU POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD BLINDLY ACCEPTED EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PLAN

A) CONDITION:  On site and off site disaster management plant (DMP) should be prepared as per the guidelines stipulated by AERB and approved by the National Emergency Response (NERC) of Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India

B) ANSWER BY TNPCB: Two volumes of onsite and offsite preparedness plan was shown during inspection approved by AERB

The unit shall have regular training drills for all personnel to be involved in handling, storing and processing by updating training manual from time to time so as to control actual spills of hazardous materials if any in the quickest possible time.  The unit has training programmes. Hence complied.

17) MADRAS HIGH COURT DIRECTS NPCIL TO CONDUCT MOCK DRILLS FOR 40 MORE VILLAGES WITHIN 30KM DISTANCE FROM NUCLEAR PLANT BY INVOLVING THE LOCAL PEOPLE:                 Even though it is stated that the said exercise was done in only one village, namely Nakkaneri village, which is stated to be nearer to the KKNPP, as we are informed that nearly 30 to 40 villages are within 30 Kms radius of KKNPP, such event must take place in all villages and more importantly, apart from the officials, as stated above, the people in the area must be made to participate and an awareness programme must be made to infuse confidence in the minds of the local people that the project is for the benefit of the country and there is no need to alarm.

1. NPCIL  presented the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) report of NEERI on Environmental Impact Assessment (2003).  This report is incomplete because it has not incorporated the risk analysis  and disaster management report for a design basis accident and for  beyond the design basis accident at Kudankulam Nuclear plant. This requirement of risk analysis and disaster management plan comes under schedule-II of the application for Environmental clearance for nuclear plant.  Hence EIA report of NEERI cannot be treated as a comprehensive report as it failed to provide the full details as required under EIA notification dt.27-1-1994 under the Environmental Protection Act, 1986.

2)  Impact area for Emergency Preparedness plan in case of a nuclear reactor accident was kept at 16km distance from the reactor by AERB and NPCIL  while the EIA report of 2003 by NEERI prepared at the request of NPCIL has prepared  the impact zone for 30km radius from the reactor.  Normally this impact area used for emergency planning zone (EPZ) for nuclear reactor accidents should be based on actual calculations for dispersal of radioactive emissions from the reactor core under different failure conditions and meteorological parameters for fixing the distance of planning  zone based on radiation exposure of the public for 1.0 mSv/year.  Such evacuation distances in practice extended upto 50km in the case of Fukushima accident on the basis of radiation exposure of 20mSv/year but Japan has officially extended this Emergency Planning Zone from 20 to 30km during the accident and declared the extra distance as voluntary evacuation zone. 

3)   In the wake of the Fukushima accident American Environmental organizations revised their emergency preparedness planning zones from 80km from nuclear plants to more than double the existing standard of 80km based on topographical and meteorological factors.  Even in the case of Three Mile Island accident the people in the surrounding areas were evacuated upto a distance of 20 miles or 32 km from the nuclear plant.  The Indian Point nuclear plant authorities presented full details on the radiation doses and their spread over large areas downwind from the reactor and also compared the disaster scenario with the particulars obtained from the Fukushima accident scenario.   

4)    But the Kudankulam nuclear plant authorities including the NPCIL have transfered the entire responsibility of preparing the emergency preparedness for a nuclear accident at Kudankulam lies over the shoulders of the local Tirnelveli District Collector and Tamil Nadu state Government who will be assisted by the NPCIL, DAE and other central organizations.  Thus it is the District Collector, Tirnelveili, the Tamil nadu Pollution Control Board and the Tamilnadu state Government who will be ultimately held  responsible for any major  failures in the preparation and implementation of the Emergency Preparedness plans due to nuclear accidents.  Unfortunately Tamil Nadu state Government and its district administrative organizations are not at all qualified even to understand the damaging impacts of the postulated nuclear accidents and prepared to meet the emergencies by taking remedial actions and hence they cannot be expected to undertake this gigantic task and hence lakhs of local people in southern Tamilnadu districts are bound to suffer from serious public health hazards and face several risks likely to be created by the inevitable failure of the Kudankulam reactors for several reasons including external threats like satellite hits and bombing the enemy countries.

5) The Nuclear Power Corporation, the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board and the Kudankulam Nuclear Plant authorities are misleading the public, the central and state Government on the safety aspects  of the nuclear reactors even by violating the International safety standards for nuclear plants by refusing to implement the measures dealing with preparation emergency preparedness plans for design basis accidents under 4^th level of safety under the defense in depth philosophy pertaining to nuclear safety and also the disaster management stipulated under 5^th level of safety under design in depth philosophy of nuclear safety.  Moreover  the madras High Court in its judgement directed the nuclear plant authorities to implement emergency evacuation measures by making mock drill exercises in more than 30 to 40 villages within 30km radius from Kudankulam and that to the exercises must be done by involving the local people who will be properly educated about the implications of the impacts of the Kudankulam nuclear plant.

 

Para	Comments
3-5 (Safety)	NPCIL has tried to dispose of the safety concerns by nitpicking on words and ignoring the spirit underlying the constitution of the expert Committee by ARRB on 19-3-2011. The following observation of the Committee summed up the rationale of its recommendations Para 4.1 In spite of all the safety features provided, the extremely remote possibility of an accident leading to partial or total melting of fuel in the reactor core due to unforeseen reasons should still be deterministically taken into consideration. Provisions for management of such an accident, termed as severe accident, need to be made such that the operators are able to control its progression and mitigate its consequences in terms of preventing, or at least minimizing, any significant adverse impact in the public domain. In right earnest, the Committee submitted its report in August, 2011. If AERB is reaaly a fully empowered regulator, NPCIL should have immediately submitted the time schedule for implementing the 17 important measures suggested on the assumption that a Fukushima-like disaster could take place and the system should be fully ready to deal with such a cdisaster both onsite and offsite. These measures are not to be taken lightly as otherwise the Committee would not have recommended them. Without these measures, from what the Committee has stated in Para 4.1, there will be a gap in the safety shield in the event of a Fukushima-like meltdown. NPCIL's latest affidavit, filed on 16-10-2012 is still talking about a phased implementation over several years of the ten residual measures as though a Fukushima-like melt down will afford NPCIL and the public the luxury of such a long lead time. In a way, the casual manner in which NPCIL is dealing with AERB Committee's recommendations demonstrates how helpless is AERB as a regulator, which reports to Atomic Energy Commission which is nothing but a component of the executive. C&AG's report on AERB amply brought this out. It is also relevant to cite here that the Task Force (see para 7 of the latest NPCIL affidavit) submitted its interim report on 11-5-2011. An interim report is meant to save time in view of extreme urgency which existed in this case. Instead of acting fast, NPCIL finalised the schedule of implementation on this on 7-5-2012, after the lapse of one year! Apparently, NPCIL had not shown the same alacrity in acting either on the Task Force's report or AERB Committee report, as in loading fuel at Kudankulam. Since the people's right under Art. 21 is involved, this cannot be left to NPCIL's version of “safety”. What about offsite disaster preparedness? Has Tamil Nadu government constituted State and District level DMAs as required the statutory NDMA? Are there contingent plans with identified nuclear shelters, hospitals, doctors, their telephone numbers etc. and have the people within 30km involved in simulating the implementation of such contingency plans? We will touch upon this in the following paras.
9-10 (Independence of AERB)	Article 8 of IAEA's Convention on Nuclear Safety (see para 9 of NPCIL's latest affidavit) clearly envisaged separation of regulation from the agency that promoted nuclear energy. No such separation either de facto or de jure exists in our case. The observations above have demonstrated how AERB finds itself ineffective before DAE/ NPCIL. The latest C&AG report clearly corroborated this.
11-13 (Spent fuel)	Retaining spent fuel in India was clearly an after thought on the part of DAE/ NPCIL as otherwise NPCIL would have obtained prior environment clearance from MOEF for Kudankulam complex on the basis that spent fuel would be stored at plant site. There are serious environmental and safety implications of storing the spent fuel as it happened at Fukushima and elsewhere. The Report of the committee appointed by Japanese Parliament on Fukushima had this to say “Units 1, 3 and 4 exploded, and the containment vessel was breached in Unit 2. Core damage was avoided in Units 5 and 6, which shut down safely. The Commission discovered that, in reality, an even worse situation could have developed at Units 2 and 3, and the situations at Unit 5 and 6 could have easily worsened. If preventive measures against terrorist attacks had been implemented, the accident might have been handled and developed in a different way. Damage to the spent fuel of Unit 4 could have occurred, with greater affect to the wider surrounding environment. There was a distinct potential at the time for this disastrous accident to result in an even more frightening scenario.” The above Committee described spent fuel storage as one of the unresolved issues. IAEA is seized of the unresolved problem of spent fuel storage. The US case law corroborates this position.
14-44 (Environment clearances)	The earlier EC does not hold good as there has been a basic alteration in the facilities at Kudankulam. Spent fuel storage has serious environment implications. Under Environment (Protection) Act and the regulations made thereunder, NPCIL was under an obligation to seek prior EC for including spent fuel storage in the complex. In fact, NPCIL should have got a cummulative EIA carried out and held a public hearing before seeking an alteration in EC. In the absence of this, the project constitutes an infringement of the law of the land. Similarly, the EC did not envisage release of 320 CuM per hour of water into the sea. Whether the quantity is small or large, it has an impact on the marine resources. The temperature difference of 2 degrees is equally unauthorised as it was never envisaged.
45-48 (Liability)	The liability issue raised in this matter is different from the one raised in the earlier PIL before SC. Here, the question is whether the Liability law is applicable and, if not, does not “polluter pays” principle apply? If there is no liability, does it not introduce a moral hazard that would have encouraged the manufacturer to cut corners in design and compromise safety
49-62 (Distater management)	NPCIL's affidavit did not answer the question on offsite preparedness. NPCIL is not competent to say that offsite preparedness as envisaged by NDMA has been ensured. It is for Tamil Nadu government to file an affidavit. Disaster preparedness is not paper preparedness. It is an elaborate process, as envisaged by NDMA, that covers NPCIL, the State govt, the local authorities, the local hospitals, the local logistics and the people with information fully shared and the disaster mock drills simulated several times over. Para 89 of HC order is reproduced below “Even though it is stated that the said exercise was done in only one village, namely Nakkaneri village, which is stated to be nearer to the KKNPP, as we are informed that nearly 30 to 40 villages are within 30 Kms radius of KKNPP, such event must take place in all villages and more importantly, apart from the officials, as stated above, the people in the area must be made to participate and an awareness programme must be made to infuse confidence in the minds of the local people that the project is for the benefit of the country and there is no need to alarm.” Neither NPCIL nor the State govt has complied with this NDMA itself prepared its disaster management guidelines in February, 2009. After Fukushima, these guidelines should have been reviewed and made more conservative. The fact that this has not been done demonstrates the casual way in which our statutory agencies have viewed Fukushima. It is to be noted that the PM chairs NDMA and heads DAE.

Comments on NPCIL’s Disaster Management Plan

1.NPCIL’s Emergency preparedness plan is limited by AERB only to 16km around the site, whereas the Madras High Court order (para 89) referred to the need for preparedness up to 30km based upon NEERI’s EIA impact zone.

2.       After Fukushima accident, the Disaster Management Plan (DMP) Zoning limits have been reviewed and extended in several countries. Japan itself increased its evacuation zone from 20km to 30km and shelter the victims upto 40km. USA’s NRC has stipulated Impact Monitoring zone (EPZ-II) up to 80km and US citizens residing near Fukushima were advised to move away beyond 80km. IAEA’s guidelines too have prescribed a zoning system that is yet to be adopted by NPCIL. The zoning limits depend on several local factors also, such as the wind direction and velocity.

NPCIL should have carried out Emergency Planning studies for different levels of severity of the accident at Kudankulam out of the 7 levels formulated by IAEA  and adopted the IAEA zoning system keeping in view the worst case scenario. After Fukushima, NPCIL has not reviewed its zoning system to ensure greater safety of the public, even though the Prime Minister directed them to take action in the wake of the Fukushima explosion and also the guidelines formulated by the  National Disaster Management Authority of India under the chairmanship of Prime Minister.

3.       NPCIL’s DMP plan is inadequate as explained above and continues to be a paper plan with little or no involvement of the local authorities and the public. For example, have the local authorities identified the hospitals where the affected people are required to get admitted? Are the public aware of the emergency numbers and the hospital details? Have mock drills been conducted to promote public awareness up to the zoning limit of 30km including more than 30 villages as indicated by the Madras High Court at para 89 of its order? Has Tamil Nadu government a budgetary provision to deal with the situation? Is the State aware of the Fukushima-kind of liability (Rs.4 lakh crores till date) that would devolve on the government in the event of an accident? NPCIL’s affidavit is incomplete unless Tamil Nadu state government and the District Collector, Tirunelveli also file the  affidavits. 

4.       NPCIL’s disaster preparedness plan is only a paper plan. To cite one specific example, as per NPCIL’s plan, the local Medical/ Health authorities are required to be ready to administer stable iodine  to neutralize  harmful radioactive iodine ingestion by providing Potassium Iodide tablets stored in the PHCs in the emergency area. If a nuclear accident of Fukushima type were to take place on the day of the hearing, will NPCIL vouchsafe to the court under oath that all PHCs have in store sufficient number of Potassium Iodide tablets and are the people in the emergency area aware that the tablets should be taken in for the purpose? Are PHCs fully aware of the dosage? If the answers to these questions are in the negative, the inevitable conclusion that one should reach is that neither NPCIL nor Tamil Nadu is prepared to deal with the disaster. Fuel loading in such a situation will amount to a highly irresponsible act.

5. It is not unusual for governments to abandon even fully commissioned nuclear power plants in view of safety considerations. South Korea recently closed down two of its nuclear power projects after a complaint that some minor parts in the plant had questionable quality certification. (report enclosed). Several plants under construction have been abandoned due to fears about safety in countries like United States and Europe. Germany abandoned nuclear power in view of the apprehensions that arose after Fukushima. Japan has closed down many of its reactors. There is no reason as to why Kudankulam should not be stopped for a similar reason.
6. NPCIL has placed the responsibility for offsite emergency preparedness on the local district authorities and the Tamil Nadu State Government. Unless Tamil Nadu government also files an affidavit that they have understood their scientific, technical, public health, environmental safety and financial responsibilities under the DMP plan and are fully geared to effectively implement the same, NPCIL's affidavit on safety cannot be accepted. Is TN government ready to discharge its responsibilities if the accident were to take place on the day the plant starts operating?
7. NPCIL's DMP plan does not appear to have taken into account the worst case scenario of level 7as per international standards followed by IAEA. Can it therefore be accepted as complete and safety-ensuring measure taken in public interest?
8. The DMP plan is merely a paper plan. Has DMP plan been simulated to the last detail and conducted the required emergency evacuation exercise as per specifications even once? Both NPCIL and TN government should file affidavits to say whether this has been done or not.
9. Till these issues are satisfactorily answered, NPCIL should be directed to freeze Kudankulam fuel loading.  

10.   NPCIL in its affidavit before the Supreme Court on 16-10-2012 clearly admitted that the NPCIL proposed in its letter dt.7-5-2012 that it will implement all the 17 recommendations made by the Task Force committee by October-November 2012 and this fact is mentioned in the Affidavit filed by the AERB on 27-9-2012 in Supreme Court under Annexure-R/8 covering pages 226-231.  Unfortunately the AERB created to promote nuclear safety has been playing the opposite role by delaying the implementation of the safety measures which were demanded to be implemented by the Prime Minister on 29-3-2011 in the wake of the Fukushima disaster. All the 17 conditions are essential ones to be complied with prior to fuel loading in order to ensure safety.

11.   AERB on 5-6-2012 before the Madras High Court that it would grant further clearances only after ensuring implementation of  safety measures recommended by the task force for strengthening the safety of Kudankulam Nuclear plant in the wake of Fukushima disaster.  But NPCIL brushes aside the spirit of the assurance given by the AERB by saying that AERB never meant that all the 17 recommendations to be implemented as a pre-requisite to grant license for initial fuel loading of the reactors.  While the Prime Minister is insisting that there should be no compromise on the absolute safety of Kudankulam Nuclear reactors the AERB and NPCIL by their statements appear to be promoting nuclear safety but by their actions are actually working against nuclear safety by planning to commission the nuclear reactors at the earliest while postponing the implementation of the essential safety measures even by violating the guidelines both on plant safety and public safety as envisaged by the standards and guidelines specified by the National Disaster Mangement Authority (NDMA) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

12.   The recommendations of the Task Force are not in the nature of “abundant precautionary measures” or a back-up system to another back-up system but are highly essential pre-requisites for ensuring nuclear safety before starting the reactors because in most major industrial accidents like Bhopal, more than half a dozen back-up systems failed and thereby created major disasters involving the loss of thousands of lives. The recommendations of the Task Force committee provided only a second line of defense to ensure more reliable safety even when the first line of safety fails due to several reasons like electrical or mechanical failures or human errors in operations, vulnerabilities due to  aging of the instruments and equipment, internal sabotage and lack of close coordination among the officers and workers involved in operation and maintenance.  The task force recommendations and their implementation must be considered as essential prerequisites for ensuring higher reliability and nuclear safety. 

I. Illegal Environmental clearance for the KKNPP project:

1)            Initially Kudankulam plant authorities applied for consent for nuclear plant project in 1988 along with brief Environmental Impact Assessment of KKNPP  1 and 2  as per Environmental Protection Act, 1986.  In this first EIA report NPCIL stated that from its 100 meters high stack it will discharge about 0.4 mSv of radioactivity per year and also promised to let out  the effluents from the waste treatment plant before dilution to contain very small quantities of radioactivity in 200 cu.m /day and the once through condensed cooling sea water of about  6 lakh cu.m per hour discharged into the sea will contain negligible radioactivity  and with a temperature increase of 5^oC. 

2)            The plant accommodates a design basis accident and the radiation dosage will be limited to 100 mSv for whole body and 500 mSv for the thyroid during an accident in the exclusion area and it will be during the normal operations limited to 50 mSv per year for the plant workers and 1 mSv per year for the common people. 

3)            Under the design safety features NPCIL emphasized that the Kudankulam reactor will adopt the safety features of the defense in depth approach  which was described in terms of 3 levels of safety.

4)            Under the topic on EIA the plant authorities emphasized that the environmental impact of the nuclear plant will be assessed under several categories including the “the potential impact due to the unlikely event of an uncontrolled release from the nuclear plant reaching the public domain”.

5)            Even under the tabulated data item-13 on Emergency preparedness the NPCIL stated that the draft proposal on off-site emergency preparedness plans was already submitted to the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board and it was also stated that under the statutory requirements the stipulations made in the clearance documents by the central and state Governments  will be adhered to.

6)            Based on this brief EIA report and other documents the Union Ministry of Environment accorded Environmental clearance for the Kudankulam nuclear plant on 9-5-1989 by stipulating firstly that the temperature of the condensed water should not exceed 5^oC over and above the ambient temperature of the water at the point of discharge into the sea.  Secondly  that the on-site and off-site disaster management plan (DMP) should be prepared as per the guidelines stipulated by ICRP/AERB and approved by the National Emergency Response Committee of the Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India.

7)            Unfortunately on a second representation of the NPCIL dt. 7-8-2001 for grant of Environmental clearance for this project the Union Ministry of Environment  sent its officials to visit Kudankulam site on 31-8-2001 and these officials were provided with false information that construction work on the plant has progressed well and that the consent conditions of the Environmental clearance letter dt.9-5-1989 were fulfilled and as a consequence this misleading information the Union Ministry said that “Keeping in view the steps already taken to implement the project, the Environmental clearance issued in May, 1989 stands valid  and there is no need  to conduct public hearing and seek fresh environmental clearance and hence granted revalidated on 6-9-2001 the original environmental clearance for this project.   Since this revalidated environmental clearance is based on false data and false information it becomes illegal null and void.

The truth is that AERB did not accord permission for construction of this project and the Tamil Nadu state Pollution Control Board also did not give any permission for the construction of this project by this time.   More over the stipulation made by the Environmental Ministry that off-site disaster management plan should be prepared by NPCIL was not fulfilled by August, 2001 and it was fulfilled only on 4-1-2011 more than a decade later.  Yet the Union Ministry of Environment did not raise this relevant questions and blindly revalidated on 6-9-2001 the original environmental clearance letter of 9-5-1989. 

II.AERB misinterprets recommendations of Task Force Committee on Nuclear Safety:

1)            AERB instead of working for nuclear plant safety is promoting nuclear hazards to the detriment of public health and Environmental Safety by misinterpreting the recommendation No.5 of the Task Force committee report submitted in the wake of the Fukushima accident for instance  the recommendation No.5 deals with “Finalization of Emergency Operating procedures for beyond design basis accident conditions”.  NPCIL treated this  as a short term measure for implementation by merely stating  “EOPs for some PIEs have been made, remaining are in progress”.

2)            The AERB  in its Affidavit filed on 27-9-2012 before the Supreme Court in SLP (Civil No.27335 of 2012) states that KKNPP is one of the advanced reactors in the world having built in design features for beyond design based accidents management.   Emergency operating procedures for all designed bassis accident have been prepared and finalized. As and when the proposed safety enhancements are incorporated the EOPs need to appropriately be formulated.  Hence AERB recommended to NPCIL to address this issue.  It is also submitted here that these procedures are for handling situations within the plant and are not related to any off-site emergency for which separate approved emergency plans are already inplace.”

This assertion by AERB clearly shows that it is a body that is least interested in promoting nuclear safety without compromising with the absolute  safety of the reactors as directed by the Prime Minister during the last week of March 2011 during a meeting attended by the officials of the Department of Atomic Energy.  Infact the United States Government directed the US nuclear regulatory commission to appoint an expert committee to study the Fukushima accident and to learn some lessons from this disaster so that necessary remedial measures can be implemented to improve the safety of the nuclear plants in USA.  This Task Force gave utmost importance for reviewing the existing emergency preparedness plans in case of nuclear accidents both design- base and beyond-design-based accidents.  But the Indian nuclear regulatory authority has taken an anti-public and anti-national stand in the matter as can be seen in the following paragraphs.

I)  US EXPERT COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE REACTOR SAFETY BASED ON THE LESSONS FROM FUKUSHIMA ACCIDENT

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1118/ML111861807.pdf

The Near-Term Task Force was established in response to Commission direction to conduct a systematic and methodical review of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission processes and regulations to determine whether the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system and to make recommendations to the Commission for its policy direction, in light of the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant. The Task Force appreciates that an accident involving core damage and uncontrolled release of radioactive material to the environment, even one without significant health consequences, is inherently unacceptable. The Task Force also recognizes that there likely will be more than 100 nuclear power plants operating throughout the United States for decades to come. The Task Force developed its recommendations in full recognition of this environment.

In examining the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident for insights for reactors in the United States, the Task Force addressed protecting against accidents resulting from natural phenomena, mitigating the consequences of such accidents, and ensuring emergency preparedness.

The accident in Japan was caused by a natural event (i.e., tsunami) which was far more severe than the design basis for the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant. As part of its undertaking, the Task Force studied the manner in which the NRC has historically required protection from natural phenomena and how the NRC has addressed events that exceed the current design basis for plants in the United States.

In general, the Task Force found that the current NRC regulatory approach includes:

• requirements for design-basis events with protection and mitigation features controlled through specific regulations or the general design criteria (Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, “Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities,” Appendix A, “General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants”)

• requirements for some “beyond-design-basis” events through specific regulations (e.g., station blackout, large fires, and explosions)

• voluntary industry initiatives to address severe accident features, strategies, and guidelines for operating reactors

This regulatory approach, established and supplemented piece-by-piece over the decades, has addressed many safety concerns and issues, using the best information and techniques available at the time. The result is a patchwork of regulatory requirements and other safety initiatives, all important, but not all given equivalent consideration and treatment by licensees or during NRC technical review and inspection. Consistent with the NRC’s organizational value of excellence, the Task Force believes that improving the NRC’s regulatory framework is an appropriate, realistic, and achievable goal.

The Task Force has found that the defense-in-depth philosophy is a useful and broadly applied concept. It is not, however, susceptible to a rigid definition because it is a philosophy. For the purposes of its review, the Task Force focused on the following application of the defense-in-depth concept:

• protection from external events that could lead to fuel damage

• mitigation of the consequences of such accidents should they occur, with a focus on preventing core and spent fuel damage and uncontrolled releases of radioactive material to the environment

• emergency preparedness (EP) to mitigate the effects of radiological releases to the public and the environment, should they occur

Finally, a new and dedicated portion of the regulations would allow the Commission to recharacterize its expectations for safety features beyond design basis more clearly and more positively as “extended design-basis” requirements. The Task Force recognizes fully that a comprehensive reevaluation and restructuring of the regulatory framework would be no small feat. The Task Force also recognizes that strengthening the roles of defense-in-depth and risk assessment, emphasizing beyond-design-basis and severe accident mitigation, and establishing a clear, coherent, and well-integrated regulatory framework would be a significant accomplishment. Therefore, the Task Force concludes that additional steps would be prudent to further enhance the NRC regulatory framework to encompass the protections for accidents beyond the design basis. The Task Force recommends

1)     establishing a logical, systematic, and coherent regulatory framework for adequate protection that appropriately balances defense-in-depth and risk considerations.

2) that the NRC require licensees (operators) to reevaluate and upgrade as necessary the design-basis seismic and flooding protection of SSCs (Structures, Systems and Components) for each operating reactor.

3)   as part of the longer term review, that the NRC evaluate potential enhancements to the capability to prevent or mitigate seismically induced fires and floods.

4)  that the NRC strengthen SBO (Station Black Out) mitigation capability at all operating and new reactors for design-basis and beyond-design-basis external events (accidents).

5 )  requiring reliable hardened vent designs in BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II containments.

6) as part of the longer term review, that the NRC identify insights about hydrogen control and mitigation inside containment or in other buildings as additional information is revealed through further study of the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident.

7 )  enhancing spent fuel pool makeup capability and instrumentation for the spent fuel pool.

8 ) strengthening and integrating onsite emergency response capabilities such as EOPs(Emergency Operating Procedures), SAMGs, and EDMGs

9) that the NRC require that facility emergency plans address prolonged SBO and multiunit events.

10)as part of the longer term review, that the NRC should pursue additional EP (Emergency Preparedness)  topics related to multiunit events and prolonged SBO. (See explanation under Note-1)

11)  as part of the longer term review, that the NRC should pursue EP topics related to decision making, radiation monitoring, and public education.

12) that the NRC strengthen regulatory oversight of licensee safety performance (i.e., the ROP) by focusing more attention on defense-in-depth requirements consistent with the recommended defense-in-depth framework.

Note-1 :   Currently, if a nuclear power plant shuts down as a result of a natural disaster and the disaster is of such severity that damage or changes to the offsite emergency response infrastructure may be substantial or are in question, the NRC and FEMA determine the status of offsite EP and coordinate approval of plant restart activities.

Evacuation time estimates (ETEs) are used as a tool to (1) develop and improve evacuation plans in advance of an accident and (2) to decide whether sheltering or evacuation is the more protective response during an accident. Evacuation is preferred if a dose in excess of protective action guides is probable, but it is not always more effective in reducing public exposure. ETEs are a planning tool and do nothing to affect conditions during an actual evacuation. Draft NUREG/CR-7002, “Criteria for Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies,” issued May 2010, provides the latest guidance for licensees to develop a comprehensive set of ETEs.

Infrastructure damage could also affect the ability of licensees to bring equipment from offsite sources to the site. The regulation in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3) requires licensees to maintain agreements with offsite organizations needed to support emergency response. Typically, this includes local fire departments, law enforcement, and medical support. As part of the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2)(i), licensees must identify and seek readily available agreements for additional offsite resources (both local and regional) that could support fire fighting, electrical power, core cooling, and other needs.

The regulation in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) requires licensees to make protective action recommendations. To facilitate a preplanned strategy for protective actions during an emergency, two EPZs surround each nuclear power plant. The exact size and shape of each EPZ is determined through detailed planning that includes consideration of the specific conditions at each site, unique geographical features of the area, and demographic information. This preplanned strategy for an EPZ provides a substantial basis to support activity beyond the planning zone in the extremely unlikely event it would be needed. The plume exposure pathway EPZ has a radius of about 16 kilometers (10 miles) from the reactor site. Predetermined protective action plans in place for this EPZ are designed to avoid or reduce dose from potential exposure to radioactive materials. These action plans include sheltering, evacuation, and the use of potassium iodide (KI) where appropriate. The ingestion exposure pathway EPZ has a radius of about 80 kilometers (50 miles) from the reactor site. Predetermined protective action plans in place for this EPZ are designed to avoid or reduce dose from the potential ingestion of radioactive materials. These action plans include a ban of contaminated food and water.

NUREG-0396, “Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants,” issued December 1978, establishes the concept and basis for the 10-mile and 50-mile EPZs, describes the basis for the types of reactor accidents that should be considered in an emergency plan, states that emergency planning is not based on probability but on public perceptions of the problem and what could be done to protect public health and safety (as a matter of prudence rather than necessity), and concludes that the objective of an emergency plan should be to provide dose savings for a spectrum of accidents that could produce offsite doses in excess of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) protective action guides.

During the emergency at Fukushima, conditions deteriorated such that Japanese officials required additional protective actions up to and beyond a 20-kilometer (16-mile) area around Fukushima (i.e., beyond the equivalent of the U.S. plume exposure pathway EPZ). The possibility of making protective action recommendations for areas beyond the plume exposure pathway EPZ has been a program consideration since the inception of the EPZ concept in the United States. The emergency planning basis for U.S. plants, as discussed in NUREG-0654, states, “…detailed planning within 10 miles would provide a substantial base for expansion of response efforts in the event that this proved necessary.” NUREG-0654 goes on to state that it would be unlikely that any protective actions for the plume exposure pathway would be required beyond the plume exposure pathway EPZ. It further stated that the plume exposure EPZ is of sufficient size for actions within this zone to provide for substantial reduction in early severe health effects (injuries or deaths) in the event of a worst case core melt accident

Note-2 :  Basis for  Japanese authorities to decide for evacuating  People from Fukushima reactor site upto  30km and sheltering people upto 40km and beyond due to the accident:

Currently evacuation zones are defined on the basis of the expected exposure of the public to radiation (in millisieverts, mSv). In Japan, the reference level is 20 mSv per year. This means that if members of the public are expected to receive more than a 20 mSv dose in a year they must be evacuated. Following the accident, the Japanese government chose these criteria based on the latest recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP).

In the event of an accident, for most nuclear power plants around the world, it is expected that people located within a 5 km radius will be evacuated. At Fukushima Daiichi, the evacuation zone was 20 km and in some circumstances out to 30 km.   

http://www.oecd-nea.org/press/press-kits/fukushima.html#2

Note-3:  US GOVERNMENT ORDERS REVIEW OF NUCLEAR SAFETY BASED ON FUKUSHIMA:

CHARTER FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION TASK FORCE TO CONDUCT A NEAR-TERM EVALUATION OF THE NEED FOR AGENCY ACTIONS FOLLOWING THE EVENTS IN JAPAN Objective The objective of this task force is to conduct a methodical and systematic review of relevant NRC regulatory requirements, programs, and processes, and their implementation, to recommend whether the agency should make near-term improvements to our regulatory system. This task force will also identify a framework and topics for review and assessment for the longer-term effort. Scope The task force review will include the following: a. A near-term review to:

• Evaluate currently available technical and operational information from the events that have occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear complex in Japan to identify potential or preliminary near-term/immediate operational or regulatory actions affecting domestic reactors of all designs, including their spent fuel pools. The task force will evaluate, at a minimum, the following technical issues and determine priority for further examination and potential agency action:

 • External event issues (e.g. seismic, flooding, fires, severe weather)

• Station blackout

• Severe accident measures (e.g., combustible gas control, emergency operating procedures, severe accident management guidelines)

• 10 CFR 50.54 (hh)(2) which states, “Each licensee shall develop and implement guidance and strategies intended to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities under the circumstances associated with loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fire, to include strategies in the following areas: (i) Fire fighting; (ii) Operations to mitigate fuel damage; and (iii) Actions to minimize radiological release.” Also known as B.5.b. • Emergency preparedness (e.g., emergency communications, radiological protection, emergency planning zones, dose projections and modeling, protective actions)

• Develop recommendations, as appropriate, for potential changes to NRC’s regulatory requirements, programs, and processes, and recommend whether generic communications, orders, or other regulatory actions are needed.

b. Recommendations for the content, structure, and estimated resource impact for the longer-term review. Coordination and Communications The near-term task force will:

• Solicit stakeholder input as appropriate, but remain independent of industry efforts.

• Coordinate and cooperate where applicable with other domestic and international efforts reviewing the events in Japan for additional insights.

 • Provide recommendations to the Commission for any immediate policy issues identified prior to completion of the near-term review.

• Provide recommendations to program offices for any immediate actions not involving policy issues, prior to completion of the near-term review.

 • Identify resource implications of near-term actions.

• Consider information gained from Temporary Instruction 2515/183, “Followup to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Events.”

 • Develop a communications plan.

• Update and brief internal stakeholders, as appropriate. Expected Product and Schedule The task force will provide its observations, conclusions, and recommendations in the form of a written report to the Deputy Executive Director for Reactor and Preparedness Programs at the completion of the 90-day near-term review. During the development of its report, the task force will brief the Commission on the status of the review at approximately the 30- and 60-day points. The report will be transmitted to the Commission via a SECY paper, and the task force will brief the Commission on the results of the near-term effort at approximately the 90-day point. The report will be released to the public via normal Commission processes. The task force will recommend a framework for a longer-term review as a part of the near-term report. The longer-term review will begin as soon as the NRC has sufficient technical information from the events in Japan (with a goal of beginning by the end of the near-term review).

Appendix C Staffing The task force will consist of the following members: Leader Charles Miller FSME Senior Managers Daniel Dorman NMSS Jack Grobe NRR Gary Holahan NRO Senior Staff Amy Cubbage NRO Nathan Sanfilippo OEDO Administrative Assistant Cynthia Davidson OGC Additional task force members will be added as needed. For the near-term review, other staff members may be consulted on a part-time basis. EDO Interface The task force will keep agency leadership informed on the status of the effort and provide early identification of significant findings. The task force will report to Martin J. Virgilio, Deputy Executive Director for Reactor and Preparedness Programs.

NUCLEAR SAFETY IS BASED ON DEFENCE INDEPTH CONCEPT INCLUDING DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN (DMP) IN CANADA

http://nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/lawsregs/regulatorydocuments/published/html/rd337/#P250_15468

 4.3.1 Defence-in-depth

The concept of defence-in-depth is applied to all organizational, behavioural, and design-related safety and security activities to ensure that they are subject to overlapping provisions. With the defence-in-depth approach, if a failure were to occur it will be detected and compensation made, or it would be corrected.

This concept is applied throughout the design process and operation of the plant to provide a series of levels of defence aimed at preventing accidents, and ensuring appropriate protection in the event that prevention fails.

The design provides all five levels of defence during normal operation; however, some relaxations may be specified for certain shutdown states. These levels are introduced in general terms below, and are discussed in greater detail in subsection 6.1.

6.0 Safety Considerations

6.1 Application of Defence-in-depth

Defence-in-depth is achieved at the design phase through application of design provisions specific to the five levels of defence.

Level One

Achievement of defence-in-depth level one calls for conservative design and high-quality construction to provide confidence that plant failures and deviations from normal operations are minimized and accidents are prevented.

This entails careful attention to selection of appropriate design codes and materials, design procedures, equipment qualification, control of component fabrication and plant construction, and use of operational experience.

Level Two

Defence-in-depth level two is achieved by controlling plant behaviour during and following a PIE using both inherent and engineered design features to minimize or exclude uncontrolled transients to the extent possible.

Level Three

Achievement of defence-in-depth level three calls for provision of inherent safety features, fail safe design, engineered design features, and procedures that minimize the consequences of DBAs. These provisions are capable of leading the plant first to a controlled state, and then to a safe shutdown state, and maintaining at least one barrier for the confinement of radioactive material. Automatic activation of the engineered design features minimizes the need for operator actions in the early phase of a DBA.

Level Four

Defence-in-depth level four is achieved by providing equipment and procedures to manage accidents and mitigate their consequences as far as practicable.

Most importantly, adequate protection is provided for the confinement function by way of a robust containment design. This includes the use of complementary design features to prevent accident progression and to mitigate the consequences of selected severe accidents. The confinement function is further protected by severe accident management procedures.

Level Five

The design provides an adequately equipped emergency support centre, and plans for on-site and off-site emergency response.

6.1.1 Consideration of Physical Barriers

To ensure maintenance of the overall safety concept of defence-in-depth, the design provides multiple physical barriers to the uncontrolled release of radioactive materials to the environment. Such barriers include the fuel matrix, the fuel cladding, the reactor coolant pressure boundary, and the containment. In addition, the design provides for an exclusion zone.

To the extent practicable, the design therefore prevents:

Challenges to the integrity of physical barriers;

Failure of a barrier when challenged; and

Failure of a barrier as a consequence of failure of another barrier.

The design also allows for the fact that the existence of multiple levels of defence is not a sufficient basis for continued power operation in the absence of one defence level.

NRC PROVIDES PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON U.S. GUIDELINES

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2011/11-050.pdf

 Under the guidelines for public safety that would be used in the United States under similar circumstances, the NRC believes it is appropriate for U.S. residents within 50 miles of the Fukushima reactors to evacuate.

Among other things, in the United States protective actions recommendations are implemented when projected doses could exceed 1 rem to the body or 5 rem to the thyroid. A rem is a measure of radiation dose. The average American is exposed to approximately 620 millirems, or 0.62 rem, of radiation each year from natural and manmade sources.

In making protective action recommendations, the NRC takes into account a variety of factors that include weather, wind direction and speed, and the status of the problem at the reactors.

Attached are the results of two sets of computer calculations used to support the NRC recommendations.

In response to nuclear emergencies, the NRC works with other U.S. agencies to monitor radioactive releases and predict their path. All the available information continues to indicate Hawaii, Alaska, the U.S. Territories and the U.S. West Coast are not expected to experience any harmful levels of radioactivity.

Maximum Dose Values (rem) - Close-In -  To 50 miles(in numerical figures)

Distance from release (miles/Km)	1.5 miles 2.4 Km	7miles 11km	10miles 16km	20miles 32km	30miles 48km	40miles 64km	50miles 80km
Total EDE	1200	160	95	63	37	18	8
Thyroid CDE	6200	840	510	270	130	59	23
Inhalation CEDE	800	110	67	31	13	4.4	1.3
Cloudshine	5.8	1	0.6	0.4	0.2	0.07	0.03
4-day Groundshine	380	46	38	32	24	13	7
Inter Phase 1st year	5400	660	590	480	380	220	130
Inter Phase 2nd year	2600	310	280	230	180	110	69

TEDE - Total Effective Dose Equivalent   CDE - Committed Dose Equivalent   CEDE - Committed Effective Dose Equivalent   PAGs – Protective Action Guidelines   EPA – Environmental Protection Agency

Notes: http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1218/ML12184A301.pdf

• Doses exceeding PAGs are underlined.

• Early-Phase PAGs: TEDE - 1 rem, Thyroid (iodine) CDE - 5 rem

• Intermediate-Phase PAGs: 1st year - 2 rem, 2nd year - 0.5 rem

• *** indicates values less than 1 mrem

• To view all values - use Detailed Results | Numeric Table

• Total EDE = CEDE Inhalation + Cloudshine + 4-Day Groundshine

• Total Acute Bone = Bone Inhalation + Cloudshine + Period Groundshine

 

88. A reference to the inspection report of the TNPCB for fresh consent dated 15.6.2012 shows that the TNPCB has made a thorough inspection on various aspects of the plant, including the Sewage Treatment Plant, Effluent Treatment Plant, and has considered the details relating to habitation, pattern of vicinity and found that each and every one of the special conditions have been complied with under the  Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 as well as the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974.   The special conditions and compliance, as it is seen in the inspection report of the TNPCB are as follows:

Consent Clause	Compliance
The Unit shall provide sewage treatment plant to treat the sewage to the standards prescribed the board.	The Unit has provided two Sewage Treatment Plants to treat the sewage to the standards prescribed by the board. They are: 1. Infrastructure building (54KLD) 2. Common Access area (250 KLD)  Hence Complied.
Once through cooling system shall be adopted for condenser cooling as reported.  The cooling water shall be disposed off into the sea after satisfying the standards prescribed by the board.	Once through cooling system has been adopted for condenser cooling. Hence complied.
In view of the discharge in the Gulf of Mannar, the temperature of cooling water should be brought down to ambient temperature of the sea before discharge.	The unit cites the Ministry of Environment and Forest rules notification dated 22nd December, 1998, under G.S.R.7 clause 84, item B for New Projects in coastal areas using sea water which states that: “The thermal power plants using sea water should adopt suitable system to reduce water temperature at the final discharge point so that the resultant rise in the temperature of receiving water does not exceed 7oC over and above the ambient temperature of the receiving water bodies” and seeks that the temperature of the cooling water at the point of confluence in sea will be within 7 degree Celsius as per the stipulations of MoEF.  This may be decided by the Board.
The trade effluent generated from the different plants of the power station should be treated to conform to the standards prescribed by the board.	Two Trade Effluent Treatment Plants (ETP) to treat the trade effluent are provided.  They are: 1. Controlled Access area ETP 2. ETP for oil removal 3. ETP for neutralisation of DM water regeneration. 4. ETP for chemical flushing of steam generator. Sea Water taken for cooling at various sections and desalination plant rejects are let into sea through the following areas: 1. Condenser Cooling Water. 2. Safety System Cooling. 3. Auxiliary System Cooling. 4. Returns from Desalination Plant.   Hence complied.
The trade effluent after treatment shall be evaporated, solidified and converted as solid waster	The unit has not estimated any quantity of trade effluent from the active area. But has a provision to evaporate the effluent and make it as solid by mixing with cement.  This solid waste will be stored in a separate building constructed specifically to stone solid wastes.       Complied.
Adequate number of coastal water quality monitoring stations should be set up.	Environmental Survey Laboratory (ESL) was found to be established since 2004 itself. ESL collects water from wells and sea shore and maintain base line records.  It was reported that this laboratory will be functioning continuously. Hence Complied
Radioactive wastes (Solid and semi solids generated during various operations both low level and high level should properly treated and contained to fix the radioactive as per standards/guidelines prescribed by AERB	The unit has a solid waste storage building specially designed to store radio active wastes.  The unit is monitored by AERB for proper storage. Hence Complied.
Adequate precautionary measures should be taken in transportation handling and storage of radioactive fuel/spent fuel/radioactive wastes.	The unit reported that AERB controls the transportation and storage of fuels and the unit has to adhere to their protocol. Hence Complied.
It has to be ensured that bore wells are provided in the storage area of solid waste to monitor any possible migration of radioactivity.	The unit has provided 6 bore wells within the plant.  Analysis report of the bore well samples are furnished by the unit and it is enclosed. The unit may be asked to provide bore wells on all directions as a condition in Consent to Operate too.
It has to be ensured that the storm water in the premises shall be collected and disposed off suitably into the sea	Storm water drain are provided and the unit has provided an under ground sump to collect and use this water for gardening. The unit has planned to dispose the excess water into sea.
The radiological consequences on the environment arising out of operations of nuclear process plant should be as low as reasonably achievable both for normal operations as well as postulated accident conditions	The unit reported that the guideline specified by Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) will be complied to satisfy the conditions.
The unit has to ensure that risk analysis carried out for all radioactive sources and measures for containment in case of such risks are identified.	The unit reported that Safety analysis has been carried out.  Volumes of Safety analysis report was shown during inspection.
On site and off site disaster management plant (DMP) should be prepared as per the guidelines stipulated by AERB and approved by the National Emergency Response (NERC) of Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India	Two volumes of onsite and offsite preparedness plan was shown during inspection approved by AERB
The unit shall have regular training drills for all personnel to be involved in handling, storing and processing by updating training manual from time to time so as to control actual spills of hazardous materials if any in the quickest possible time.	The unit has training programmes. Hence complied.
All the vacant land within the project zone should be afforested with a tree density of 1000 per acre with trees having thick canopy cover.	The unit has requested to exempt the conditions as 10%. However the unit shall be imposed with a condition that minimum 25% of the area shall be developed as green belt.

and this shows that the TNPCB has applied its mind and having satisfied about the compliance has issued the final order of consent to operate.

89. An Off-Site Emergency Exercise was conducted on 9.6.2012 between 5.15 AM and 12 Noon.  In the table given in the counter affidavit, the various events have been explained as follows:

Item No	Time	Action
3.1	05:15 – 05:26 Hrs	Reactor Control Engineer Observes the following (mock observation) a) Sharp decrease in primary circuit pressure b) Raise in primary containment pressure & temperature c) Reactor trip on pressure above the reactor core low d) Sharp decrease in Pressurizer level e) Primary circuit leak monitoring system going to alarm state in Monitoring and Control Diagnostic System fragment f) abnormal radiation field inside the primary containment g) Closure of containment isolation valves except Reactor Building exhaust ventilation system isolation dampers 12KLA22A801 & 14KLA22AA802
3.2		Rx Control Engineer informs Shift Charge Engineer (SCE) about the incident. SCE ensures that the Reactor is tripped, ESFAS actuated and safety systems lined up and long term recirculation is established.
3.3		SCE confirms actuation of containment isolation logic
3.4		SCE further observes, Closing of all containment isolation valves except 12KLA22A801 & 14KLA22AA802 (RB Exhaust ventilation system isolation dampers) (The above dampers failed to close even after pressing close PB on mosaic panel.  Both close and open indications existing) Stack activity high alarm appears on Upper Level Control System (ULCS) workstation (in panel CWH30).
3.5	05:27 Hrs	SCE declares plant emergency by announcement in PA system and informs Site Director, SD, CS, OS and CISF commandant.  SCE acts as PED and instructs Health Physicist Unit to do field survey of the following location. Radiation field outside Reactor Building Outer door of MAL Stack
3.6		SCE nominates one of the control room staff for communicating the emergency declaration to other advisory and services groups.
3.7		SCE nominated person carries out emergency notification
3.8	05:50 Hrs	Site Emergency Committee (Advisory Group) arrives at Plant Emergency Control Centre (MCR).
3.9		SCE briefs SEC & Station Director takes charge of PED
3.10	05:55 Hrs	Plant Emergency Director (PED) convenes meeting with SEC members and discuss about prevailing site condition
3.11		SEC further instructs Maintenance Services Group to make arrangement to close RB Exhaust ventilation system isolation dampers 12KLA22A801 & 14KLA22AA802 from 12 & 14 UKD ESFAS panel.
3.12		SHP reports high radiation field at outside Operating Island (0.5mSv/hr mock result)
3.13	05:59 Hrs	SEC reviews the radiological data and advises Site Director for declaration of Site Emergency.
3.14	06:05 Hrs	Site Director (Site Emergency Director-SED) declares Site Emergency.  SCE announces the site emergency by PA system.
3.15		SCE nominated person for communication and information group carry out Site Emergency notification.
3.16	06:18 Hrs	District Collector, Tirunelveli is informed about the developments who in turn alert the State Government machineries.
3.17	06:25 Hrs	SEC members move to Site Emergency Control Centre (Nuclear Training Centre)
3.18		OIC ESL activates ESL lab and forms a survey team to do survey in public domain.
Shift crew along with Maintenance Services group continue to put effort to close the failed Containment isolation valve 12KLA22A801 & 14KLA22AA802 SCE continue to monitor the plant parameters and ensure core cooling
3.19	06:25 – 06:58 Hrs	SED convenes meeting and discuss the prevailing condition by taking feedback from OIC-ESL and SHP
3.20		Prevailing meteorological conditions were established (mock value) and following data (Mock) was given b y OIC, MML & SHP to SEC Plume direction               : NW Wind direction                 : SE Wind speed                     : 3.2 m/s Stability clause                : D Affected sector/village      : Sector"O", Village:   Nakkaneri
3.21		Emergency Survey at site boundary reports that there is increasing trend of radiation field at Exclusion Zone (i.e. site main gate).  The current radiation field is 0.01 mSv/hr (Mock result)
3.22		Radiological survey team was sent to sector "O" in emergency survey vehicle
3.23	06:58 – 07:15 Hrs	SEC leaves SECC and reach Off-site emergency Control Centre at Anuvijay Town ship. CS, TSS, MS, OS and Head (IS&F) will remain at Site and assist SCE to bring the plant condition to normal SEC advices SED for informing District Collector, Tirunelveli, about the site radiological condition and possible escalation to offsite Emergency. SED informs District Collector, Tirunelveli.
3.24	08:35 – 08:40 Hrs	District Collector, Tirunelveli along with other State officials reaches Off-site Emergency Control Centre, Anuvijay Township
3.25	08:35 – 08:50 Hrs	Offi-site emergency survey results were received on wireless at the Off-site Emergency Control Centre.
3.26		Survey team reports that radiation field at site exclusion zone boundary is 0.01mSv/hr (mock result).
3.27		SED advices District Collector, Tirunelveli, for declaration of Off-site Emergency as situation is calling for it.
3.28	08:55 Hrs	Based on SED advice, District Collector, Tirunelveli, Off-site Emergency Director (OED) declares Off-site Emergency (Grade-1-Stay Indoor)
3.29		OED forms the following teams and send them to the designated places Access control and traffic diversion – to prevent & divert the vehicles entering into sector "----" (No actual traffic control will be done.  Only counting of vehicles will be done) Warning and advise – To go to the affected village and announce to Stay indoor. Decontamination Team – To check contamination (decontamination if required) of vehicles which comes out of the affected sector
3.30	09:07 Hrs	Access control and traffic diversion reports back OED through telephone after reaching their designated traffic diversion points
3.31		Warning and advise reports reaches Nakkaneri and announce the villager to Stay indoor
3.32	09:19 Hrs	Due to increase in radiation field in the affected village (0.1 mSv/hr), SED advices OED for declaration of grade-2 off-site emergency.
3.33	09:20 Hrs	Based on SED advice, OED declares Grade-2 off-site emergency – Administration of stable iodine
3.34		OED instructs Dy.Director Health Services, Tirunelveli to form Prophylactics Distribution Team to initiate distribution of Iodine tablets to the affected sector "O".
3.35		Dy. Director Health Services, Tirunelveli forms Prophylactics Distribution Team and sent them to the affected villages Nakkaneri
3.36	09:24 Hrs	OED directs District Transport Officer, Tirunelveli to mobilize the required number of buses and dispatch them to the affected on his instruction.
3.37	09:25 Hrs	Survey team reports increasing trend of radiation field (0.5-0.6 mSv/hr) at affected village
3.38	09:27 Hrs	OED instructs the survey team for further survey of the affected sector of the radiological condition.
3.39	09:35 Hrs	Iodine prophylaxis Team reaches the affected village and distributing iodine tablet was simulated.
3.40		OED forms following teams and send them to carry out the designated duties. Convoy Team Evacuation Team Rallying post team Patrolling Team
3.41	09:53 Hrs	Iodine prophylaxis Team completes iodine tablet distribution.
3.42	09:54 Hrs	Survey team reports persistence of high radiation field (1.0 mSv/hr) at affected village
3.43		SED advises OED for declaration of Grade-3 Off-site Emergency (Evacuation)
3.44	09:54 Hrs	Based on SED advice, OED declares Grade-3 off-site emergency-Evacuation. (sample evacuation done in the exercise)
3.45		OED directs District Transport Officer, Tirunelveli to release the required number of buses to the affected village
3.46	09:54 – 10:03 Hrs	Convoy Team, Evacuation Team, Patrolling Team and buses for evacuation reaches affected village Rallying post team reaches rallying post and makes necessary arrangement for receiving the evacuees. District Supply Officer will arrange food for the evacuees at rallying post. Patrolling Team stay in the affected village for protecting property of the evacuees.
3.47	10:08 Hrs	Following information received at Off-site Emergency Control Centre from SCE Containment isolation dampers 12KLA22A801 and 14KLA22AA802 of 1UJA normal exhaust ventilation system are closed.
3.48	10:14 Hrs	Warning & advice team announces for boarding the buses in orderly manner. Convoy Team & Evacuation Team guide the public for boarding the buses orderly.
3.49		After boarding, buses leave for rallying post (evacuation and convoy team go along with the buses)
3.50	10:24 Hrs	Survey team reports return of radiation field in the affected village is 0. to 0.3 mSv/hr
3.51	10:33 Hrs	Buses reach rallying post and evacuees are temporary sheltered in the rallying post
3.52	10:43 Hrs	Survey team reports radiation levels in the affected village have come down to 0.01 micro Sv/hr to 0.02 micro Sv/hr and this is equal to natural background values.
3.53	11:00 Hrs	SED advises OED for declaration of Termination off-site emergency
3.54	11:00 Hrs	OED on the advice of Site Emergency Director terminate off site emergency
3.55		OED instructs the evacuation teams to bring back the evacuees to the village back.
3.56	11:07 Hrs	Site emergency was subsequently terminated by announcement. Notification sent as per the procedure
3.57		HPU reports that radiological conditions inside operating island are found to be normal
3.58	11:45 Hrs	Evacuees reaches their village
3.59	11:20 Hrs	Plant emergency was subsequently terminated by announcement Notification sent as per the procedure.
3.60	12:00 Hrs	OED convenes Feedback meetings at OECC, Anuvijay Township.

and the event was participated by not only the officials of the NPCIL and Department of Atomic Energy, but also AERB.  Even though it is stated that the said exercise was done in only one village, namely Nakkaneri village, which is stated to be nearer to the KKNPP, as we are informed that nearly 30 to 40 villages are within 30 Kms radius of KKNPP, such event must take place in all villages and more importantly, apart from the officials, as stated above, the people in the area must be made to participate and an awareness programme must be made to infuse confidence in the minds of the local people that the project is for the benefit of the country and there is no need to alarm.

According to the website safety  considerations are: 
http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/te_1487_web.pdf

A design outcome could be spending proportionately more on protecting those systems, the consequence of failure of which to an external event would be more serious. However, to an extent

this is already done by the application of more rigorous design codes to such items.

The hierarchy of Westinghouse PWR Safety Critical Functions could be adopted as a practical implementation of the aspiration for safety significance given in paragraph 3.13 of reference [3.8]:

• Safe shutdown;

• Safe hold-down;

• Safe decay heat removal;

• Safe containment;

• Safe cooling of spent fuel.