ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT-1988 FOR 1 AND 2 REACTORS OF KUDANKULAM
[Old EIA procedures for 2001]
[Old EIA procedures for 2001]
Brief Environmental Impact Assessment of KKNPP 1 & 2 (1988)
Environmental Clearance (EC) for KKNPP 1 & 2, was granted by Ministry of Environment & Forests (MoEF), New Delhi in 1989 based on the Environmental Appraisal data submitted by NPCIL in 1988 in line with the requirements of Environment Protection Act-(EPA), 1986. At that time there was no regulatory requirement of either Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) or Public Hearing (PH) prior to grant of environmental clearance by MoEF. Subsequently, EIA and PH became a pre-requisite for the grant of environmental clearance for NPPs vide MoEF EIA - Notifications amendments in 1994 and 1997 respectively. However, in 1988, NPCIL had submitted a “Brief EIA of KKNPP 1 & 2”, along with the questioner form of MoEF for “Environmental Appraisal of Industrial Projects”. Subsequently, for KKNPP 1 & 2, NPCIL completed Comprehensive EIA (2003) through NEERI, Nagpur for establishing baseline environmental status and preparation of Environmental Management Plan. This comprehensive EIA report (2003), was not needed to be submitted to MoEF as EC was already granted in the year 1989 and re-validated by MoEF in the year 2001. The Brief EIA of KKNPP 1 & 2 (1988) is presented in the following paragraphs.
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE PROPOSED KUDANKULAM ATOMIC POWER PLANT
The Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) at the proposed Kudankulam site will initially consist of two reactors of 1000MW each of the pressurized water reactor (VVER in Russian) type with a provision to add two more units of1000MWe each. This plant belongs to the latest VVER-RB type of the Soviet VVER design evaluation and incorporates several new safety features developed as a result of considerable design and operating experience.. On the previous 440 MWe VVER reactors as well as a sizable number of 1000 MWe VVER reactors which are already operating. In this report the general safety objectives for Nuclear Power Plants and specific features of proposed Kudankulam NPP and its impact on the environment are outlined.
2. THE PHILOSOPHY OF RADIATION PROTECTION:
The radiation protection philosophy developed for Indian power programme will be adopted for this power plant also. The Radiological Protection Programme (RPP) adopted in the Indian NPPs is based on the recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). The International Atomic Energy Agency, World Health Organisation and the International Labour Organisation have formulated these recommendations into a joint document called the Basic Safety Standards (BSS) of Radiation Protection. India as Member State of the IAEA has used the BSS as the basis for its RPP. Figure-1 gives the exposure control philosophy of the RPP.
3. SAFETY OBJECTIVES:
The overall safety objectives adopted in the programme are based on the principles enunciated by the founders of the atomic energy programme in the early years.
“Radioactive materials and sources of radiation should be handled not only in a manner which fully ensures that no harm can come to workers in the establishment or any one else but also in an exemplary manner so as to set a standard which other organizations in the country may be asked to emulate”.
To fulfill these objectives, the following measures are taken:
the plant is designed with multiple barriers and built-in engineered safety features which (i) prevent accidents, (ii) limit the magnitude of the accident and (iii) mitigate the consequences of an accident should one occur. These measures reduce both the probability and the potential magnitude of the consequences of an accident.
During normal operations the dose equivalent to workers and members of the public at the fence post (1.6km radius exclusion zone boundary around the plant) are to be kept as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) and should not exceed the dose equivalent limits set by ICRP (figure1)
The non-radiological accident in the plant should be very low in frequency and severity compared to those in similar non-nuclear plants.
Notwithstanding the site safety features and the inbuilt plant safety features outlined above, every plant prepares plans and procedures for emergencies. It is recognized that emergency planning and protective measures are regarded only as second level of protection to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
Each plant trains its staff in the disciplines such as plant operation, maintenance activities, radiological protection and emergency control and qualify them for the work entrusted to them. This is with a view to reduce the chances of human errors.
To minimize the impact on the environment, the following principles are adopted’
a) The plant operations shall not interfere in any manner with utilization of environmental resources in the area outside its control.
b) No deleterious effects, either of an acute or chronic nature, shall accrue from plant operations.
c) The ecological balance of life forms including humans shall not be disturbed.
d) The discharges of radioactive/non-radioactive pollutants from the plant to the environment shall be at such levels and quantities that the resultant accumulation of the pollutants in any component of the environment including life forms will not affect them in a manner detrimental to the ecosystems.
4. SAFETY ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY:
The main considerations governing safety in the siting of NPP are:
a) The risk to the NPP from external events (natural and man-induced) should be less than the intrinsic risk from the NPP itself:
b) The radiological consequences in the environment due to the NPP should be “as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA)” both for normal operation as well as accident situations.
To meet these conditions detailed analysis of the following are undertaken.
4.2 External Natural Events:
4.2.1 Seismicity: The site lies in seismic zone II as per IS 1893-1984. The bed rock type in the site area is biotite gneisses enclosing lenticular bands of charnochites and quartzites which is suitable for foundation. Geology and seismo-tectonics over an area of 300km radius around the plant have been examined to arrive at the earthquake design basis. As per the interim report, for S2 (Safe shutdown earthquake) level, maximum peak horizontal ground acceleration of 0.15g has been arrived at, on the basis of deterministic approach (IAEA-50-SG-S1). On probabilistic basis the S2 level event has an average return period of 50,000 years.
4.2.2 Flooding: The flood analysis of this site is mainly based on analysis of tropical cyclones and resulting storm surges.
A reference was made to CWPRS, Pune for the flood analysis relating to this site. CWPRS have recommended on a preliminary basis the following surge height to be safe against flooding:
Chart datum 0.00 m
Tidal range 1.00 m
Storm surge 1.40 m
Wave run up 3.50 m
Total 5.90 m
On this basis an elevation of +6.0 m above chart datum is considered to be safe against flooding on a conservative basis. The sit elevations generally vary from +5 m to about +40m above chart datum and hence the structures can be located above the postulated flood level. The actual pinpointing of the layout has been made such that the plant structures are above the flood level. A further detailed analysis taking into account the actual shore profile is likely to reduce the margin provided for wave run-up and may result in lower flood levels. This study will be carried out for further refinement.
4.3 Man induced events: For this purpose, air craft crashes, storage and use of flammable, corrosive or toxic chemicals and explosivesin the vicinity of the site have been considered. Adequate screening distances are available in this regard. There are no airports nearby within a radius of 50km around the plant. Major storage of toxic chemicals, explosives, corrosives, flammable liquids are neither existing nor permitted within the sterilized zone. No industries are reported in the area within 10km around. There is no mining activity within 10km around the plant. A very small area of 67.95 acres at a distance of 3km from the proposed plant has been leased out by Tamilnadu Government for limestone quarrying (open quarrying upto about 2m depth). The Tamilnadu Government have been requested not to renew the lease subsequently beyond the present lease period ending upto 6th Jan 1994. Industiral development in the vicinity of the plant will be regulated through the state Government for reasons stated in 4.4.1.
4.4. RADIOLOGICAL IMPACT AND ITS ASSESSMENT:
4.4.1 General: The average doses to the individual and collective doses to the population are functions of the surrounding population and its distribution. To minimise the radiological impact, regulation of the population and its distribution is required. The 2km radius exclusion area defines the boundary between the plant and public habitation. A sterilized zone of upto 5km is also established such that within the sterilized area, only natural growth is permitted and the option to sample environmental matrices such as food items, water, air, meat, fish, eggs and milk is exercised. These measures help in obtaining assurances that control measures to limit doses to the public are indeed effective. They also make implementation of emergency measures more practicable in the event of an accident (Fig-2)
The meteorology, surface hydrology and hydrogeology at the site are also evaluated to ensure that discharges of gaseous and low level liquid effluents will not pose problems during normal operations as well as accident situations.
4.4.2 Population Distribution:
The details of population distribution for this site are as given below. The State average population density of Tamil Nadu is 371 persons/sq.km (1981). The average population density within 10km radius around the site is 130 persons/sq.km (Total Population of about 41000 within 10km around the plant as per 1981 census). There are no population centers having a population of more than 1 lakh within 30km radius around the site. Nagarkoil, a population center with a population of 1,71,641 as per 1981 census is at a radial distance of 30km. The population within the sterilized zone (5km radius around the proposed reactor locations) is about 15,000 belonging to villages Kudankulam, Vijayapati (mostly Idinthakarai village) and Erukkanthorai ( a small portion). There is no resident population within the exclusion zone-2km radius around the proposed reactor locations. Hence no rehabilitation is required for establishing the exclusion zone.
The Meteorological data as available at Kanyakumari Meteorological station about 27km from site have been collected. The average annual rainfall is about 810mm (1976-80) Based on wind speed observations (1976-80) the prodominent wind frequencies are 44.5% and 16.2% the directions being from west and northeast respectively. The frequency for occurrence of calms is only 2.6% . The topography and wind speed are considered to be good for dispersion. A stack height of about 100m is proposed for this site. As per details of by storms crossing the coast from 1891 to 1980 it is seen generally that storms have crossed near Nagapattinam most of the times which is 375 km away from the site. A few time storms have crossed near Pamban which is about 200km away from site. In 1912 a storm has crossed South of Tuticorin and in 1922 near Kanyakumari with wind speeds of 91 to 98km/hr. The intensity of cyclones in the general vicinity of the site is lower than the ones that normally strike the east coast north of Tuticorin. The ambient temperature varies from a minimum of 19.2oC to a maximum of 36.8oC (1976 to 80). The relative humidity ranges from 60 to 85% (1976 to 80) Detailed meteorological investigations at the site will be carried out in due course.
4.4.4 Land Use:
About 60% of the area within 10km radius around the site falls in the sea. The remaining area consists of agricultural land and barren land. The main agricultural crops are paddy, millets and chillies with annual yields of about 14400 Te, 4300 Te and 3000 Te respectively. The subsidiary crops are tobacco, pulses, cotton and oil seeds with annual yields of about 380 Te, 850 Te, 250 Te and 70 Te respectively.
About 35% of the area within 2km radius exclusion zone around the proposed reactors falls in sea. The remaining area of 650 to 700 Ha of land will need to be acquired to establish the exclusion zone. This land is mostly barren and unirrigated. Due to top soil being limestone, less rainfall and lack of irrigation, agricultural yields are poor. About 12 Te ofmillets and 1 Te of cotton per year are reported as agricultural produces in the land falling in exclusion zone.
About 400 acres of land have been identified for the housing colony near Chettikulam village. In this land also, agricultural activity is limited.
No forest land needs to be acquired either for the plant, its exclusion zone and colony.
Fishing activity in the sea nearby is existing in a limited scale. No mechanized fishing activity is seen nearby. There are three fisherman villages , Idinthakarai, Koothankuzhi and Perumanal within 10km around with a total annual fish catch of about 3200 Te from the sea. About 3000 fishermen in the above villages are engaged in fishing. Near Kanyakumari (about 27km at Chinnamuttam, there is a fishing harbor recently constructed and mechanized fishing activity is existing.
4.4.5 Geo Hydrology:
The site area slopes towards the sea and groundwater occurring under unconfined water table conditions shows a gradient towards the4 sea. This is indicated by the water table contour map prepared for the area. Depth to water table is found to increase away from the coast. Near the site, it is about 5m as noted in a well located within the site and further away towards Vijapati and Parameswarapuram villages, the depth to water table increases to about 8m. Ground water is limited in quantity in this area due to low rainfall and poor replenishment.
4.4.6 Envrionmental Survey Laboratory:
At the proposed Kudankulam site, a an environmental survey laboratory will be set up long before the reactors begin to operate, for undertaking environmental studies which consists of two phases namely, 1) the pre-operational phase and 2) the operational phase. The following investigations form part of the pre-operational phase.
i) Information on background radioactivity levels in the vicinity of the plant;
ii) The distribution of the radioactive material in the various matrices of the environment and the estimations of the recipient capacity (thus helping in identifying the critical pathways of exposure and the dilution capacity of the environment).
iii) Data on bioaccumulation factors for potentially hazardous radio nuclides, by study of stable element distribution. These yield data on uptake of trace elements and possible isopotic dilution effects.
iv) Micrometeorological characteristics of the sit efor evaluating dispersion of airborne radio nuclides.
Figure -3 gives the environmental path ways for the air route and Figure-4 presents the pathways of exposure for radio nuclides discharged to the aquatic environment.
During the operational phase, the investigations done during the pre-operational phase are used as base line data upon which any noticeable impact on the environmental can then be attributed to the NPP and its operation. Routine surveillance helps in detecting any effect on the environment not hitherto foreseen and also in checking the adequacy of design provisions in controlling effluents form the plant.
4.5 Foundation conditions:
The site is generally underlain by banded and foliated biotite, granite gneissic rocks covered by varying thicknesses of weathered gneiss and shell limestones. The bed rock of biotite granite gneiss encloses lenticular bands of charnockites and quartizites. Rock outcrops are seen at the tie between the high and low tide lines all along the shore and also in the high ground and nala cutting in the area.
Limited bore hole investigations indicate that a fairly competent foundation grade rock of biotite granite gneiss with lenticular bodies of charnockite and quartizites is available at depths of 5m to 16m below ground level beneath the shell limestone cover. Bouldery weathered zones are likely to be encountered within the depth of 16m below ground.
Detailed sub-soil investigations involving more number of bore holes will be carried out and work in this regard is being commenced. However, based on the preliminary data and investigations, the foundation conditions are considered suitable for the designs proposed to be adopted at this site.
4.6 Water availability:
Condenser cooling system will be on once-through basis with sea water as the coolant. Process water system will have multiple loops with closed primary, closed secondary and tertiary systems. The tertiary system would use sea water on once-through basis. Fresh water will be used for make up of the closed process systems, domestic needs and colony use. The requirement of about 10 cusecs of fresh water for 200 MWe power potential has been assured from Pechiparai reservoir across Kodayar river. Pipelines for 65km distance will be laid to draw fresh water from Pechiparai reservoir to the site.
4.7 Other factors:
Other factors such as electrical system aspects, construction facilities, access etc are aspects that have been taken into account.
5. DESIGN SAFETY FEATURES:
The design of the proposed Kudankulam reactors incorporates a number of safety features which supplement the natural safety features offered by the site. This Defence-in-depth approach can be described in terms of three levels of safety as described below.
Level-1: The safety features of this level are intended to prevent an accident. These include reactor control systems, reactor protection system, liquid poison system, radiation monitoring systems and emergency equipment.
Besides the design adopts principles such as redundancy in protective and safety systems, diversity, physical separation and independence of systems and fail-safe philosophy.
Testability of components and systems, in-service inspection and selection of proven equipment with known and low failure rates are additional features intended not only to enhance the safety level of the plant but also to obtain a high reliability.
A comprehensive system of quality assurance at all stages of the NPP is enforced such that fabrication of equipment and their installation and commissioning produce the desired quantified level of safety.
Level-2: This includes those systems intended to minimize the magnitude of an accident should one occur. Examples are:
i) Fast acting shutdown systems (two independent systems)
ii) Engineered limits on the rate of power rise.
iii) Emergency core cooling system
iv) Off-site and on-site redundant electrical power supply to all components important to safety.
Level-3: Safety features of this level limit the consequences of an accident when the first two levels of safety are assumed to fail simultaneously.
The containment system,
containment heat removal systems
pump back system.
The ventilation system and the high efficiency particulate and iodine filters and the stack belong to this level.
The proposed Kudankulam plant employs the improved version of the containment system, namely a double containment blended to a vapour suppression pool and filtration and pump back system.
Design and construction of all components, systems and structures associated with reactor safety follow the best applicable codes, standards and practices. Factors influencing common cause failures are identified and corrective action taken in design.
Every stage in design, construction, commissioning and operation of the NPP takes into account aspects of safety and reliability. Well documented methods are adopted during procurement, quality assurance, erection and commissioning of systems.
6. SAFETY ANALYSIS:
A uniquie feature of the safety assessment methodology in NPP is the systematic study of the plant behavior under conditions which may result in uncontrolled release of radioactivity to the environment. As shown in Fig-1 the ICRP recommendations provide for dose control during accident situations also. To comply with this provision the siting criteria outlined earlier have been formulated to include also the impact of a maximum conceivable release of radioactivity following a maximum credible accident to the NPP.
The following are considered in the evaluation of the safety aspects of the NPP under accident conditions:
a) The acceptable intervention and contamination levels.
b) Evaluation of the site parameters such as dispersion under worst meteorological conditions, hydrological dispersion, environmental utilization and population distribution.
c) Evaluation of the design and operating conditions of the NPP for identifying the spectrum of possible accidents and release of radioactivity associated with each accident and the overall containment capability of the plant.
A safety analysis report outlining the safety features of the design, their description, performance characteristics and failure analysis is prepared The report also includes documented safety analysis describing and evaluating the predicted response of the plant to initiating events (such postulated disturbances in process variables, postulated malfunctions or failure of equipment, human errors, influence of external evens etc.)leading to accident conditions, including relevant combinations of such disturbances, malfunctions, failures, errors and events. The result of such analysis are expressed in terms of likelihood of the events, the extent of damage to the barriers between the sources of radioactivity and the public and the radiation doses to the public and site personnel.
i) The reactor design incorporates a highly reliable mechanical shut down system which can shut down the reactor in a few seconds, under any accident conditions, without need of electrical power.
ii) Another system for shutdown is the boron injection system which can safety shut down the reactor and keep it under shut down for a prolonged period.
iii) Core cooling system is backed up by an emergency core cooling system (ECCS) which will get actuated automatically in the event of a loss of coolant accident.
iv) The power supply to plant equipment is graded in different levels of reliability.
v) Power supply for safety related systems is backed up by power from diesel generators and DC storage batteries
The reactor building is a thick reinforced concrete air-tight building (containment) lined with steel on the inside face. In the event of an accident, the containment will be boxed up and will be isolated from the environment and releases through stack will be controlled.
The ICRP has recommended control measures, protective counter measures and intervention levels for accident situations which will be followed.
The safety analysis report is reviewed by AERB through a series of safety committees constituted by AERB.
After a satisfactory review of the report the plant is formally “licensed” by the AERB after final review to operate under a given set of limits and condtions.
7. SAFETY IN OPERATIONS
Prior to commissioning of the plant , the staff for operation, maintenance and related services are given training and authorization at various levels as outlined in the Safety Report. Formal class room training with practicals and prolonged on-the-job training at similar plants are given. The requirements for authorization include successful completion of written examinations, checklists, walk-though and orals. Familiarisation of the emergency plan as well as radiological protection are important pre-requisites.
Along with the safety report, another document, containing the operating limits and conditions is prepared by the plant organization. This document called the “Technical Specifications” is reviewed and approved by the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board(AERB)
During operation, safety surveillance in the plant and environmental survey in the public domain are provided by a team of qualified personnel independent of the station operation and management. In a similar manner, the design and operation of all waste management facilities are also undertaken by an organization independent of station management. This set up ensures that radiation protection procedures and the technical specifications are followed properly by the plant management and that exposures of site personnel as well as effluent releases to the environment are properly monitored and recorded. Violations, if any, and all unusual occurrences having a bearing on safety are promptly reported and corrective action taken in a timely manner.
The RPP provides for inter alia, monitoring of a workers for external radiation as well as internal contamination, if any . Over exposures, if any, are reported promptly and investigated by a special committee whose recommendations are binding on the plant management.
Records of all activities are maintained in a timely and systematic manner. These are reviewed periodically such that the lessons learnt are applied to other facilities as appropriate.
8. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT:
8.1 General: The environmental impact of an NPP can be assessed in terms of the following categories:
i) the impact due to acquisition of land needed to set up the plant buildings and other support facilities.
ii) the impact due to discharges into the environment which include radioactive materials, conventional chemical pollutants, if any and thermal plumes.
iii) the potential impact due to the unlikely event of an uncontrolled release from the plant reaching the public domain.
8.2 Acquisition of Land:
The land requirement and rehabilitation of the villages if any, within the acquired area, are aspects which are not new only to nuclear power stations but common to all major projects. However, only in the case of nuclear power stations, the precaution is taken to ensure that public habitations in the vicinity is not too close to the plant and that in the case of emergencies the population upon which counter measures are taken are within manageable levels. The magnitude of the rehabilitation of the public and the resulting impact on the human settlement is much lower than normally encountered in hydel projects.
Regarding the site at Kudankulam , the population within the 1.6km exclusion zone is nil and therefore there will be no rehabilitation of people. The same is the case for colony. The details of land needs for the plant and colony are already given in 4.4.4. There is practically no displacement of people except acquisition of land involving mostly barren and unirrigated land of private ownership for which appropriate compensation will be paid.
8.3 Releases during normal operations:
The nuclear power reactors are not associated with conventional pollutants. Therefore the environmental impact assessment mainly relates to radioactive releases from the plant. This aspect has been adequately controlled and regulated from the early stages of nuclear power development. In case of the impact due discharges into the environment, the radiation protection philosophy envisages a dose equivalent limit of 1.0 mSv per year to members of the public from all sources excluding natural and medical exposures. Out of the total dose equivalent limit as above separate allocations are fixed by AERB for each of the facilities at the site and leaving a margin for future expansion also.
8.3.1 Air releases during normal operation
Out of the limit as above the air route is given a separate allocation. Based on this allocation for air route, authorized limits for releases are fixed by the AERB. Taking into account the contributions of important radionuclides it can be shown that the per caput dose of an individual living within 100km from the plant would not be higher than 0.4 micro Sv per annum if the plant were to operate close to the authorized limits. Experience at similarly operating plants in Soviet Union indicates that the releases were much less than of the authorized limit of iodines and particulates. Thus the actual value of the per caput dose could be less than 0.1microSv per year. Even in the case of the most exposed individual, the additional burden incurred by him is well within the natural variation of the natural background radiation.
A stack height of about 100m will be provided. The air release from the plant are passed through high efficiency particulate absolute filters (0.3 micro meter) which essentially remove all the particulates. The discharge air may contain minute quantities of tritium and active inert gases which will be well below the authorized limits.
8.3.2 Release through water route:
Out of the total limit as in 8.3 an allocation is also stipulated for the water route for each facility at the site. Authorised limits will be fixed by AERB. Waste waters in the plant are segregated right at the source based on different levels of activity. A separate waste management plant for the liquids will be set up which provides for segregation, collection, treatment, storage and safe disposal in a manner that fulfills the intent of ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable.) Treatment methods include filtration, ion exchange, evaporation and chemical treatment, waste waters containing radioactivity are sent to the waste management plant for treatment. After treatment the radioactive residue is fixed in cement for containment and burial within the exclusion zone boundary of the plant. The treated liquids with appropriate dilution is released into the water body within authorized limits stipulated by AERB
The treated effluents from the waste treatment facilities before dilution are expected to contain only 10 E-9ci/lit of total activity, which is already very low. The quantity of treated liquid effluents for release would amount to about 200 Cu.m for two units per day. Once through condenser cooling would be adopted for the proposed 2 x 1000 MWe NPP. The quantity of treated liquid effluents as above would be mixed with the large (about 600000 Cu.m per hour) once-through sea water flow in the outfall, thereby, further getting diluted by orders of magnitude. Hence there will be practically negligible activity in the discharge water. With a very small increase in temperature (5oC)) across and the natural large dilution in the sea and appropriate separation between intake and outfall determined by model studies, thermal pollution of aquatic body will not be of any consequences.
The fishing activity in the nearby coast will be taken not of in setting up authorized limits through the relevant pathways.
8.3.3 Solid Wastes:
Low level solid wastes after treatment are buried within the plant complex in the exclusion zone. These are contained in leak tight RCC vaults. In special cases, internally steel lined external water proofed RCC pits called tile holes are used which are shielded and sealed. High integrity containers are used for retrievability. In the burial area adequate bore well facilities are provided as a check for any migration of activity.
With respect to the potential impact of the uncontrolled releases in cases of accidents, it may be mentioned that the plant is designed to accommodate a design basis accident (DBA) as outlined earlier such that intervention levels given in Fig-2 are not exceeded. The proposed Kudankulam reactors are provided with double containment and full vapour suppression.
For the remotest possibility of an accident more severe than the DBA, emergency plans are available to ensure that the public are not unduly exposed and that a number of protective counter measures are included in the emergency plan.
8.5 Environment at NPP sites
The early planners of nuclear energy development have shown foresight in emphasizing the aspect of improving the environment at the sites of all its installations. Tree plantation is given prime importance not only from aesthetic point of view but also to reduce the impact on the environment due to the plant operation both during normal and accident conditions, to minimize dust load, reduce heat radiation and improve micro climate around the nuclear power stations and laboratories which house sophisticated machinery and equipment. Organized tree planting activity will be state dafter approval of the proposed project and a number of threes will be planted within the exclusion zone of the proposed plant and the colony.