PART-1
AP ENGINEERS HAVE ALSO MISLED CHIEF MINISTERS AND THE CENTRAL WATER
COMMISSION ON GODAVARI PEAK FLOODS
AP State Engineers misled AP Chief Minister to enter into impracticable
and illegal Interstate agreement with Madhya Pradesh and Orissa during August
and December 1978 ( extract of para 100 and 102 of Bachawat Tribunal report of
1979:
Clause VIII(E) of the Agreement
dated the 7th August, 1978 between Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh
and Maharashtra provides—
“(E) The state
of Madhya Pradesh agrees subject to the State of Orissa
agreeing for the construction of Polavaram project of the State of Andhra Pradesh so that the maximum submergence in Madhya
Pradesh territory at Konta does not exceed R.L.+150ft due to all effects
including backwater effect. The Polavaram
project shall be designed for the maximum probable flood in consultation with
the Central Water Commission so as not to exceed the limit of submergence
mentioned above.”
Clause-II(I) of the Agreement
between the states of Andhra Pradesh and Orissa dated the 15th
December, ides-1978 prov
“(I) The States of Orissa and
Andhra Pradesh agree for the construction of Polavaram Project of the
State of Andhra Pradesh, so that the maximum submersion in the
State of Orissa
territory at Motu/Konta does not exceed RL +150ft due to all effects
including
backwater effect. The Polavaram Project
shall be designed for the maximum probable flood in consultation with the
Central Water Commission so as not to exceed the limit of submergence mentioned
above”.
The Central Water Commission sent
letter No.6/125/78-T.E/25, 12-2514, dated the 3rd July, 1979 to
Andhra Pradesh Government, the material portion of which is as follows:
“It is seen from the project report that the
State Government of Andhra Pradesh have proposed the Polavaram project for an
FRL /MWL of +150ft. Therefore, prima
facie, with MWL at Polavaram at RL +150ft. submergence due to all effects
including that of backwater effect will always be more than RL +150ft. upstream
and also at Konta. The State Government
will no doubt be working out the backwater effects at Konta/Motu considering
advance releases from Polavaram Dam. It
is however seen that
during the year, 1966 CWC had observed that a flood level
at Konta had reached an RL 46.595m (RL +162.7ft).
This is an observed flood whose frequency is expected to be high. For a flood at Konta corresponding to
frequency the flood adopted for the Polavaram Dam (which will be between 1 in
500 years to 1 in 1000 years),
the natural flood level at Konta should be
expected to be substantially higher than RL +45.72m (RL +150ft.) It would thus be seen that the stipulation
that a flood level at Konta/Motu should not rise above RL +150ft will not be
practicable and that the agreements entered into by the States may have to be
suitably modified. Perhaps this
situation about observed flood level at Konta might not have been known to you
and other states when this agreement was concluded.”
:U.S.Dam Design=standards Often,,either with I.D.F or P.M.Fit is likely that
downstream inundation would be the same with or without failure of the dam.
The consequences of dam failure may
not be acceptable if the hazard potential to these down-stream habitations is
increased appreciably by the failure flood wave or level of inundation.
When a dam=break analysis shows
downstream incremental effects of approximately two feet or more, engineering
judgment and further analysiswill be necessary to finally evaluate the need for
modification to the dam. In general, the consequences of failure are considered
acceptable .
when the incremental effects (depth)
of failure on downstream structures are approximately two feet or less.
8.
A.p. Engineers failed to follow the American safety design standards for dams
because they known that for the report of the dam break analysis prepared by
the experts of N.I.O.H, Roorkee, that the flood wave height below the dam in
the river channel at Rajahmundry was 34 meters and hence since there is an incremental
increase of flood wave height by morethan 2 feet they have to redesign the dam
as per the U.S. standards to ensure safety of the project and since they failed
to do this revised design commited a serious technical mistake on safety
accepts of the project this is not acceptable to the public .Even today the
head works od these polavaram project can be changed from a big dam into a
barrage.
PART-2
AP STATE ENGINEERS DESIGNATED POLAVARAM
AS A BARRAGE AND THEREBY MISLEAD CENTRAL WATER COMMISSION TO ACCEPT PEAK FLOOD
OF 36 LAKH CUSECS FOR THE DESIGN OF THE POLAVARAM PROEJCT (E-MAIL DT.11-12-2009)
Central Water Commission
Hydrology (South) Directorate
Letter dt.13-2-2008
In the earlier studies,(1996)? the
project authorities proposed a design flood of 80,000 cumecs (36 lakh
cusecs). These studies were based on
flood frequency approach and the observed data for the period 1981-1995 was
used to obtain flood of 500-year return period.
Central Water Commission accepted this estimated flood of 80,000 cumecs
in 1979. From the records, it is found
that this flood was accepted when the structure proposed at the project location
was a barrage. In the revised reports submitted
earlier, 2004? same design flood i.e.80,000 cumecs has been recommended and no
revised studied were carried out.[The Author Adds: It is shocking under what influence the CWCdeliberately haveignored the then standard of 1000-year return flood as per even Indian Standards to approve polavaram]
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