A PRELIMINARY DAM BREAK SCENARIO OF ALAMATTI PROJECT
Prof.M.L.Narasimham. Professor of Civil engineering College of Engineering Andhra University | Prof.T.Shivaji Rao Director, Center for Environmental Studies, Gitam University | Prof.M.V.Venkata Rao Retd. Professor of Civil Engineering College of engineering Andhra University |
( “ENVIRONEMNTAL IMPLICATIONS OF ALAMATTI DAM” – A Paper presented at the workshop on
“Socio-Technological and Environmental aspects of Alamatti dam and Krishna waters”,
Civil Engineering Department, Andhra University, Visakhapatnam.October,1996.)
Click on web site for PHOTO OF ALAMATTI DAM :
http://www.indianetzone.com/33/alamatti_dam_karnataka.htm
http://www.hindu.com/2009/07/06/stories/2009070653280300.htm [Summer conditions with low flows in Alamatti ]
INCRESING ALAMATTI DAM HEIGHT DELAYS AGRICULTURAL OPERATIONS IN A.P.STATE By 45 to 60 DAYS
VIJAYAWADA: The raising of Almatti Dam height to 524.26 metres to hold an additional 303 tmcft would delay the arrival of water to Krishna delta by a minimum of 45 days, said Irrigation experts at a conference organised by the Krishna Delta Parirakshana Samithi at Hotel Ilapuram here on Tuesday.see web site:below.
“Socio-Technological and Environmental aspects of Alamatti dam and Krishna waters”,
Civil Engineering Department, Andhra University, Visakhapatnam.October,1996.)
Click on web site for PHOTO OF ALAMATTI DAM :
http://www.indianetzone.com/33/alamatti_dam_karnataka.htm
http://www.hindu.com/2009/07/06/stories/2009070653280300.htm [Summer conditions with low flows in Alamatti ]
INCRESING ALAMATTI DAM HEIGHT DELAYS AGRICULTURAL OPERATIONS IN A.P.STATE By 45 to 60 DAYS
VIJAYAWADA: The raising of Almatti Dam height to 524.26 metres to hold an additional 303 tmcft would delay the arrival of water to Krishna delta by a minimum of 45 days, said Irrigation experts at a conference organised by the Krishna Delta Parirakshana Samithi at Hotel Ilapuram here on Tuesday.see web site:below.
During poor monsoon periods due to recyurring El Nino conditions,farmers in krishna delta will suffer more because the onset of depressions and cyclones during that period will ruin the paddy as had occured in 2010..
But Bijapur farmers leaders argue that maharashtra is storing more than 800 TMC in their reservoirs and therby utilise 1200TMC of krishna waters and that they do not expect enough water in Alamatti resrvoir and hence the plea of incresing the height of Alamatti is silently accepted by Maharashtra Government experts who know the truth but never reveal it before the Brajesh Kumar tribunal on krishna water dispute.so there are different kinds situations that can develop to create different Hazards like Extrem floods and Droughts also based upon the occurrence of either El Nino conditions for some years and La Nina conditions later on.
http://www.hindu.com/2011/01/12/stories/2011011262750300.htm
SEVERAL DAMS FACED RESERVOIR-INDUCED SEISMICITY AND EARTHQUAKES.see website
http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/RIS_final_lorez2.pdf
Reservoir-Induced Seismicity, or RIS, is thought to occur in two
ways: (1) by the added weight of a reservoir and (2) by the water
that seeps into cracks underground or along a fault. In the first
case, the filling of a reservoir with millions, even billions, of tons
of water can add stress to faults, causing them to rupture. In the
second case, water seeps into the rock and changes the fluid pressure
in micro-cracks and fissures in the ground under and near a
reservoir..There are more than one hundred cases of R.I.S
http://www.deccanherald.com/content/49696/mild-tremors-experienced.html
http://www.deccanherald.com/content/67758/experts-study-tremors-around-almatti.html
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/hubli/Scientists-team-to-visit-Bijapur/articleshow/7462964.cms
Alamatti Dam located Downstream of a Highly Hazardous Koyna Dam may face a DAM BURST,creating a DISASTER
http://envis.maharashtra.gov.in/envis_data/pdf/dec.pdf . koyna region faced a devastating7.5 magnitude Earthquake?
http://cities.expressindia.com/fullstory.php?newsid=141880
http://www.hindu.com/2000/10/08/stories/0408210c.htm
http://www.indianexpress.com/ie/daily/20010203/ifr03016.html
http://waterresources.kar.nic.in/salient_features_ukp.htm [Alamatti Dam web site with,incomplete data]But Bijapur farmers leaders argue that maharashtra is storing more than 800 TMC in their reservoirs and therby utilise 1200TMC of krishna waters and that they do not expect enough water in Alamatti resrvoir and hence the plea of incresing the height of Alamatti is silently accepted by Maharashtra Government experts who know the truth but never reveal it before the Brajesh Kumar tribunal on krishna water dispute.so there are different kinds situations that can develop to create different Hazards like Extrem floods and Droughts also based upon the occurrence of either El Nino conditions for some years and La Nina conditions later on.
http://www.hindu.com/2011/01/12/stories/2011011262750300.htm
SEVERAL DAMS FACED RESERVOIR-INDUCED SEISMICITY AND EARTHQUAKES.see website
http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/RIS_final_lorez2.pdf
Reservoir-Induced Seismicity, or RIS, is thought to occur in two
ways: (1) by the added weight of a reservoir and (2) by the water
that seeps into cracks underground or along a fault. In the first
case, the filling of a reservoir with millions, even billions, of tons
of water can add stress to faults, causing them to rupture. In the
second case, water seeps into the rock and changes the fluid pressure
in micro-cracks and fissures in the ground under and near a
reservoir..There are more than one hundred cases of R.I.S
Alamatti Dam on Earth-quake prone zone may face DAM- BURST,creating a National Disaster.
http://www.indianexpress.com/ie/daily/20010203/ifr03016.html [the author prerdicts seismicity]
http://www.stanford.edu/~aadya/publications/KoynaPresentation.pdf
http://www.deccanherald.com/content/80002/tremors-continue-rock-regions-around.htmlhttp://www.indianexpress.com/ie/daily/20010203/ifr03016.html [the author prerdicts seismicity]
http://www.stanford.edu/~aadya/publications/KoynaPresentation.pdf
http://www.deccanherald.com/content/49696/mild-tremors-experienced.html
http://www.deccanherald.com/content/67758/experts-study-tremors-around-almatti.html
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/hubli/Scientists-team-to-visit-Bijapur/articleshow/7462964.cms
Koyna Dam Reservoir is still producing Earth Quake tremors due to reservoir-induced seismicity in February,2011
http://www.mid-day.com/news/2011/feb/060211-koyna-minor-earthquake-ratnagiri.htmThree Dams also failed in Andhra Pradesh between 2006 and 2010 due to various reasons
The Palemvagu dam in Khammam district
which breached on Monday. Tuesday, Aug 05, 2008
http://www.hindu.com/2008/08/05/stories/2008080555900100.htm (Palemvagu) · Ratnagiri district of Maharashtra experienced an earthquake of 3.1 on the Richter scale on Saturday evening that left no major impact in its wake.
The tremors were felt near the Koyna river region, confirmed scientists of the Indian Seismology department. An official from the Delhi headquarters said, "There were slight tremors and nothing major. It is an earthquake prone area." The earthquake occurred at 7:28 pm on Saturday.A resident from a nearby village in Ratnagiri said, "I didn't feel any tremors. It must have been a very minor one." This is not the first time the Koyna area has suffered an earthquake -- recently a moderate earthquake of 6.5 on the Richter scale was felt in the same area. It is believed that the Koyna Dam has contributed to earthquakes in the region.
http://www.mid-day.com/news/2011/feb/060211-koyna-minor-earthquake-ratnagiri.htmThe tremors were felt near the Koyna river region, confirmed scientists of the Indian Seismology department. An official from the Delhi headquarters said, "There were slight tremors and nothing major. It is an earthquake prone area." The earthquake occurred at 7:28 pm on Saturday.A resident from a nearby village in Ratnagiri said, "I didn't feel any tremors. It must have been a very minor one." This is not the first time the Koyna area has suffered an earthquake -- recently a moderate earthquake of 6.5 on the Richter scale was felt in the same area. It is believed that the Koyna Dam has contributed to earthquakes in the region.
Magnetic anomalies discovered by aeromagnetic surveys c onducted by NGRI in koyna & Warna regions
http://www.igu.in/8-4/1agrawal.pdf .Do they show high seismic potentials that may cause Dam Collapses? Alamatti Dam located Downstream of a Highly Hazardous Koyna Dam may face a DAM BURST,creating a DISASTER
http://envis.maharashtra.gov.in/envis_data/pdf/dec.pdf . koyna region faced a devastating7.5 magnitude Earthquake?
http://cities.expressindia.com/fullstory.php?newsid=141880
http://www.hindu.com/2000/10/08/stories/0408210c.htm
http://www.indianexpress.com/ie/daily/20010203/ifr03016.html
http://www.kbjnl.com/aboutus.htm [Alamatti project managers' Data,frequently changed web site data]
http://www.gitam.edu/cos/env/skeches/sketches.htm [ a few Rough sketches of Alamatti project]
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2622/stories/20091106262203400.htm [Tungabhadra;6 to 7 lakhs cusecs]
Floods in Maharashtra in August 2005:
Almost all reservoirs in the state are overflowing because of excess rain water fed into them. Total water released from the Koyna Dam is being gradually reduced. Today afternoon 20,000 cusecs water was released from this dam. However from a number of other dams, 1-3 lakh cusecs water has been released today (Khadagwasla, Pandarpor, Sangam, Ujai, Sangli, Akali and Suranapul) [5th.August,2005]
Almatti dam CAG faults Maharashtra on delay in raising alarm about Alamatti back waters and it is encountered by the refusal of Karnataka State for releases from Alamatti :
The height of the Almatti Dam in Karnataka, constructed (1978-1989) on the river Krishna, flowing down from Maharashtra was the subject matter of a Supreme Court case. Technical studies conducted in the past by GOM indicated that the territory of Maharashtra in the vicinity of Sangli Town (RL- 518 Meters) would come under submergence, if the full reservoir level (FRL) was kept at 519.60 M Supreme Court allowed FRL upto 519.60 M (2000) expecting the issue of submergence to be adjudicated by a competent tribunal. Clearance for raising storage level to 519.60 M was accordingly given by GOI (Central Water Commission and Planning Commission) subject to the condition that water storage level shall be so regulated, by discharging sufficient water, that there would not be any submergence in the territory of Maharashtra. In monsoon-2005, the Karnataka Government did not care to pre- deplete the reservoir for avoiding submergence in Maharashtra till 31 July 2005. Water storage due to heavy rainfall had reached full reservoir level (FRL-519.60 M) on 26 July 2005 itself. First letter for releasing water from Almatti Dam was written on 3 August 2005 to Karnataka, after Sangli got flooded fully. The Government of Karnataka from 31 July 2005, started releasing water from 519.60 M to 519.10 M and upto 517.20 M on 4 August 2005. Sangli remained under prolonged submergence for seven to eight days, mainly due to back water effect of Almmatti Dam, affecting many families, to whom GOM had granted relief assistance of Rs 58.78 crore. This could have
been avoided, had the conditional clearance to the project by GOI been timely monitored by keeping close vigil on water levels in the Almatti dam by keeping a note of it in the State DMP.
Water levels in all other dams were also not monitored in 2005. Government accepted (September 2006) the facts in respect of Almatti dam and stated that in 2006 the matter was taken care of.
WHY KARNATAKA STATE IS HELPLESS IN PREVENTING FLOODING OF SANGLI DISTRICT
Irrigation experts told Frontline that both States, especially Maharashtra (by virtue of being the upper riparian), probably stored waters in their dams far in excess of the necessary storage level before the onset of the monsoon. They probably did not wait to build up storage levels slowly as the monsoon progressed fearing the level would come down if the monsoon failed. But with excess rains in the catchment areas in Maharashtra, the States were forced to release water from their dams, which had reached their full reservoir levels (FRLs) thereby aggravating the flood situation.
Even as the people are reeling under the impact of the floods, Maharashtra and Karnataka indulged in a dispute over the release of the Krishna waters. Maharashtra has accused Karnataka of not fulfilling its obligation to release adequate quantities of the Krishna waters from the Almatti dam so that the flood situation and the backwater effect in its inundated southern districts could be brought under control. It even got Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to intervene in the matter.
Karnataka has refused to release 6 lakh cusecs of water from the Almatti dam that Maharashtra has been demanding. On August 5, Karnataka released 4.20 lakh cu against an inflow of 3.57 lakh cu, reducing the water level in the dam to 516.4 metres, as against the FRL of 519.6 m.
Karnataka Chief Minster N. Dharam Singh said the release of 6 lakh cu would inundate 600 villages in Karnataka. But with Maharashtra increasing the outflow from its upstream Koyna dam (3.96 lakh cu was released on August 6) steadily, Karnataka, according to engineers at the Almatti dam site, will also have to increase gradually the outflow to 5 lakh cu. The water discharges from the Almatti dam have already affected over 60 villages in Hungund and Muddebihal taluks of Bagalkot and Bijapur districts.
According to the Water Resources Minister M. Mallikarjun Kharge, Maharashtra was needlessly creating a controversy over the discharge of water from Almatti. His contention is that the villages in Sangli and Kolhapur could not have been affected by the backwaters of the Almatti as they are located at a height of 538 metres above sea level. After all, floods had ravaged villages in both districts in 1964 and 1976, before the dam was constructed. He also claimed that in 2002-03 and 2004, when the dam had reached full storage level, no village in Maharashtra was submerged. Irrigation experts also point out that a joint survey by engineers from both States, which was later cleared by the Central Water Commission (CWC), stated that villages upstream up to and beyond Sangli would not be flooded even when the water level at the Almatti dam reached 524.256 m..See the following article on "DEVASTATION AND DISPUTE" in FRONTLINE MAGAZINE,Chennai .http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2217/stories/20050826006413100.htm
FLOOD CONTRIBUTION FROM MAHARASHTRA RESERVOIRS DURING 5th.AUGUST,2005
Almost all reservoirs in the state are overflowing because of excess rain water fed into them. Total water released from the Koyna Dam is being gradually reduced. Today afternoon 20,000 cusecs water was released from this dam. However from a number of other dams, 1-3 lakh cusecs water has been released today (Khadagwasla, Pandarpor, Sangam, Ujai, Sangli, Akali and Suranapul) [5th.August,2005]
For a comparative study on the Environmental Prime Minister Mrs.Indira Gandhi's perspective on making big dams more safe and useful for the public study the following website on Polavaram dam
http://tshivajirao.blogspot.com/2010/11/polavaram-dam-in-indira-gandhis.html
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2217/stories/20050826006413100.htm
Alamatti dam suspected to have caused back water afflux resulting in flooding in sangli region]
http://indianairforce.nic.in/show_page.php?pg_id=115
[Alamatti Dam released 25 lakhs cusecs ?]
Study the last News item "FLOOD RELIEF EX-KURNOOL "
Introduction:
http://tshivajirao.blogspot.com/2010/11/polavaram-dam-in-indira-gandhis.html
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2217/stories/20050826006413100.htm
Alamatti dam suspected to have caused back water afflux resulting in flooding in sangli region]
http://indianairforce.nic.in/show_page.php?pg_id=115
[Alamatti Dam released 25 lakhs cusecs ?]
Study the last News item "FLOOD RELIEF EX-KURNOOL "
Introduction:
Failure of dams in general may occur in two ways. One mode of failure is gradual one where sufficient time is available for the officials to plan the Emergency rescue operations. The other mode of failure is a sudden collapse resulting in flash floods where enough time is not available. for rescue operations to save people living downstream of the dam In the second case the magnitude of damage will be many folded compared to a gradual failure of the dam. Whenever large dams are proposed to be constructed it becomes necessary to take up a study on the possible effects of the dam break and the extent of submergence in the ddown stream side of the dam site. Thus the dam break analysis becomes a part of the Environmental Impact Analysis]EIA ]of the Dam project. In fact this analysis is most significant and important than other aspects concerned with the EIA procedure adopted due to ithe sudden nature of Dam collapseoccurrence without any notice and the possible serious loss of precious lives and valuable properties..
In this paper a brief out line on the preliminary work on the dam break scenario on Alamatti project is presented after discussing the possibilities that may lead to the failure of Alamatti dam on krishna river
CAUSES OF DAM FAILURES:
http://www.masterbuilder.co.in/ci/358/Dams/ [Causes for Dam failures in India]
http://www.damsafety.org/news/?p=412f29c8-3fd8-4529-b5c9-8d47364c1f3e[animations,dam bursts]
http://www.chinastakes.com/2008/5/china-earthquakes-more-peril-dam-and-reservoir-collapse.html
[ Chinese Experts recommend that Reservoir Emptying is a solution for Dam safety,so reduce Height of Alamatti dam to 515 meters elevation as Krishna tribunal experts are not technical experts to decide on the sizes of storages or heights of dams which are matters of public safety.? According to Section 45 of Indian Evidence Act,non-experts should not promote Ecological Crimes]
http://sites.google.com/site/profshivajirao/polavaramdam-0
[ Even if Maharashtra and Andhra pradesh Secretaries to Government and officials,expertrs and advocates have miserably failed to understand and speak on the various critical ecological and environmental risks involved in raising the height of Alamatti dam due to lack of accountability to the public safety and optimal development without risks to national economy and public safety,the
Tribunal members cannot be unaware of the Environment Protection Act,1986 and its regulations which have a strong bearing on the damaging impacts of irrigation &power projects which have to be designed in tune with the EIA.EAP,DMP and EMP guidelines formulated by the Union Govt.agencies as can be seen by relevant reports presented in the web site on polavaram Project and without taking these legal and technical aspects,the Tribunal need not venture to decide on these issues of life and death to lakhs of people in karnataka and Andhra pradesh and Maharashtra.in terms of Dam-Break analysis,Disaster Managemwent and Flood inundation issues that will surface due to improper decision-making without consulting the concerned Environmentalists,Hydrologists,Seismologists,Meteorlogists who make the risk analysis etc,.]
http://www.masterbuilder.co.in/ci/358/Dams/ [Causes for Dam failures in India]
http://www.damsafety.org/news/?p=412f29c8-3fd8-4529-b5c9-8d47364c1f3e[animations,dam bursts]
http://www.chinastakes.com/2008/5/china-earthquakes-more-peril-dam-and-reservoir-collapse.html
[ Chinese Experts recommend that Reservoir Emptying is a solution for Dam safety,so reduce Height of Alamatti dam to 515 meters elevation as Krishna tribunal experts are not technical experts to decide on the sizes of storages or heights of dams which are matters of public safety.? According to Section 45 of Indian Evidence Act,non-experts should not promote Ecological Crimes]
http://sites.google.com/site/profshivajirao/polavaramdam-0
[ Even if Maharashtra and Andhra pradesh Secretaries to Government and officials,expertrs and advocates have miserably failed to understand and speak on the various critical ecological and environmental risks involved in raising the height of Alamatti dam due to lack of accountability to the public safety and optimal development without risks to national economy and public safety,the
Tribunal members cannot be unaware of the Environment Protection Act,1986 and its regulations which have a strong bearing on the damaging impacts of irrigation &power projects which have to be designed in tune with the EIA.EAP,DMP and EMP guidelines formulated by the Union Govt.agencies as can be seen by relevant reports presented in the web site on polavaram Project and without taking these legal and technical aspects,the Tribunal need not venture to decide on these issues of life and death to lakhs of people in karnataka and Andhra pradesh and Maharashtra.in terms of Dam-Break analysis,Disaster Managemwent and Flood inundation issues that will surface due to improper decision-making without consulting the concerned Environmentalists,Hydrologists,Seismologists,Meteorlogists who make the risk analysis etc,.]
It is established by scientists that when the reservoirs behind high dams are filled up with water ,they become sources of man-made hazards.and they may cause earth quake tremors like in Koyna Dam Reservoir and this phenomenon is called “reservoir – induced-seismicity”. Dams can fail due to Extreme floods, improper spillway designs,bombing,fonndation defects,poor construction or human failures in operating spillway gates .
In fact,the Karnataka state Government expressed doubts about safety of dams in karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. due to possible collapse of Koyna Dam and wanted Central Water Commission[CWC]to take responsibilty to ensure safety of Dams and wanted DAM-BREAK Analysis studies for all the Dams in 2000.
http://www.hindu.com/2000/10/08/stories/0408210c.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dam_failure
http://www.probeinternational.org/original-content/leading-causes-dam-failure
http://saiindia.gov.in/cag/sites/default/files/cag_reports/maharashtra/rep_2006/civilper_chap_5.pdf
http://www.downtoearth.org.in/node/6314
http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/what%20we%20do/global%20climate%20change%20and%20energy/tackling%20climate%20change/intl_strategy/dev_countries/india/india-climate-5-water.pdf
In the case of Almatti Dam probable failure can occur due to extreme floods or potential seismic hazards
Seismic Hazards and related calamities are known to man kind for centuries but their impact becomes intensive when they begin to occur in the vicinity of major dams. Seismic Hazards like earth quakes usually occur due to release of endogenic forces and related crust adjustments. Although Deccan plateau has all along been considered as stable land mass evidencing no tectonic movements, the recent Latur earthquake disproved this belief. Satellite photographs indicate that South Indian Peninsula is not an exception to such pulsatory tectonic forces. Several lineaments in South India are witnessing seismicity even today. While the Indian tectonic plate is moving annually at 5cms and is colliding with Tibetan plateau, the convective current is pushing the Indian plateau Northwards and when it moves it does not move as a single sheet but it causes up and down of the terrestrial surface due to the varying nature and the density of the crustal rocks. Such upward portions are called as “Cymatogenic arches” and the complementary down-warped portions are called “deeps”. The Belgaum-Kakinada arch passes through the upper Krishna project and as such it becomes necessary to assess the seismic potential of the project site and whether the site is safe both natural size as well as for increased sections.[For details on seismic aspects see figures presented in the last pages]
In fact,the Karnataka state Government expressed doubts about safety of dams in karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. due to possible collapse of Koyna Dam and wanted Central Water Commission[CWC]to take responsibilty to ensure safety of Dams and wanted DAM-BREAK Analysis studies for all the Dams in 2000.
http://www.hindu.com/2000/10/08/stories/0408210c.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dam_failure
http://www.probeinternational.org/original-content/leading-causes-dam-failure
http://saiindia.gov.in/cag/sites/default/files/cag_reports/maharashtra/rep_2006/civilper_chap_5.pdf
http://www.downtoearth.org.in/node/6314
http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/what%20we%20do/global%20climate%20change%20and%20energy/tackling%20climate%20change/intl_strategy/dev_countries/india/india-climate-5-water.pdf
In the case of Almatti Dam probable failure can occur due to extreme floods or potential seismic hazards
Seismic Hazards and related calamities are known to man kind for centuries but their impact becomes intensive when they begin to occur in the vicinity of major dams. Seismic Hazards like earth quakes usually occur due to release of endogenic forces and related crust adjustments. Although Deccan plateau has all along been considered as stable land mass evidencing no tectonic movements, the recent Latur earthquake disproved this belief. Satellite photographs indicate that South Indian Peninsula is not an exception to such pulsatory tectonic forces. Several lineaments in South India are witnessing seismicity even today. While the Indian tectonic plate is moving annually at 5cms and is colliding with Tibetan plateau, the convective current is pushing the Indian plateau Northwards and when it moves it does not move as a single sheet but it causes up and down of the terrestrial surface due to the varying nature and the density of the crustal rocks. Such upward portions are called as “Cymatogenic arches” and the complementary down-warped portions are called “deeps”. The Belgaum-Kakinada arch passes through the upper Krishna project and as such it becomes necessary to assess the seismic potential of the project site and whether the site is safe both natural size as well as for increased sections.[For details on seismic aspects see figures presented in the last pages]
Due to the floods and other causes often massive dam structures burst leading to submergence of vast areas .Panshet dam on Mutha rier burst in 1969 and caused serious damage and loss of lives in Pune. Following heavy rains in August 1979, and earth and masonry dam on the river Machchu burst and caused 7 meters high surge which submerged Morvi town and left 1500 people dead in the neighbourhood. There are 16 dam burst in India and the number will be greater if minor irrigation dams are also included. The Koyna dam on Krishna river is 103 meters high and stores 2780 million cubic meters of water. The dam was subjected to earth quake shocks of magnitude 5.4 Richter scale in September 1967 and 6.4 Richter scale in December 1967. The earthquake caused damage and killing 177 people and injuring 2300 others.
http://nptel.iitm.ac.in/courses/IIT-MADRAS/Hydraulics/pdfs/Unit41/41_2.pdf%20
http://nptel.iitm.ac.in/courses/IIT-MADRAS/Hydraulics/pdfs/Unit41/41_2.pdf%20
All large reservoirs must therefore be considered as potential sources of induced earthquake activity, since dams are also good targets for enemy action, the US Air force destroyed hydro-electric dams in North Korea in 1953. Under these circumstances an over-sized Alamatti dam may fail due to a maximum credible accident in view of its location on the cymatogenic arch of Belgam-Kakinada and in view of the previous occurrence of an earthquake at Koyna dam in the same geographical basin of the Krishna river. The dam safety and disaster scenarios along with disaster management plant must be considered both for normal sized Alamatti reservoir with a dam height of 515 meters and also over-sized Alamatti reservoir with a height of 524 meters. The safety of the dam will be determined only after evaluation and resettlement of the human and animal populations that will be subjected to flash floods and inundation at different places down stream.
DAM BREAK SCENARIO OF ALAMATTI:
Whenever a dam fails suddenly, the entire volume of water stored in the reservoir will move down stream in the form of a surge/a wall of water.. The surge height can be evaluated using the free surface flow fundamentals. One simple method is to consider the existing water levels and assuming the sheet to follow the water surface. Another method is through solving the governing equations of motion. For the case of Alamatti dam, in the present study both the approaches have been adopted with certain assumptions. In the first method the water levels at Alamatti dam (524)and Narayanapur (490) being known it is assumed that the water spread will be below these two elevations in this reach. The profile will be parabolic as against the assumed linear profile. However for an initial approximation the linear profile can be considered and based on this the submergence contour can be fixed. For the remaining reach, with the known bed levels, a constant water depth much below the normal depth for the maximum flood discharge is assumed. For the maximum flood discharge of 33000 cumecs assuming a bed width of 500 meters and a longitudinal slope of 8 x 10-4 on the average for the river as can be seen from the toposheets and taking C= 80 the normal depth comes to be 9.5 meters . Hence a depth of 10 meters is assumed to prevail over which will be on the lower side since the reservoir volume and its discharge have not been included. With this data the computations have been carried out and the results are presented in Table 1.
Table -1 RESULTS OF A SIMPLE MODEL FOR SUBMERGENCE D/S OF ALAMATTI
Location | Distance from Alamatti (Km) | BL | Water Level | Approx. Submergence contour | No.of villages submerged (list given in Annexure-I) |
Alamatti | 0 | 480 | 524 | ||
Narayanapur | 64 | 467 | 490 | 507 | 58 |
Kollur | 139 | 350 | 360 | 425 | 82 |
Bhima Confluence | 175 | 330 | 340 | 350 | 20 |
Jurala | 230 | 300 | 310 | 330 | 36 |
Siddeswaram | 305 | 290 | 300 | 305 | 40 |
A more rigorous analysis is carried out by considering the dam break equation given below.
X = yo [ = + 1n(1- =)]…….1
SoWhere yo = normal depth
So = bed slope
= = yo, y = depth at any distance x from the origin located at y = o.
yFor carrying out the analysis the following data has been considered.
Volume of water stored : 230 TMC = 230 x 28.40 x 106 = 6.53 x 109m3
Volume of flood water : 2.18 x 109m3
(assuming 1/3 release)
Average height of reservoir : 33.5m
(Height at dam site = 44 m ; Height at farthest pt. = 23m)
Assumed time of release :1.0 hr = 3600sec
Discharge : (Volume/Time) =(2.18 x 109)/3600 = 6.05 x 105m3
Average width of river : 500m
Average bed slope : 8 x 10-4 m3
Chezy constant :80
Normal depth : 6.30 m
The results obtained using this data are presented in table2.
Table-2 RESULTS OF VARIED FLOW MODEL FOR SUBMERGENCE BELOW ALAMATTI
Location (nearest station) | Dist. D/s of Alamatti (km) | B.L. | Depth of water | W.L. | Approx. time of surge arrival (hr). | Submergence contour | No. of villages submerged (list given in Annexure-II) |
Alamatti | 0 | 480 | 44 | 524 | 0.0 | 515.5 | 32 |
Narayanapur | 60 | 467 | 40 | 507 | 0.50 | 464.5 | 20 |
Tintani | 95 | 390 | 32 | 422 | 0.78 | 397.0 | 12 |
Lingadahalii | 105 | 356 | 16 | 372 | 0.86 | 366.75 | 10 |
Mushtihalli | 110 | 355 | 6.5 | 3 61.5 | 0.90 | 360.75 | 10 |
Bagur | 115 | 355 | 5 | 360 | 0.94 |
From tables 1 and 2 it can be seen that a number of villages are going to be submerged due to sudden collapse of the dam.,resulting in flash floods. It can further be seen that the time lag between the dam failure and the surge arrival at a distance as large as 115km d/s of the dam is just 1 hour. The study carried out is only approximate and a more rigorous analysis would lead to a better post dam break scenario. It is suggested here that analysis with complete data is to be carried out to obtain more authentic information on the extent of submergence.
CONCLUSIONS:
From the study carried out here the following conclusions can be drawn.
1. As Alamatti project site is located in an earthquake prone area, dam break analysis is needed for its normal heights as well as enhanced height
2. From the results obtained through a simplified approach and a refined methodology, it can be seen that a number of villages are going to be submerged in the event the dam fails suddenly.due to one reason or the other The list of villages are given in Annexures-I and II for the two approaches.
3. A more precise study is suggested to be made by state Government organisations and the Central water commission{CWC] and the Union Ministry of Environment &Forests and interested organisations and experts to obtain more authentic information on the post dam break scenario for being placed before the public and the Courts and commissions like the Krishna water Disputes Tribunals who are expected to take decisions based on a comprehensive approach to the problems of Design criteria of Dams based not only on water availability but also on the structural,environmental and ecological safety but also economic viability and sustainable development which has to be in tune with the United slogan of Development without Destruction
4.While the River Water Disputes Tribunals composed of Eminent Legal Experts are at liberty to allocate the volumes of water between different basin states on the basis of availabvility and the needs of the riparian states,they should not overstep into the domain of Environmental and civil engineering experts who have to strictly follow the high scientific and technical design criteria in tune with the Environmental protection Act,1986 and the design standards and guide lines formulated by the Central water Commission[CWC],Indian Standards Institution [ISI]and the Internation Commission on Large Dams[ICOLD]
.Any violation of these Laws and Guide lines by the RiverWater Disputes Tribunals in apportioning the Waters of a River among the basin states amounts to perpetration of environmental crimes against mankind and Nature whose sssets form the basic economic foundation for ensuring the right to life,the right to health and the right to livelihood of millions of poor people of the states and the country.
4.While the River Water Disputes Tribunals composed of Eminent Legal Experts are at liberty to allocate the volumes of water between different basin states on the basis of availabvility and the needs of the riparian states,they should not overstep into the domain of Environmental and civil engineering experts who have to strictly follow the high scientific and technical design criteria in tune with the Environmental protection Act,1986 and the design standards and guide lines formulated by the Central water Commission[CWC],Indian Standards Institution [ISI]and the Internation Commission on Large Dams[ICOLD]
.Any violation of these Laws and Guide lines by the RiverWater Disputes Tribunals in apportioning the Waters of a River among the basin states amounts to perpetration of environmental crimes against mankind and Nature whose sssets form the basic economic foundation for ensuring the right to life,the right to health and the right to livelihood of millions of poor people of the states and the country.
ANNEXURE-1
(List of villages going to be submerged as obtained from a simple model)
Reach-1 Alamatti- Narayanapur Section
1.Yalgur | 11.Banoli | 21.Bijjori | 31.Myager | 41.Marol | 51.Nagarhal |
2. Vadardgi | 12.Deur | 22.Khankeri | 32.Katku | 42.Havargi | 52.Jhulgadda |
3. Chelmi | 13.Gagur | 23.Bachma | 33.Tuddgi | 43.Amaravadgi | 53.Annedur |
4.Budhral | 14.Kanchagnu | 24.Nalatrad | 34.Valkaldin | 44.Kamaaldini | 54.Chitapur |
5.Kalgi | 15.Jangadol | 25.Sitinaai | 35.Sangam | 45.Kadiyal | 55.Berindaai |
6.Madur | 16.Arnargol | 26.Rampur | 36.Vargaddin | 46.Henmantha | 56.Malgadi |
7.Kandagnu | 17.Yargal | 27.Naynegali | 37.Ganjiha | 47.Kargi | 57.Hemaradgi |
8.Handarga | 18.Hunkunti | 28.Chittikinkop | 38.Belga | 48.Chinnapur | 58.Narhaldum |
9.Gonol | 19.Rakasgi | 29.Mankan | 39.Bislal | 49.Tandihal | |
10.Hergeri | 20.Jokkalk | 30.Bomang | 40.Dhani | 50.Indrat |
Reach-II Narayanapur – Kollur Section
1.Kottagudda | 16.Deratakola | 31.Biranur | 46.Joldur | 61.Hosurasidhapur | 76.Anchisugur |
2.Mahamaga | 17.Konal | 32.Parkapur | 47.Hanchnol | 62.Somana maradi | 77.Gopalpur |
3.Joldun | 18.Hallabhani | 33.Jongandul | 48.Yelgundi | 63.Gonjali | 78.Hedogi |
4.Kadrihal | 19.Gonal | 34.Hattigudur | 49.Juggli | 64.Polkana mardi | 79.Dondamali |
5.Yedalghar | 20.Aladhal | 35.Nandihalli | 50.Guntagadla | 65.Modur kal | 80.Orapen |
6.Geddalamari | 21.Harchand | 36.Jonnur | 51.Gandratala | 66.Sunndakal | 81.Konocha palli |
7.Mikanthrayagudda | 22.Derapur | 37.Yekkanch | 52.Yeriodi | 67.Galaga | 82.Korakihalli |
8.Bandori | 23.Mushti halli | 38.Gudur | 53.Lingusengu | 68.Hulla gudda | |
9.Kakkeri | 24.Gudihal | 39.Hayyala | 54.Ramroli | 69.Muntanhol | |
10.Santapur | 25.Shellagi | 40.Baswantapur | 55.Aidabhari | 70.Mandatagi | |
11.Manjalapur | 26.Sugur | 41.Buzdra | 56.Ammonkol | 71.Nawalagudda | |
12.Rayageri | 27.Chandeswarhal | 42.Bommanahalli | 57.golapalii | 72.Karegudda | |
13.Channapattan | 28.Kurnal | 43.Anwadr | 58.Paidoddi | 73.Yerandi | |
14.Halabhari | 29.Shekapur | 44.Waddgera | 59.Yeragoti | 74.Bagur | |
15.Benokonhalli | 30.Hemanur | 45.Hanchadl | 60.Chinchalli | 75.Aijal |
Reach-III Kollur Section – Bhima Confluence
1.Anasagur | 6.Ratnadagi | 11.Shikpur | 16.Gugal |
2.Gandenur | 7.Bandelanli | 12.Kurakehalli | 17.Basavanpur |
3. Changur | 8.Kodalu | 13.Yatgol | 18.Girijapur |
4.Konkal | 9.Gonal | 14.Koppal | 19.Arshingi |
5.Tumkur | 10.Gundlur | 15.Herur | 20.Kadlur |
Reach-IV Bhima Confluence-Jurala
1.Mudmala | 10.Nandimalli | 19.Karvihali | 28.Chinnachintarayula |
2.Kolpur | 11.Khandhur | 20.Koratkunta | 29.Garlapadu |
3.Mandipal | 12.Atmakur | 21.Mainadoddi | 30.Narsandiddi |
4.Pespul | 13.Gunthuholi | 22.Chinnakupur | 31.Bhimpur |
5.Pancholerpadu | 14.Derarsugur | 23.Alkur | 32.Gundapalli |
6.Gandhipuram | 15Ganjpalli | 24.Gajapuram | 33.Reknikunta |
7.Poeula | 16.Hanumandoddi | 25.Kurtlapaid | 34.Madanapalli |
8.Anugonda | 17.Yadlapur | 26.Nattampadi | 35.Katapalli |
9.Mastipalli | 18.Karokal | 27.Upperu | 36.Chinnagonipalli |
Reach-V Jurala-Siddeswaram
1.Arepalli | 11.Peda Dagada | 21.Nadiagraharam | 31.Chandur |
2.Tumpalli | 12.Yaparla | 22.Mulkalpalli | 32.Pragatur |
3.Raichintala | 13.Bekkam | 23.Jelugupalli | 33.Pudyatur |
4.Ramapuram | 14.Chinnmarur | 24.Lentipuram | 34.Utakuru |
5.Rangapuram | 15.Velatur | 25.Biruru | 35.Bukkapuram |
6.Bunyuddipuram | 16.Kalluru | 26.;Ananthapuram | 36.Gondina |
7.Janampalli | 17.Ayyanapalli | 27.Shrikpalli | 37.Uppalapadu |
8.Jedadinni | 18.Mararkan | 28.Sasnur | 38.Giripadu |
9.Jipdipalli | 19.Kopanur | 29.Trapuram | 39.Virapuram |
10.Miyanpur | 20.Taptol | 30.Pallepadu | 40.Villala |
ANNEXURE-II
(List of villages going to be submerged as obtained from varied flow model)
Reach-I Alamatti-Narayanapur Section
1.Yalgur | 9.Deur | 17.Bijjoli | 25.Chanu |
2.Budhral | 10.Gongur | 18.Khanikeri | 26.Havargi |
3.Kalgi | 11.Kanchagnu | 19.Sitimaai | 27.Amaravadgi |
4.NMadur | 12.Tangadol | 20.Bonang | 28.Henmanthaa |
5.Kandagnur | 13.Arurgol | 21.Tuddgi | 29.Chinnapur |
6.Handarga | 14.Hunkunti | 22.Vargaddinni | 30.Tandihal |
7.Gonol | 15.Rakasgi | 23.Belga | 31.Chitapur |
8.Bonosi | 16.Topkkalk | 24.Marol | 32.Nark |
Reach-II Narayanapur –Tintani Section
1.Bachmha | 6.Yedalghar | 11.Yelgundi | 16.Yeriodi |
2.Kottagudda | 7.Mikanthrayagudda | 12.Tuggli | 17.Ramaroti |
3.Malamsogae | 8.Bandori | 13.Gonavatla | 18.Aidabhari |
4.Geddalamuri | 9.Hanchnol | 14.Guntagold | 19.Ammonkol |
5.Kadirhal | 10.Joldur | 15.Lingasugur | 20.Golapalli |
Reach-III Tintani –Lingadahalli Section
1.Kakkeri | 4.Channapattan | 7.Devatakola | 10.Paidoddi |
2.Santapur | 5.Halabhari | 8.Konal | 11.Yerajant |
3.Manjalapur | 6.Benokonahalli | 9.Tammankal | 12.Yeragoti |
Reach-IV Lingadahalli – Mushtihalli Section
1.Gonal | 3.Horinana | 5.Arabholi | 7.Somanamoddi | 9.Jalihalli |
2.Alodohal | 4.Devapur | 6.Ganjall | 8.Hosurasiddapur | 10.Chinchahalli |
Reach-V Mushtihalli – Bagur Section
1.Mushtihalli | 3.Sugur | 5.Anjal | 7.Yeravali | 9.Kotigudda |
2.Shellegi | 4.Benimahal | 6.Katagudda | 8.Nawalagudda1 | 10.Miyapur |
Stae of art technology in Water Resoures Management emphasises smaller dams and barrages for augmenting water resources for improved agriculture and food production in place of bigger and hazardous large dams in the light of growing number of dam bursts due to extreme floods being caused by inensifying cyclones of longer duration and also the frequent number of dam bursts which are about 68 per year in China. See web:
WHY EXTREME FLOODS MUST BE USED FOR THE DESIGNOF ALAMATTI DAM?
According to the President of the International Commission on Large Dams, Prof.L.Berga a review of the extreme floods reported on several occassions in large rivers all over the world including the Narmada dam in India the magnitudeof extreme floods has been presented in the form of nomograms and tables and equations have been formulated and published for being used by other countries in the world. India is also a member which declared that the country follows these international ICOLD standards for design of dams See the following websites for the full length article and the nomogram on the subject by Prof.L.Berga.
https://sites.google.com/site/shivajirao32/polavaramdam-1Article by President,ICOLD, See Web: LBergaextremefloods.doc
Based on the International Standards and also ISI Standards the inflow design flood magnitude is estimated for the calculations used for Alamatti Dam Break Analysis and also for calculating the backwater levels.
During September, October 2009 Extreme floods occurred in Krishna river resulting in extensive submersion of lands, villges, towns and cities along the banks of the Krishna river and hence the following graph is very relevant for calculation of peak floods for irrigation design purposes.
BRIJESH KUMAR TRIBUNAL ORDER ON KRISHNA WATER SHARING (December,2010. After review this order will be published as Final Award)
Clause-I
In view and on the basis of the discussions held and the findings recorded on the issues hereinbefore, the following order is passed in so far as it deviates from, modifies, amends and reviews the decision and the order passed by the KWDT-1.
Clause-II
That for the purposes of this case, so as to assess the yearly yield of the river Krishna afresh, on the data now available, an yearly water series for 47 years has been prepared, accordingly the dependable yield is determined as follows :-
(a) Average yield - 2578 TMC
(b) Yield at 50% dependability - 2626 TMC
(c ) Yield at 60% dependability - 2528 TMC
(d) Yield at 65% dependability - 2293 TMC
(e) Yield at 75% dependability - 2173 TMC
Clause-III
That it is decided that the water of river Krishna be distributed amongst the three States of Maharashtra, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh on 65% dependability of the new series of 47 years i.e. 2293 TMC.
Clause-IV
That it is decided that the allocations already made by KWDT-1 at 75% dependability which was determined as 2060 TMC on the basis of old series of 78 years plus return flows, assessed as 70 TMC in all totalling to 2130 TMC, be maintained and shall not be disturbed.
Clause-V
That it is hereby determined that the remaining distributable flows at 65% dependability, over and above 2130 TMC (already distributed), is 163 TMC (2293 TMC minus 2130 TMC = 163 TMC).
Clause-VI
That it is hereby decided that the surplus flows which is determined as 285 TMC (2578 TMC minus 2293 TMC= 285 TMC) be also distributed amongst the three States.
Clause-VII
That the balance amount of water at 65% dependability i.e.163 TMC and the surplus flows of 285 TMC is distributed as given below:
State of Karnataka
Allocation at 65% dependability : 65 TMC
Allocation out of surplus flows : 105 TMC
Total :170 TMC
Flows made available for Minimum flows in the stream out of 65%
Dependability : 7 TMC
Grand Total :177 TMC
State of Maharashtra
Allocation at 65% dependability : 43 TMC
Allocation out of surplus flows ;35 TMC
Total : 78 TMC
Flows made available for Minimum flows in the stream out of 65%
Dependability : 3 TMC
Grand Total : 81 TMC
State of Andhra Pradesh
Allocation at 65% dependability : 39 TMC
Allocation out of surplus flows :145 TMC
Total :184 TMC
Flows made available for Minimum flows in the stream out of 65%
Dependability : 6 TMC
Grand Total :190 TMC
Clause-VIII
That the total allocations at different dependabilities including those made by KWDT-1 at 75% dependability with return flows are given below :
State of Karnataka
Allocation at 75% dependability with return flows 734 TMC
Allocation at 65% dependability 65 TMC
Allocation out of surplus flows 105 TMC
Total 904 TMC
Plus 7 TMC provided for Minimum flows 7 TMC
Grand Total 911 TMC
State of Maharashtra
Allocation at 75% dependability with return flows 585 TMC
Allocation at 65% dependability 43 TMC
Allocation out of surplus flows 35 TMC
Total 663 TMC
Plus 3 TMC provided for Minimum flows 3 TMC
Grand Total 666 TMC
State of Andhra Pradesh
Allocation at 75% dependability with return flows 811 TMC
Allocation at 65% dependability 39 TMC
Allocation out of surplus flows 145 TMC
Total 995 TMC
Plus 6 TMC provided for Minimum flows out of 65%
Dependability 6 TMC
Grand Total 1001 TMC
Note: Average yield of Krishna river according to Bachawat Tribunal report is 2396 TMC, making surplus water amount to 336 TMC. Out of which 50% was anticipated for Karnataka and 25% each to AP state and Maharashtra.
ALAMATTI DAM UPTO 528.8 METERS RAISED IN PARTS
http://bhujangam.blogspot.com/2011/03/alamatti-dam-upto-5288-meters-raised-in.html
