why Dr. K.L.RAO WARNED ON DAM BURST POSSIBILITY FOR POLAVARAM DAM?

Prof.T.Shivaji Rao,

Director, Center for Environmental Studies, GITAM University, Visakhapatam-45
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=84228   [MoEF Minister says Polavaram dam Works be stopped due to lack of clearence for Newly proposed Embankment Dams on sabari∧ Sileru]
https://sites.google.com/site/profshivajirao/1-5-83klrao.jpg  (Dr.K.L.Rao Press Note of 30-4-1983)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=72_evCt8rpU&feature=related  ( Dr.K.L.Rao's Real live story vision  of the killing of all people of Rajahmundry and konaseema due to   collapse of Polavaram dam )  

Substantiating Dr.K.L.ao's warning: For instance Sriram sagar project at pochampadu village was     designed for PMF of 15 lakhs cusecs for a catchment area of about 1 lakh sq,km,and the spillwayof 765mwas provided.2]at a down stream location,Inchampally project was proposed with a spillway of 1278 meters3]further down,polavaram project is proposedwth a spillway of 907meters to handle P.M.F of 50 lakhs cusecs4]further down stream,cotton barrage which handles 50 lakhs cusecsisis provied with spillway of 3,600 meters.Thus,polavaram spillway is very much under-designed and hence it does not workaccording toDr.K.l.Rao.

consequently ,as per experts,it is bound to collapse sooner than later,according to expertswho squote crucial        American expert's   Murrphy's law,

"if some thing can happeh,it will happen"'and so polavaram dam is bound to collapse

http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/07/28/000094946_00071805314844/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf
(World Bank report on Dam Safety  in India finds that several states  and the Central Water Commission do not seriously specialise in estimating the critical parameters for Dam safety  as in other countries like USA)

FIRST REPORT BY BACHAWAT TRIBUNAL ON POLAVARAM BARRAGE [1973]
Bachawat Tribunal considered the Issues raised by Basin states if Godavari floods can be transferred into krishna river and if so,under what conditions and in which form it could be done.The web site provides the answers by presenting the technical reportrs of Various Expert committees constituted by Central Government at different periods to provide the technical solutions for the purpose
http://bhujangam.blogspot.com/2011/04/first-bachawat-tribunal-report-on.html 
 Reasons for traditional CWC experts to recommend for a barrage at Polavaram as a dam ahead of a rich delta region will cause enormous loss of human life and properties due to extreme floods as in the case of the flood havoc caused in Krishna river basin due to extreme floods of Octobe2009 as seen from the website
 http://www.slideshare.net/saibhaskar/krishna-river-floods-management-book
A.P.state and CWC under-estimated a critical Design parameter on Spillway Design Flood,see web site:
 http://nwda.gov.in/writereaddata/linkimages/6907034768.pdf   
[see  section 6.2.4] Spillway Design flood was taken as 500 year Return flood inplace of the PMF or 1000-year Return flood as per CWC standards because Polavaram is treated as a BARRAGE for Design
Thus Hydraulic safety of the project was given up.According to Dr.K.L.Rao,the structural safety of the project was also given up because of the under-design of spillway as per his statement of 31-4-1983 in Indian Express News paper from Vijayawada[copy available under polavaram-4/6 web site]
ALTERNATE  STUDIES BY CWC  & NWDA WERE IGNORED BY A.P.STATE
http://nwda.gov.in/writereaddata/linkimages/4026395154.PDF
Alternate alignments for cutting down the cost of the project were ignored by A.P.state to boost the project cost estimates under some pretext or the other

http://www.sandrp.in/drp/DRP_Aug_Sept_2010.pdf  [ NGO's protests on Polavaram Dam]
WHY  EXPERTS OF CWC &; MOEF FAILED TO VERIFY IF DAM-BREAK ANALYSIS REPORTS ARE PREPARED as per standards in all other countries for all important DAMS as seen from websites:
http://hydropowerstation.com/?tag=dam-failure  [mandatory requirements of DBA,DMP/EAP in India]
http://apspcb.org.in/pdf/lshep/EMP%20Report/Ch11_Disaster%20Management%20Plan2.pdf 
[Lower Siang Hydro-Power Project,Dam Break Analysis,Disaster Management plan,Arunachal Pradesh]
 http://nealliance.net/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Downstream-impact-study-of-ower-Subansiri-HEP-Chap-9-DAMBREAK-ANALYSIS.pdf
 [SubanSiri HYDRO-POWER PEROJECT,Arunachal Pradesh.a  controversial project,affecting Assam ]


http://www.masterbuilder.co.in/ci/359/Dam-Break-Analysis/ 
http://www.ymparisto.fi/download.asp?contentid=17016http://www.ymparisto.fi/download.asp?contentid=17016 
http://www.iahr.org/e-library/beijing_proceedings/Theme_C/DAM%20BREAK%20ANALYSIS.html
http://www.ceers.org/ijest/issues/full/v6/n2/602006.pdf 
ttp://www.nih.ernet.in/TechnicalPapers/Dam_Break_Study_of_Myntdu_Leska_Dam_using_Dambrk_Model.pdf 


WHY CWC and MOEF did not verify whether DMP/EAP reports for polavaram are scientifically made 
as per the standard procedures  in conformity with DAM SAFETY guidelines laid down in their web sites:
 http://164.100.194.5:8081/ssdn1/htmls/Guidance%20Manual.htm 
see chapter 6 and article .6.8 for Dam Break analysis,Disaster Management/Emergency Action Plan Reports]
       :http://www.cwc.gov.in/main/downloads/EAPChapters.pdf
National Committee on Dam Safety at its 27th meeting held on 27th September,2005 has finalized these Guidelines for Development and Implementation of Emergency Action Plan for Dams.And POLAVARAM DAM was given faulty Environmental clearence in October,2005 by violating these guide lines by CWC and MOEF ,the concerned agencies dealing with Dam Safety problems

Are Indian Experts  bluffing by announcing publicly that

"India follows International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD) norms, where large dams are those with maximum height of more than 15 metres (from its deepest foundation to the crest)." 

as presented in  the following  website:?

http://www.masterbuilder.co.in/ci/358/Dams/ICOLD
As a general rule, ICOLD recommends that design floods shall be PMF (Table 11) and the
capacity of gated spillways shall be sufficient to discharge the full design flood without taking
into account the dampening effect resulting from flood routing through the reservoir. But for
the ungated spillway of a flood control dam, the retention effects may be considered when
calculating the design outflow flood (ICOLD, 1984; ICOLD, 1992).,Table 11 Design flood guidelines of ICOLD

http://kfki.baw.de/conferences/ICHE/2002-Warsaw/ARTICLES/PDF/129C2.pdf

Why State &Central Water Commission Engineering Experts failed to adopt ICOLD norms in 2005?


Why Dams Fail?      lhttps://sites.google.com/site/ayyagaribhujangarao/whydamsfail  [ several reasons given]
IITM, Experts predict that by Climate Change impacts,Godavari floods will increase by 20%,see website :

http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/what%20we%20do/global%20climate%20change%20and%20energy/tackling%20climate%20change/intl_strategy/dev_countries/india/india-climate-5-water.pdf

TV Interviews on Objections to Polavaram dam ,see the following web site for more details;
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_FbDgoW-DRQ&NR=1
http://www.sardarsarovardam.org/

If CWC advised for spillway discharge of 30 lakhs cusecs flood for Sardar Sarovar Dam in Gujarat,how can A.P.state be permitted in 2005 to use 36 lakhs cusecs for spillway design of polavaram with more rainfall intensity in its catchment with almost thrice in its size and that too in an adjoining river basin?
 Videos on dam collapses in different countries to show that dams often burst to cause havoc.

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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KEdM6Ys6spA&feature=related   (Hoover dam burst)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=65D_E5SQqbo&feature=related  (Dam burst animation)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9_61-wGFlcc&feature=related (French dam breaks 1959)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KEdM6Ys6spA&feature=related (Teton dam burst)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u2beeXgvQlk&feature=related (Teton dam burst story)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uQzCDJrnWBk&feature=related  (Teton story)

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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kIeNM8cm6J8&feature=related (Baldwin dam burst)

Catch-22 situation created by the Union Ministry of Environment and Forest in according clearance for 3700 ha. of forest land is a meaningless as well as a mischievous action taken by the government  in respect of polavaram dam project.  Even the Orissa High Court Judgement of April 2006 directs the AP State Government to go ahead with Polavaram project without causing any submersion of villages forest lands and displacement of tribals in Orissa.  This judgement is like the judgement in the Shakespearean drama of Merchant of Venice where the judge asks the plaintiff a Jewis money lender, Mr.Shylock to take his pound of flesh from the chest of the defendant merchant who fail to repay the debt in time. This judgement directs Shylock to cut his pound of flesh fromthe chest of the defendant on the condition that no drop of blood should fall on the ground, it means a Catch-22 situation, or a self-defeating course of action: or a paradoxical condition or set of circumstances that preclude any attempt to secure the goal without escaping  from the disabling conditions.  you cannot have your pound of flesh without a drop of blood.  Henc ethe action of the Central Government in giving clearances to Polavaram project is an act of cheating the people of India.While the state officials and judicial academy members have to abide by Article 51 A(g) of the constitution of  India.

Right fromthe beginning the Engineering experts of AP state Government and the Central WAter Commission have been knowingly committing grave mistakes in the design of he dam and in estimating the cost benefit ratios  on improper data.For instance the National Water Development Agency (See web site:see paras .
http://nwda.gov.in/index4.asp?ssslid=122&subsubsublinkid=32&langid=1

http://nwda.gov.in/writereaddata/linkimages/6907034768.pdf

http://nwda.gov.in/writereaddata/linkimages/4129963896.PDF
http://nwda.gov.in/writereaddata/linkimages/6479885403.PDF

a]Alternatives not considered by A.P.state as per Environmental Clearence Regulations,1994 While the Central Water Commission suggested for off take canal at 110ft elevation with a discharge point in Krishna basin at about 60ft, the AP state Government for its own vested interests for increasing the elevation of the Polavaram dam on a large scale insisted on increasing the level of Polavaram at off take level of 133ft with a discharge point in river Krishna at an elevation of about 92ft.A.P.state did not consider the alternatives of Barrages project since they failed to assess the Hazard potential due to a dam-break analysis although it was prepared by the National institute of Hydrology and Disaster Management  and Risk  Analysis reports too were not prepared and thus they failed to grasp the need for preparing alteratives to the project

http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/safety/guidelines/eng-guide/chap6.pdf [U.S.A.]

A.P.state  and CWC are misleading the courts by failing to prepare these crucial reports even when CWC directed for redesign of the project by increasing PMF from 36 to 50 lakh cusecs.

Since CWC and A.P.state failed to evaluate Hazard Potential of the Dam as per international standards on Dam safety,they failed to modify the Dam as per standard procedures

According to Bureau of Indian Standard guidelines IS: 11223-1985, “Guidelines for fixing spillway capacity”, the IDF to be considered for different requirements

IDF for the safety of the dam

 Design flood for storage dams( As per ISI Standards)

http://nptel.iitm.ac.in/courses/Webcourse-contents/IIT%20Kharagpur/Water%20Resource%20Engg/pdf/m2l04.pdf

Dams are important hydraulic structures which are constructed to serve a variety of purpose, more of which shall be discussed in detail in lesson 3.2. Most dams have a capacity to store substantial amount of water in the reservoir, and a portion of the inflow flood gets stored and the excess overflows through the spillways. According to Bureau of Indian Standard guidelines IS: 11223-1985, “Guidelines for fixing spillway capacity”, the IDF to be considered for different requirements

2.4.3.1 IDF for the safety of the dam

It is the flood for which, when used with standard specifications, the performance of the dam should be safe against overtopping, structural failures, and the spillway and its energy dissipation arrangement, if provided for a lower flood, should function reasonable well.

1.    For large dams (defined as those with gross storage greater than 60 million m³or hydraulic head greater than 30 m), IDF should be based on PMF.

2.     For intermediate dams (gross storage between 10 and 60 million m³ or hydraulic head between 12 m and 30 m), IDF should be based on SPF.

3.    For small dams (gross storage between 0.5 to 10 million m³ or hydraulic head between 7.5 m to 12 m), IDF may be taken as 100 years return period flood.

4.    Floods of larger or smaller magnitude may be used if the hazard involved in the eventuality of a failure is particularly high or low. The relevant parameters to be considered in judging the hazard in addition to the size would be:

a.    Distance to and location of the human habitations on the downstream after considering the likely future developments; and

b.    Maximum hydraulic capacity of the downstream channel at a level which catastrophic damage is not expected.

It is the flood for which, when used with standard specifications, the performance of the dam should be safe against overtopping, structural failures, and the spillway and its energy dissipation arrangement, if provided for a lower flood, should function reasonable well.

  Floods of larger or smaller magnitude may be used if the hazard involved in the eventuality of a failure is particularly high or low.

 Relevant Design factors considered in judging the hazard in addition to size of Dam project

1] Distance to and location of the human habitations on the downstream after considering the likely future developments; and

2] Maximum hydraulic capacity of the downstream channel at a level at which catastrophic damage is not expected

http://nptel.iitm.ac.in/courses/Webcourse-contents/IIT%20Kharagpur/Water%20Resource%20Engg/pdf/m2l04.pdf

CWC failed to estimate Peak Flood for Spill-way design:

Moreover the Central Water Comission always considered Polavaram as a barrage structure for purposes of design flood and thereby accepted for spillway design a 500-year return flood of 36 lakhs cusecs while the CWC guidelines insist on considering for the size of Polavaram dam a Probable Maximum Flood or a 1000-year return flood for spillway design purposes.  .see the following web site for design of Dams in USA.

http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/safety/guidelines/eng-guide/chap2.pdf [safety standards for dams]
http://tshivajirao.blogspot.com/2010/11/polavaram-dam-in-indira-gandhis.html 

AREA TO BE IRRIGATED -BASED ON WRONG CALCULATIONS: WRONG-BENEFIT RATIO
DOES POLAVARAM DAM PROJECT CREATE 2 lakhs Ha.of additional  New irrigation Area ?
According to the calculations by Dr.Bhiksham in his book on "POLAVARAM  PERSPECTIVES",
published in 2007,polavaram project brings into irrigation about one lakh ha.of land as against the claim made by the Government of 2.91 lakh ha,while 2 lakh ha.is needed under National Project Criteria.see  the following web sites:http://mowr.gov.in/writereaddata/linkimages/NProjects572133778.pdf
  [CWC guide-lines for National projects,irrigation]http://pib.nic.in/release/release.asp?relid=49885  

The NWDA website of the Government on Polavaram project clearly states under table 9.2 of the report under the Polavaram right canal out of 1,62,691ha of irrigable land area only 44,000 ha[about one lakh acres] is unirrigated while the rest of the land is irrigated under different sources like canals, lift irrigation systems,borewells and village tanks as can be seen from the following web site:
http://nwda.gov.in/writereaddata/linkimages/6479885403.PDF    [see Table 8.2]
http://www.apwaterreforms.in/Water%20resources%20Statistics-PDF%20files/4.2.pdf  [A.P.water sources.District-wise irrigation under,canals,tanks,bore-wells etc.,]
http://www.jalayagnam.org/index1.php?action=results  [Tadipdi Lift and Pushkaram Lift schemes ]
http://jalayagnam.org/index1.php?action=devlop  [Jala yagnam Projects ]
http://irrigation.cgg.gov.in/dp/VishakapatnamDistrictProfile.jsp 
CAG report on Pushkaram LIS objected in December 2010 [as reported in EENADU,Dt.22-12-2010]that Government has shown 73,318 ha.of irrigable land under Pushkaram lift irrigation scheme and the same land is again  shown under Polavaram command area under Left Canal.Parell canals were started within 6 months of each other.Hence Head works and pumps costing Rs.102 crores are wasteful expenditure.More money is wasted for Main canals that are redundant.Arguments of the state officials that they will use these head works for another new project when polavaram is completed were not accepted  by the Controller & Auditor-General..Similar is the case with Tadipudi Lift Irrigation scheme.
http://www.edocfind.com/download.html?dl=aHR0cDovL2phbGF5YWduYW0ub3JnL3N0YXRyZXBvcnQvYW5kaHJhX3JlZ2lvbi9UQURJUFVESV9MSUZUX0lSUklHQVRJT05fU0NIRU1FLnBwdA==&t=ppt&name=Tadipudi%20Lift%20irrigation%20Scheme%20-%20Slide%201

http://www.igovernment.in/site/andhra-launches-pushkara-lift-irrigation-scheme/     [Pushkara LIS]

http://saiindia.gov.in/cag/sites/default/files/andhra/rep_2009/civil_chap1.pdf   (See Pages 73 to 75)

Comptroller and Auditor General faulted AP State Government for including the about 2 lakh acres of  land coming under Pushkara Lift Irrigation scheme sanctioned by Planning Commission at a huge cost is again included under the Polavaram command area.  When the State government was questioned about this irregularity the state Government replied that they will disband the pumping units and pipelines and use them elsewhere after polavaram project is completed but the Auditor General refused to accept such lame excuses and did not accept the reply.  Similarly another 2 lakh acres to be covered by Polavaram project is also under irrigation by the lift scheme at Tadipudi on Godavari river thus 4 lakh acres already being cultivated under 2 major lift irrigation schemes is again shown under the catchment of Polavaram project to mislead the central Government agencies to manipualte the figures to show a favourable cost benefit ratio without which the project will become economically very unviable and cannot be sanctioned by the planning commission or other Ministries of the Union Government.

 Thus polavaram Dam project does not Qualify for being taken up as a National project for several reasons although demanded by A.P.state and although blindly supported by the Central Water Commission[CWC] without going into details of various components of the project and its implications to public health and welfare in the basin states.The state Public accounts committede of the A.P.state assembly may come out with more details in the matter in January,2011.

  Hence as per independent experts there is only about 1 lakh hectares of land available to be freshly irrigated by water from Polavaram dam while the claim is made for irrigating about 3.2 lakh acres under the right canal and 4 lakh acres under the Left Canal,making a total of 7.2 lakh acres  
http://eastgodavari.nic.in/irrigationchapter1.html 
In fact independent experts have collected field data which shows that about 95% lands under the left polavaram canal is already irrigated and only 5% land may get benefitted by polavaram dam project.see the following web site:
http://www.weap21.org/downloads/NRLP.pdf  Similarly under the left canal of the Polavaram project while about 4 lakh acres is proposed to be irrigated with water from Polavaram dam about 2.5 lakh acres is already under irrigation under the lift irrigation schemes,canals, medium irrigation projects, borewells and village tanks with the result that only about 1.5 lakh acres can be fed by Godavari waters from Polavaram project. 

http://books.google.co.in/books?id=HSnDO8Nlj2IC&pg=PA238&lpg=PA238&dq=pwerspectives+on+polavaram+project&source=bl&ots=VToJpFbRP6&sig=76NYpCAyQLPMTLk9cURDSVBfahM&hl=en&ei=lmifTP2-Ecercefi5IQK&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CCoQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q&f=false [ see Chapter 6 on Costs exceed Benefits by Dr.G.Bhiksham,Expert]

 If these two true facts are taken into conisideration the cost benefit analysis of Polavaram dam will be negative and there is no feasibility for taking up this project to promote national economy . Under the circumstances how can planning commission promote.such  a project that is highly risky as also not economically viable but also verycostly, uneconomical and  detrimental to public  and national interests

http://tshivajirao.blogspot.com/2010/06/why-inevitable-collapse-of-polavaram.html

http://tshivajirao.blogspot.com/2010/06/polavaram-dam-design-engineers-mistakes.html

http://www.wise-uranium.org/mdas.html#FAIL (Dam failures in animations)

http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/srdamsafety.pdf

http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/node/1464

http://www.internationalrivers.org/node/570 http://uwrl.usu.edu/people/faculty/DSB/icoldbulletindamsafety355format.pdf

http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/6-6-11/42574.html (68 dams collapse per year in China)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morvi_dam_burst (Morvi Dam failure in Gujarat)

http://www.dnr.state.oh.us/water/pubs/fs_div/fctsht30/tabid/4116/Default.aspx

http://nptel.iitm.ac.in/courses/IIT-MADRAS/Hydraulics/pdfs/Unit41/41_3.pdf (Dam failures in India)

http://www.sandrp.in/dams/Jaswant_Sagar_Dam_breach_Aug07.PDF (Jaswant Dam failures)

http://www.edf.org/documents/3011_Gambling_Dams.pdf (World Dams failures)

http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/node/4701 (Environmental flows to be maintained in rivers)

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See the following websites to understand how the Polavaram dam break analysis report is unscientifically  and haphazardly prepared in a half-hearted manner in 1999 when compared with similar dam break analysis reports prepared  for other dams in India by the same organisation, namely National Institute of Hydrology, Roorke  which is a wing of the Union Ministry of Water Resources like CWC .

http://indiawaterportal.org/sites/indiawaterportal.org/files/Dam_Break_Study_of_Myntdu_Leska_Dam_using_Dambrk_Model.pdf   (Dam break for Myntdu Dam)

http://indiawaterportal.org/sites/indiawaterportal.org/files/Dam%20break%20study%20of%20Barna%20dam_NIH_1996-97.pdf    (Dam Break analysis for Barna Dam)

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On 30-4-1983 Padmabhushan Dr.K.L.Rao, an International expert on irrigation Engineering ,a member of the Central Water Commission and a Union Minster for Irrigation and Power gave a special Interview to the correspondents of Indian Express and Andhra Prabha daily news papers at Vijayawada that the Polavaram dam design is highly defective and will not work and hence there is no question of transfer of Godavari water into Krishna basin. He gave a detailed reasoning for this purpose .

“Dr.K.L.Rao ruled out the possibility of diverting surplus Godavari waters to the Krishna owing to defective designing of the Polavaram project. Only 1800ft. spillway was provided into Polavaram project to clear 40 lakh cusecs of flood waters in the Godavari as against 13000ft. long Dowlaiswaram anicut designed by Sir Arthor Cotton. Even Prakasam barrage was designed to 6,280ft. long though the flood water would not be more than 12 lakh cusecs. Dr.Rao said it was simple Arithmetic to understand that the Polavaram design would not work he said”

During 1984-85 when the author was working as an expert committee member of the AP government Irrigation Department entrusted with the preparation of the Environmental Impact Assessment report for Polavaram project, he frequently discussed the crucial issues pertaining to the feasibility of this project with some of the Chief Engineers who often interacted with Dr.K.L.Rao on the technical problems of this project. Dr.K.L.Rao toured several countries to visit the major irrigation projects and made detailed notes about the design ,operation and safety aspects of the projects. Dr.K.L.Rao it appears used to exhort the engineers to be careful in designing the spillways so that the failure of dams due to under-estimation of peak floods should not result in collapse of the dams as they occurred at Kadam dam in Godavari basin, Machchu dam in Gujarat and other dams in India,China and USA.

Dr.K.L.Rao used to narrate that the magnitude of extreme floods generally increase year after year due to growing deforestation and development of agriculture, industries and human habitations in the catchment areas of rivers. For instance in the case of Godavari the peak flood rose from 15 lakh cusecs in 1850’s to 21 lakh cusecs in 1940s to 30 lakh cusecs in 1953 and 35 lakhs in 1986. Consequently he felt that liberal provisions must be made for spillway to discharge the increasing levels of peak floods also due to sudden releases of flood waters from dams in the upstream areas during cloud bursts consequent to intense rains and cyclones.

Some engineers make appropriate forecasts of the probability of failure of earthen dam by using simple algebra. For instance the storage capacity of the dam is assumed as ‘C’ and ‘G’ is the rate at which water flows out of the dam as per the number and size of the flood gates in the dam. The unutilized capacity of the dam is ‘E’ and the normal stored water is ‘A’ and so C=A+E. A cyclonic storm produces peak flood ‘F’ at dam site and the duration of the storm flow is ‘D’ . The rate at which the dam gets filled up = (F-G). Hence the time taken by the flood to fill up the unutilized capacity of the reservoir = E/(F-G). If this time of filling is greater than the duration of the flood then all the flood water will be safely stored in the reservoir. But if the duration of the flood is greater than the time of filling of the unutilized capacity of the reservoir than the flood water received into the reservoir will flow over the earth and rockfill dam resulting in erosion and breaching that causes a catastrophic failure. The flood flow below the dam jumps suddenly from G to F+C/T where ‘T’ is the time it takes for the emptying of the water in the reservoir.

Thus in the case of the Polavaram dam the following preliminary engineering calculations show how and when the dam will collapse due to peak flood estimates of 49 lakhs cusecs by CWC and 93 lakhs cusecs estimated by Shri.T.Hanumantha Rao, Ex.Engineer-in-Chief of AP State Government)

A = Polavaram reservsoir storage = 200 TMC = 5600 x10⁶m³

G = Spillway discharge = 1.0 x 10⁵ cumecs (0.1 million cumecs)

E = Unutilised storage of the reservoir = 235 TMC = 6674 x 10⁶m³

above FRL

D = Duration of intense storm = 48 hours

F = inflow design flood = 49 lakh cusecs = 1.5 x 10⁵cumecs (as per CWC estimate)

F-G = incremental increase in storage = 1.4 x 10⁵ – 1.0 x 10⁵ = 0.4 x 10⁵ cumecs

Hence the time for filling up of the = (6674 x 10⁶m³)/ 0.4 x 10⁵ =16,685 seconds = 46 hours.

Hence if the duration of the storm is more than about 46 hours the flood water will flow over the earthen dam resulting in its collapse. The above calculations are approximate only and they can be improved by taking up elaborate flood routing exercise and computer modeling.

But if the inflow flood, based on the extreme flood of 26.5 lakhs cusecs of October 2009 at Srisailam against its 100-year flood of 9.4 lakh cusecs is taken into consideration, the extreme flood into Polavaram dam project could be 33 x 26.5/9.4 = 93 lakh cusecs ( 2.7 lakh cumecs as estimated by Sri.T.Hanumantha Rao.

In such a case, time of filling = 6674 x 10⁶m³ /1.7 x 10⁵ = 10 hours

Hence, if the duration of an intense cyclone, were to be in excess of 10 hours, Polavaram dam is bound to collapse. Risk = (Probability of an accident) X (costs of damage due to the accident)

Role of Meteorologists and Hydrologists in Design of Big Dams :

Besides the Civil Engineers, Meteorologists, Hydrologists and Environmentalists have to play a crucial role in the design of modern major dams as per the new generation of dam design standards of U.S.A. The Civil Engineers when designing a dam must get the latest data on Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP)from the Meteorological experts and the Probable Maximum Flood must be determined by the Hydrological experts. The Civil Engineers must determine the capacity of the dam and the spillway discharge rate through flood gates to ensure not only safety of the dam but also the safety of the people and their properties downstream due to an anticipated maximum credible accident for the one reason or the other. Flood gates being an expensive component of the construction of a dam, the civil engineers naturally consider a trade of between the cost of the dam and the economic benefits and the degree of safety it will provide to the people and their properties. The dam design must be based on the probability that an intense cyclonic storm will cause the dam to over flow and consequently the floods destroy the dam inspite of the spillway provided for the design flood. If this probability is 0.01 then the dam is said to safely handle any small flood upto a 100-year flood. Sometimes the cyclonic weather conditions that produce one severe storm may persist and produce another severe storm in a sequence. Thus the policy of operation of the dam becomes a critical factor in estimating the probability of a catastrophic failure floods cause catastrophic failure of a dam because the water stored behind the dam will be suddenly added virtually to the natural extreme flood which becomes an extra burden to be contained by the ill prepared flood banks downstream of the dam. The failure of one dam in a river basin sometimes lead to the failure of other dams downstream and the flood effect will be cumulative to the detriment of the people and their properties in the vulnerable areas.

Historical Failure of Dams:

An expert Robert Jensen estimated that since 12^th century 2000 dams in the world failed including failure of 200 major dams between 1900 and 1980. On an average 30 dam failures occurred per decade. According to International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD) 2.2% of all the failure rate dropped to 0.5%. According to another expert Blied the failure rate of dams between 1900 and 1969 is 2.4% for small dams and 1.7% for large dams. It is estimated that the average global risk of any dam failing in any given year is 1 in 10,000. Experts estimated that 40% of the dam failures due to overtopping while 30% failures are due to foundation failures. In China 2300 out of 80,000 failed since 1950 taking the failure rate to 4%.

Cases of catastrophic dam failures in China in 1975:

When politicians, officials and contractors take up construction of dams on massive scale under the guise of development programmes there is bound to be scope for avoidable failure of dams resulting in large scale deaths of people and economic ruination of the country. This situation is reflected by the failure of 2 major dams namely Banquio and Shimantan dams in China in 1975. Banquio dam was built in 1950 on Ru river, 118 m high with a storage capacity of 492 million cubic meters . An experienced irrigation expert Chen Xing proposed 12 sluice gates but the authorities reduced them from 12 to 5 and so Chen criticized the Government for compromising with the safety aspects and consequently he was transferred from the project in 1961. But when the problems surfaced in the project Chen was brought back and he was requested to help the Government in solving the problems. Since the beginning there were some mistakes in the design and construction of this dam including cracks in the dam and sluice gates. For rectifying these defects Russian experts were invited for improving the dam and this Soviet design was called an “Iron dam, a dam that could not be broken”. Perhaps this is a reflection of the ego inherently present among engineering experts who are responsible for failure of many dams. The dam built in 1950 was designed for a 1 in 1000 year flood (300 mm of rainfall per day). The peak flood was estimated to be one from a storm that would drop 0.53m of rain over a 3 day period. In August 1975 the engineers estimates on flood misfired because a 1 in 2000 years flood occurred and poured one years rainfall in 24 hours and a rainfall 1060mm was recorded in 24 hours near the typhoon center. But new records were set at 189.5 mm rainfall per hour, 1060mm rainfall per day, exceeding annual rainfall of 800mm . It is reported that by some experts that the cyclone dropped a meter of water in 3 days comprising 0.448m due to the first storm on August 5^th. A second down pour lasted for 16 hours on August 6^th and a 3^rd down pour lasted for 13 hours on August 7^th . Another dam on Hong river was also constructed and it also collapsed. The Shimantan dam was built to withstand a 1 in 500 year flood due to a cyclone that drops 0.48m of rain over a 3 day period and its storage capacity was 95 million cubic meters. By August 8^th, the Banquio and Shimantan dam reservoirs began to get filled up to their full capacity because the run-off into these reservoirs exceeded the spillway discharges but at 12.30AM the water in the Shimantan dam reservoir rose 40cm above the crest of the dam and the dam collapsed and the reservoir emptied its 120 billion cubic meters of water within 5 hours. Half an hour later the Banquio dam was crested when some people attempted to save the embankment from collapsing. But soon the dam burst and resulted in creation of a wall of water 6m high and 12m wide moving followed by the emptying of 600 million cubic meters of more water. In total 62 dams broke and the flood covered a million hectares of agriculture in fields in 29 countries and municipalities. 11 million people in the region were effected, 85,000 were died due to dam failures. The flood water moved at 14m per second and there was no time for giving warnings and the authorities were hampered because the telephone communication was knocked out immediately and the people did not expect any one of these so called “iron dams” to fail.

Plain areas suitable for anicuts and barrages and hilly areas for big dams:

Once the Banquiao and Shimantan dams were completed in 1950s many many smaller dams were built. Initially these dams were built rightly in the mountain regions. But in 1958 Vice Premier Tan Zhenlin arbitrarily ordered that the dam building should be extended also to the plain areas of China. The Vice Premier also asserted that primacy should be given to water storages for irrigation. A noted expert hydrologist , Chen Xing objected to this policy on the basis that it would lead to water logging and alkalization of farm lands due to a high water table produced by the dams in plain areas and deltas. Not only were the warnings of Chen Xing ignored but political officials changed his design for the largest reservoir on the plains. Chen Xing, on the basis of his expertise as a hydrologist, recommended twelve sluice gates for the dam but this was reduced to five by critics who said Chen was being too conservative. There were other projects where the number of sluice gates was also arbitrarily reduced significantly. Chen Xing was sent to Xinyang. But Chen Xing criticized the promoters of mass-scale dam construction and he was branded as a “right-wing opportunist”. When serious problems with the water system developed in 1961 a new party official in Henan brought Chen Xing back to help solve the problems. Even Indian experts like Sir Arthor Cotton, Dr.A.N.Khosla and others asserted that while big dams be constructed in upland hilly regions, plains region must be preferred for anicuts and barrages in the Godavari river basin. Thus Polavaram dam is a violation of the basic engineering principles.

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If the Polavaram dam has to get the permission from the Central Electricity Authority, Union Ministry of Power, the AP State Government has to make a fresh application for this permission by submitting the following documents

1. Environmental Impact Assessment Reports based on the Probable Maximum flood in Godavari of 50 lakh cusecs and for this purpose they can use a portion of the statistical data earlier submitted in the EIA report for this projectin October 2005. However this new report must incorporate a fresh dam break analysis report it can be prepared by the National Institute of Hydrology at Roorkee during 2010

2) The AP State Government must prepare a fresh report on Emergency Action Plan based on the fresh dam break analysis report on the basis of the new guidelines issued by the Union Ministry of Water Resources in the year 2006 which is a a detailed document containing the innumerable proforma on various aspects of the plan.

3) A fresh Rehabilitation and Resettlement Plan to identify the number of villages likely to be inundated by the reservoir and also by the floods in the upstream side of the Polavaram dam including the areas covered by Orissa and Chattisgarh Fresh Cost Benefit Analysis report based upon the actual lands which can be brought under irrigation under the left and right canals by deducting the lands already brought under irrigation by the existing irrigation systems including Yeleru reservoir and other reservoirs and also the major lift irrigation systems known as Tadipudi and Pushkaram project estimated to irrigate about 4 lakh acres and also the lands under irrigation under the irrigation tanks and a large number of borewells that have been brought into being during the last few years. The new reports to be prepared must take into consideration the literatre and updated information on various aspects of irrigation projects contained in the following websites.

The National Planning Commission, Union Ministry of Economic Affairs, Union Ministry of Water Resources, Environment and Forests, Agriculture and Tribal Affairs, Officials must take the full responsibility to get the reports prepared on scientific lines and get them scrutinised by genuine expert committees with honest and accountable experts not only to the Government but also to the public to uphold the interests of the nation in the long run.

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http://nidm.gov.in/idmc2/PDF/Presentations/Flood/Pres5.pdf

http://www.cwc.gov.in/main/downloads/EAPChapters.pdf

http://sites.google.com/site/profshivajirao/polavaramdam-6

http://www.masterbuilder.co.in/ci/358/Dams/

water.state.co.us/damsafety/ExampleEAP040510.doc

www.tceq.state.tx.us/assets/public/.../field.../damsafety/gi-394.doc

http://www.fema.gov/plan/prevent/damfailure/fema64.shtm

http://www.owrb.ok.gov/hazard/dam/pdf_dam/SampleEmergencyActionPlan.pdf

http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/20060315114627-Legal%20Liability%20for%20Dam%20Failures%20&%20Emergency%20Action%20Planning.pdf

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WHY STATE AND UNION GOVERNMENT EXPERTS OF VARIOUS MINISTRIES AND OFFICIALS INCLUDING PEOPLE IN AP STATE, ORISSA AND CHATTISGARH ARE KEPT IN DARKNESS ABOUT DETAILED DAM BREAK ANALYSIS STUDIES ON POLAVARAM DAM ALONG WITH EMERGENCY ACTION PLANS?

According to the Environmental Protection Act 1986 and its regulations the AP State Government engineers and officials of various Ministries like Finance, Environment and Forest state Pollution Control Board and other Ministries the Environmental Impact Assessment(EIA) Report for this project must contain not only the Dam Break Analysis (DBA) report but also the Emergency Action Plan (EAP) reports, Risk Analysis (RA) reports in detail so that the costs of remedial actions to be taken in case of a potential dam burst will have to be included in the original project budget so that the genuine cost benefit ratio can be scientifically deduced on the basis of the alternate project proposals aimed at securing the similar economic benefits as contemplated by the original project.  Similarly the various expert committee members  of various Ministries in the Union Government like Finance, Agriculture, Water Resources, Planning Commission, Central Water Commission, environment and Forest and Tribal Affairs must also scrutinise the EIA report including EAP, RA, DBA reports.  Unfortunately due to lack of accountability among all the concerned engineers, Secretaries and officials of the AP State and Union Government Ministries most of the permissions  for Polavaram dam project were sanctioned blindly with the result that the people of Andhra Pradesh were mislead by both the Union Government officials as well as state Government officials on the safety, economics and sustainable development aspects of the project.  Hence people in the state are looking at the project just as the traditional blind men looked at the elephant in the old Chinese story.  Today the people in Malkangiri disrict of Orissa are agitating against the Polavaram project on the ground that the damaging impacts of this project will be felt in 18 villages including displacement of more than 20,000 people, mostly tribals and more than 1.5 lakh acres of forest lands to be inundated due to the proposed Polavaram dam.  The Orissa people are questioning the Central Government Why the Union government Ministries have blindly giver permissions for an interstate projects like Polavaram without taking into consideration the views of the neighbouring states of Orissa and Chattisgarh as per rules and regulations.  The dam break analysis reports prepared for Polavaram dam by the AP State Government and scrutinised by several Ministries of the Union Government are blind to realise the damaging impacts such as providing watery grave to 50 lakhs of people downstream of the dam in case of an inevitable collapse of the dam for several reasons and the consequential economic loss of more than 1 lakh crores of rupees which makes the country poorer and thereby promotes poverty on a large scale including promotion of unemployment and inflation which are not certainly the main objectives of the proposed project.   The people of India have a right to life, right to health, right to employment and all these rights are going to be adversely affected by this dam. 

Even today alternative barrage proposals must be immediately considered if the people of Andhra Pradesh including its leaders of all political parties are genuinely interested in making use of Godavari waters for the benefit of all the regions of the state.  Better late than never.  The Chief Minister must organise an open public debate to work out alternate plans for harnessing Godavari waters so that the approvals of Orissa and Chattisgarh can also be obtained in short time. 

 Embankments failed to prevent Krishna floods from drowning the Temple Town of Alampur Oct.2009

 

Embankments utterly fail to provide flood protection
Source :http://www.slideshare.net/saibhaskar/krishna-river-floods-30-sep-to-07oct09

EMBANKMENTS AT BHADRACHALAM FAILED TO PROTECT TOWN FROM FLOODS

   2009 FLOODS IN KRISHNA RIVER CAUSED HAVOC BY DAMAGING EMBANKMENT WALLS

2006FLOODS IN GODAVARI RIVER CAUSED HAVOC BY DAMAGING EMBANKMENT WALLS

ANNEXURE _!: Failure of Embankments in Andhra pradesh as flood protection Works

FAILURE OF GOVERNMENT TO ENSURE MAINTENANCE OF FACILITIES FOR EMBANKMENT WALLS TO FUNCTION EFFECTIVELY DURING FLOODS IN RAINY SEASON:  Heavy rainfall in neighbouring Maharashtra saw over 6 lakh cusecs of water flowing into the Sriramsagar project in Nizamabad district while the river flowed at a height of 67 feet at Bhadrachalam leaving a trail of destruction. Godavari at Dowlaiswaram near Rajahmundry crossed 22.5 feet, the danger level due to heavy rain in the catchment area.

The officials are concerned that a 1986 type situation might recur when the water level touched 23.60 feet. Officials released 27 lakh cusecs of water into the sea on Sunday.

http://www.hindu.com/2006/08/07/stories/2006080705530600.htm

 Rajahmundry: Heavy rain for the last three days caused havoc in the city repeating the last year's fury. It was on September 19 last year, all the low-lying areas of the city were inundated due to heavy floods to the Godavari.

After midnight on Wednesday, there was heavy to more heavy rain and the Nalla Channel pumping system, which has to carry sewage water of more than half of the area, failed. As a result, the rainwater stagnated in the streets like Aryapuram, Tummalava, Seshaiahmetta and a few areas in old town.

Outdated system

The corporation arranged one 150 HP motor and three 30 HP motors long ago to pump out water. But they had become outdated. "As there is no other go we are running the motors which will do at least 40 to 50 per cent of pumping," said the engineer.

After the last year floods, Chief Minister Y.S. Rajasekhara Reddy came to Rajahmundry and announced that he was sanctioning Rs.3 crores for replacing engine, motors and pumping system. "The corporation has not got the amount. The Commissioner and we engaged private motors and asked ONGC and AP Paper Mills to send their pumping machinery along with our fire tenders," said the Mayor.

http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/thscrip/print.pl?file=2006092206860300.htm&date=2006/09/22/&prd=th&  

 ANNEXURE-2: Embankments as Flood Protection Works are failures  in Assam too.

Embankments do not provide flood Protection – a Case of Study of Brahmaputra river :

http://aasc.nic.in/course material/Disaster/documentation on past disasters.pdf

http://aasc.nic.in/course%20material/Disaster/documentation%20on%20past%20disasters.pdf

The short term ad hoc type of flood protection measures so far adopted in the case of the Brahmaputra, especially the extensive network of earthen embankments around 5000k.m., has deleterious impact on the regime of river, more specially its aggradations ,thus contributing to further intensification of flood hazard potential of the valley.

Embankments changed behavior of rivers for the worst:

The 1986 Assam Flood Expert Committee has aptly brought out the problems .It has been observed that the embankments have changed the behaviour of the rivers towards worst. And therefore, suggested that no more embankments should be constructed to avoid a deterioration of the situation.

The Rastriya Barh Ayog has grimly warned that a stage may come when it may no longer be possible to contain the river by embankment.    Former Chief Secretary H.N. Das while venting his opinion in The Economic Times 29th Nov’1998 wrote “Build a Dam and be Damned”.

Natural drainage obstructed by Embankments causes more flooding:

Ill effects can be seen from the accompanying illustration. The embankment leads to high flood level within the embanked area, resulting in rise of river beds with consequent reduction of fertility of land behind the embankment. In case of a breach, the flood water submerges the surroundings sometimes with devastating potential. Drainage congestion is a major problem due to construction of embankment even after the flood water has receded. Water in the surrounding areas does not have an outlet.

The sluices provided become non-operational for various reasons. This results in rising of river beds and narrowing of the channel. The water logging is another problem in embankment construction. It aids in aggrading the river beds, silt which used to be deposited in the plains, now drops inside the river channels. The land drainage pattern gets changed drastically because all streams are now guarded by marginal embankments.

 Performance of Embankment Measures:

Construction of embankment widely adopted as structural measures of flood management though has provided reasonable degree of protection. There are 31.5 lakh ha. of chronically flood prone areas in the state. Some 50% of this area i. e. 16.3 lakh ha. are protected by constructing 4450 km. of embankments. The efficacy of embankment has also become a controversial and debatable topic on the ground of:

• loss of land for construction and resettlement

• risk and effects of sudden embankment failure

• disruption of fish breeding cycle between rivers and flood plain

• increased flooding in unprotected areas

• loss of sediment for nutrient and land building.

• Reduced passage for flow of flood water and consequent rise of the level of flood waters,

• Drainage congestion behind the embankment

• Gradual rise of river beds due to silting.

Breaches in Embankments cause more floods:

Usually construction of embankment and associated flood mitigation methods results in general increase of water levels unless suitable long term measure like storage reservoir or channel improvements are provided. Till now the embankment have been adopted as an alternative to long term solution in the Brahmaputra valley. This sometimes leads to disastrous situation due to breaches of embankments. I fact, the popular feeling in Assam today is that embankment themselves have become a major factor for causing floods and people would be much better off without them. The 1986 Assam Flood Expert Committee strongly felt “that the embankments have changed the behavour of Assam rivers towards worst .No more embankment should be constructed to avoid a deterioration of situation.”

Causes of Embankment Failures:

The Problems of the Embankments Failure are, such as:

¨ Failure due to piping

¨ Cutting of embankment by antisocial elements for quick relief,

¨ Cutting of toe by cultivators leading to exposure of the hydraulic gradient,

¨ Erosion of embankment river current,

¨ Improper maintenance,

¨ Use of substandard construction materials,

¨ Use for temporary shelter when villages are inundated,

¨ Accumulation of rain water due absence or inadequate cross drainage facility.

Deforestation causes accelerated floods:

Human intervention and depredation in the watersheds also aggravate the problem.. The most serious environmental problem now facing on earth is deforestation. This part of world is not lagging behind either. The size of the problem can only be understood from an historical perspective. Few decades ago the entire region has been unrecognizably densely wooded with most human activities seemingly conducted within interminable forestland. Today that scenario is no longer existing.

What is so alarming is the rate of tree felling in the hill States. It is so rapid that doubt has been raised whether we will ever be able to make amends for the harm that has been done. Its effects, if unchecked, are most certain to bring about permanent ecological harm with dramatic increase in flooding problem. According to a report “the State of India’s Environment,1987” by an NGO, it is understood that from Kashmir to Assam the story is the same. Below 2000metres there is literally no forest left. In the middle Himalayan belt which rises to an average height of 3000 metres, the forest area, originally estimated at being a third of the total areas , has reduced to a mere 6.8%. We are seeing the serious consequences arising when the trees, termed as natures’ own flood barriers are felled. Because of denudation of forest cover the surface runoff has considerably increased leading to devastating floods in recent days.

Embankments serve vested interests while being detrimental to public interests:

The construction of embankments as flood control measures failed to serve the purpose for which it was meant .As mentioned above it has most deleterious effects. In that context the Planning Commission, Government of India took a strong view as under: “The government must ban further construction of embankments by unthinking engineers, supported by politicians and officials, who do not understand the hydrology of rivers. It should also include social scientists, environmentalists and geographers in developing strategies to deal with the situation .Otherwise both flood relief and fund meant for embankments are likely to go to corrupt and well-connected, and death and devastation in Assam will continue.”

ANNEXURE-3:WHY PREVIOUS ADVISORS TO AP GOVERNMENT OBJECTED TO POLAVARAM DAM?

http://www.sakti.in/godavaribasin/indira-sriramakrishnaiah.htm

Polavaram Project - Problems

1.      Cannot be of much use without either Ichampalli or Bhoopalapatnam projects on the upstream.

2.      R & R problems, Coal belt, etc.

3.      Dam line requires changes.

4.      Flood management is a problem.

5.      The Irrigation is limited to 7.0lakh acres (75% this already under some sort of irrigation) and with only          seasonal power.

6.      80 TMC transfer to Krishna delta is at the time not much required.

7.      Godavari and Krishna deltas get affected (loss of khariff paddy in 4.0 lakh acres).

8.      Yeleru canals need to be remodelled (C.D.Works).

9.      Rail and Road bridges are to be remodelled.

10.  Drawing about 250 TMC during rainy season from Polavaram to Krishna river disturbs the irrigation systems and agriculture.

11.  Kolleru lake level raises.

12.  Upputeru capacity becomes inadequate.

13.  Budameru becomes a river of sorrow.

14.  Vijayawada city gets into danger of flooding.

15.  Industrial and other developments between V.T.P.S. and Vijayawada may face serious flood problems.

16.  Delinking the Krishna delta from Nagarjunasagar and          partly attaching it to polavaram results in diminishing the protective rights of Krishna delta.

17.  Problem of heavy silting.

The deltas suffer from the drainage generated from the Eastern ghats.  Further adding 250 TMC in khariff season is like driving the last nail.  Environmentalists are not addressing themselves to these more serious problems and the study is limited to the R & R problems of polavaram reservoir only.

All this effort at a cost of nearly Rs.10,000 crores is for limited unsustainable benefits resulting in permanent injury to delta ayacut and other sectors.

Strategically, to plan to transport nearly 250 TMC at the eastern slopes of the Eastern Ghats is suicidal for the entire rich basin upto the Bay of Bengal, apart from lurking danger to the life lines, the Trunk road, railway line, irrigation tanks and canals.  This area suffers from flood problems frequently which will become more intensive.

Having lost nearly 50 years over the mighty projects of Ichampalli and Polavaram (earlier Ramapadasagar) which could not be resolved even now due to :-

(a)    heavy investment,

(b)   less benefits,

(c)    unresolved inter-state problems,

(d)   unsurmountable problems relating to environment and ecology,

(e)    limited irrigation coverage of only 8 to 9 lakh acres,

(f)     inevitably of lift irrigation to serve further needy areas,

(g)    consequent increase in regional disparities, and

(h)    drought areas not getting any benefit, I have expalined the availability of water, the period, the location and feasibility to take up lift irrigation to begin with, leaving the construction of the reservoir at Ichampalli and Polavaram to the wisdom, talent and effort to the future generations.

The Godavari flows almost close to the northern border.  The water is to be transported to higher levels negotiating the rising topography and over long distances.

Lift irrigation is therefore a must and distances to be reached are great.  The following strategies are evolved and adopted.

New Techniques (Alternatives)

1.      Use of natural water resources to function as canal systems.

2.      Low head pumping arrangements.

3.      Storage reservoirs submerging only unproductive lands without much rehabilation problems. 

4.      Swapping of waters from one system to the other.

5.      Beneficiaries participation and management from investigation to execution and operation.

The study revealed that about 600 TMC can be pumped without any head works across the Godavari. Utilising streams as carriers of pumped water and swapping of water from one system to the other has resulted in considerable economy, least disturbance to the environment and need less maintenance.

The scheme to irrigate 58 lakh acres, providing 40 TMC for drinking and industries, 10 TMC to Hyderabad and 40 TMC to Rayalaseema is made out after detailed study of levels and topography.

The cost per acre is as low as Rs.11,000 to 12,000.  The total power required during 4 to 5 months of rainy season is about 3000 MW, which can be managed over a period of 15 to 20 years.  All clearances can easily be obtained since no inter-state problems are involved and only limited problems relating to environment are involved.

Water supply to the Hyderabad city can be had at 30 to 50% of the cost of bringing water from the Nagarjunasagar.

New financial instruments need to be developed.  The scheme can be financed by the beneficiaries, if only the required atmosphere is created by suitable steps like enactments of the required acts, etc.  The government can act as friend, philosopher and guide, generously lending financial. Administrative and technical support when needed at the right time.

-.Sriramakrishnaiah K Dr., 2004, pp116-117, 2nd Irrigation Day Celebrations, 3rd March 2004, Background note for utilization of Godavari waters, Vision of Dr. K.Sriramakrishnaiah ,BE,FIE on Water resources and Utilisation in Andhra Pradesh.

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The Godavari is the biggest river in Andhra Pradesh.  It is also the lowest running river.  Its flood flow is limited to four to five months of south-west monsoon period.  Only nominal flows are available in other months.

Godavari flood flows transport considerable volume of silt.  Any reservoir across Godavari looses considerable capacity very fast.  The Godavari is flanked by dense Dandakaraya forest.   Any reservoir across Godavari involves submersion of valuable forest areas.  Alongwith it the tribals, who live in these forests have to be rehabilitated.  Mineral wealth, specially coal, a valuable energy fuel, may also be lost due to submersion under any reservoir.  The submersion extends to the neighbouring states, and this problem cannot be solved easily.

The main river has two notable works one at the entry into Andhra Pradesh-Sriramsagar, and the other at the head of the delta formation- Sir Arthur Cotton Barrage, near Dowlaiswaram.  In between Inchampalli reservoir and Polavaram project are proposed.   These projects have kindled the hopes and aspirations of the people in the Godavari basin and outside.

The rapid siltation of Sriramsagar, the biggest major irrigation project in the Telangana, is causing worry.

There is a plenty of scope to construct small reservoirs within the command which will improve the storage position.  Due to these reservoirs, the capacity of pumps to be installed gets reduced and the benefit of the post-monsoon crop, which is most desirable, can be had.

- Dr. K.Sriramakrishnaiah, 2004, pp122-126, 2nd Irrigation Day Celebrations, 3rd March 2004, Background note for utilization of Godavari waters, Vision of Dr. K.Sriramakrishnaiah,BE,FIE on Water resources and Utilisation in Andhra Pradesh.
 ANNEXURE - 4 :Demand To Cancel Forest Clearence

http://indigenouspeoplesissues.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6519:polavaram-dam-a-letter-to-jairam-ramesh&catid=63:central-asia-indigenous-peoples&Itemid=85 Saturday, 04 September 2010 21:56

Polavaram Dam: A Letter To Jairam Ramesh

From: Himanshu Thakkar

South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers & People,

c/o 86-D, AD block, Shalimar Bagh, Delhi,

himanshuthakkar@iitbombay.org, ht.sandrp@gmail.com www.sandrp.in

Ph: 27484655/ 9968242798

To: Shri Jairam Ramesh

Union Minister of State for Env and Forests (IC), New Delhi

Respected Sir,

I have just seen your letter dated Aug 18, 2010 to Orissa Chief Minister on the aboves subject, uploaded yesterday on MEF website.

1. Your letter says that the Forest Clearance has been given to the Polavaram Project on July 28, 2010 is subject to the condition, "... no submergence and displacement of people including STs take place in Orissa and Chhattisgarh...". However, this condition is in complete contradiction with the environment clearance given by your ministry on Oct 25, 2005, which says in para 2, "Total 1,93,35 persons are likely to be affected by this project, out of that 1,75,275 persons in Andhra Pradesh and 6,316 persons from Orissa and 11,766 are from Chattisgarh." It is clear the condition of no submergence and displacement on Orissa and Chhattisgarh, stated in your letter, in the Tribal Development Ministry's condition, and in the forest clearance letter is in complete contradiction with the environment clearance given by you. One of them have to be cancelled due to this contradiction, we would like to know, which one would be cancelled.

2. This condition of no submergence or displacement in Orissa or Chhattisgarh is based on the proposal to construct embankments along the respective rivers in Orissa and Chhattisgarh. However, the proposal to construct these embankments was not part of the project that was given clearance by your ministry on Oct 25, 2005. This change in scope of the project came to light when the project went for CWC clearance (given on 23.01.2009 following flawed *in principle* forest clearance given by your ministry on Dec 26, 2008). Following letter from MEF, the Govt of AP applied for concurrence of the MEF for building embankments on 29.01.2009. The issue came up for discussion in the meeting of EAC of River Valley committee on Feb 16-17, 2009. Prior to this EAC meeting, we had sent a detailed letter on 13.02.2009 to the EAC, explaining the implications of the proposal, lack of EIA or public consultation process, how this changes the scope of the project and so on, the same is attached. It is clear from details of this letter that hundred of ha of land would be required in Orissa and Chhattisgarh for the building of embankments, for mining of materials for building of embankments, for leaving land on the banks of the river on both sides, for building approach road, for building cross drainage channels and so on. A very large portion of this land would be forest land and it would also imply displacement of the people and their livelihoods. This itself is sufficient ground to show that MOTA condition, Orissa HC condition, your condition and FC condition of no submergence and displacement in Orissa and Chhattisgarh is impossible to adhere to, and this should again be sufficient ground to cancel both the priliminary and final FC given by your minister.

3. After the EAC meeting of Feb 16-17 2009, the EAC decided on this issue, "The EAC therefore directed the project proponent to initiate suitable action requesting the appropriate authorities in Orissa & Chattisgarh for conducting public hearings in the respective states of Chattisgarh & Orissa in respect of embankment proposal and report back to the committee." I am attaching the minutes of this EAC meeting for ready reference. This decision of the EAC implies that the project needs fresh clearance for this component and since project without this component would violate the various legal norms and conditions the project also cannot go ahead without that. However, the project is yet to take these steps and if it were to take this steps it would violate your conditions of no submergence and displacement in Orissa and Chhattisgarh. It is clear that your condition of no submergence and displacement in Orissa and Chhattisgarh is impossible to adhere to and hence the FC of the project has to be cancelled.

4. Here we would like to add that the EAC decision in Feb 16-17 2009 meeting was flawed since it is clear that this was changing the scope of the project cleared earlier. So EAC should also have asked that the earlier EC be cancelled till this decision is followed.

5. The Forest clearance given by your ministry, incidentally, has a condition, namely no (x), which says, "The project authority shall maintain flow of water in the down-stream course of river equal to the normal flow of water existing in pre-dam condition". I am at a loss to understand if this condition is to be adhered to (and I assume it needs to be adhered to all round the year, in all years, since there are no qualifications in the condition), how can the dam be built or operated at all? It seems there has not been sufficient application of mind while according the final FC dated 28.7.2010, which is sufficient reason for its cancellation.

These objections to the final FC and narration of the contradictions in your letter actually gives an opportunity to revisit the project and look for better options in achieving the irrigation and water supply in project areas. Hope you will take necessary steps in that direction after cancelling the flawed Environment clearance of Oct 25, 2005 (which was also quashed by NEAA in Dec 2007) and the forest clearances of Dec 26, 2008 and July 28, 2010.

I would be happy to explain these issues if necessary and will look forward to your early response.

Thanking you,

Himanshu Thakkar

ANNEXURE-5:visakhapatnam water sources and irrigation.

VISAKHAPATNAM:    [12-7-2010]   ,    http://www.andhranews.com/ftopic4004.html&start=4

                                                                                                                  More than 54 per cent excess rainfall in Visakhapatnam district during June and in the first week of July during current Monsoon did not bring in encouraging amounts of water into any of the seven reservoirs.

The only major reservoir that caters to 51,465 acres of irrigation needs in Visakhapatnam and East Godavari district – Thandava -- had to take a crop holiday during last season due insufficient inflows. Thandava with 380 ft full reservoir level, currently has filled up to 366.6 ft. compared to 354.75 ft. last season by this time.

Irrigation and Command Area Development Visakhapatnam Executive Engineer K.B.R. Prasada Rao told The Hindu that rainfall this year had been good till now and if continued further, more inflows were expected. Inflows into Thandava were 646 cusecs, 864 cusecs into Raiwada, 492 cusecs into Konam, 230 cusecs into Pedderu and 45 cusecs into Varaha, as on Friday.

Current levels of reservoir are Raiwada (104 mt./114mt. FRL); Konam (95.85mt./101.25mt.); Varaha (450.57 ft./460 ft); Gambhiramgedda (117.40 ft./126 ft.); Meghadrigedda (49.9 ft./61 ft.); Pedderu (136.15 ft./137 ft.).

The EE said that with meagre inflows last year, the Irrigation Department could supply to 60 to 80 per cent of the ayacut and hoped that during current season the reservoirs would fill up covering entire command area. The district currently has 3,63,294 acres under all kinds of irrigation projects – medium and minor ones.
Strengthening of bunds had been taken up on minor irrigation projects, which when completed would improve the irrigation water supply to tail-end areas by 40 per cent.
Seventy three tanks were taken up for repair works during current financial year at a cost of Rs.9.72 crore and works valued at Rs.3.2 crore were grounded so far. Some of the tenders are executed by the Water Users' Associations, which amount to Rs.1.2 crore.
Meanwhile, a Rs.1-crore project proposal to de-silt the Meghadrigedda reservoir, which was being exclusively used for drinking water purposes of GVMC area, was pending with the Corporation, he said. The reservoir overflowed only in 2005 and 2007 in the last one decade to lift the sluice gates. About 2.43 lakh cubic metres of silt is proposed to be removed to restore the original capacity of the reservoir to 1.02 TMC. The GVMC funds the maintenance of the reservoir while the irrigation department manages it on their behalf.
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