Prof.T.Shivaji Rao, Director, Environmental Studies, GITAM University, Visakhapatnam
http://www.nirs.org/reactorwatch/licensedtokill/LiscencedtoKill.pdf
http://www.nirs.org/reactorwatch/licensedtokill/LiscencedtoKill.pdf
(Killing fishes and marine life due to reactor effluents,
cheating by nuclear industry pages 101 and 104)
http://bhujangam.blogspot.com/2011/08/economic-costs-of-nuclear-reactor_05.html
http://tshivajirao.blogspot.com/2011/09/why-indian-nuclear-plants-are-bound-to.html
http://tshivajirao.blogspot.com/2011/08/diaster-consequences-of-kovvada-nuclear.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cost_of_electricity_by_source
www.morehead.unc.edu/revitalise/feb/envsciexcel.html (Software of Gaussian Plume Model)
Click on :Download the Excel model. (software used for calculations of accident scenario)
http://tshivajirao.blogspot.com/2011/09/why-indian-nuclear-plants-are-bound-to.html
http://tshivajirao.blogspot.com/2011/08/diaster-consequences-of-kovvada-nuclear.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cost_of_electricity_by_source
www.morehead.unc.edu/revitalise/feb/envsciexcel.html (Software of Gaussian Plume Model)
Click on :Download the Excel model. (software used for calculations of accident scenario)
http://saarc-sdmc.nic.in/pdf/india/file6.pdf ( (Disaster Management,NIDM,GOI)
http://saarc-sdmc.nic.in/pdf/india/file2.pdf (Disaster Management, Advise to states,NIDM,GOI))
(For the socio-economic impacts of Jaitapur Nuclear accident analysis must be made on the guidelines provided in the above website that contains the data for the nuclear accident at Sizewell reactor)
AS AN IRRITATED SNAKE KILLS A MAN, NUCLEAR PLANTS SILENTLY KILL MANKIND AND NATURE FOR FINANCIAL GAINS BY CONTRACTORS,OFFICIALS& POLITICIANS ?
Nuclear Plants are just silent killers of man and Nature created by the GOD. In nature the Uranium ore contains 99.3% of Uranium-238 and the remaining 0.7% is Uranium-235. Uranium-238 and Uranium-235 in nature are least harmful. But business people and other vested interests dig the iron ore and convert the least harmful Uranium-235 into the fuel form of Uranium-235 by purifying it to make a fuel by enriching it to about 4% of Uranium-235 that is packed in pellets and inserted into the core of the nuclear reactor for producing both electricity and material for making the bombs. The reactor when the nuclear atom is given a blow by a neutron, enormous heat and other poisonous Radio-active atoms like Xenon, Barium, Cesium, Strontium, Plutonium and other dangerous radioactive substances are produced. These radioactive substances are discharged into the air and water by several ways and when they enter into the environment consisting of air, water and soil and foods like vegetables, fishes, prawns they ultimately get into human beings and produce cancers and birth defects in generations of people for many decades to come. These poisonous radioactive substances destroy natural and human life and culture and convert lands upto hundreds of kilometers into permanent nuclear burial grounds for ever.
How harmless Uranium ore materials in nature are converted into destructive and killer materials by man can be understood by the following simple example. For instance king cobras live in nature in anthills in forests and lead their normal life peacefully by catching their prey for food during nights But greedy people go and poke their iron rods into their abodes and disturb the Cobras when they become angry and bite the trespassers to inflict death over them by their poisons. Similarly, the selfish people are mining the harmless Uranium and converting it into harmful Enriched Uranium and then using it to produce electricity by means of the Nuclear plants and in the process they are producing Radioactive pollutants that poison man and nature slowly due to routine releases of radioactivity into the environment. In course of time if an accident occurs in the Nuclear plant due to several reasons like in Fukushima or Chernobyl, the poisonous pollutants are thrown into the atmosphere and they kill thousands of people slowly and inflict cancer to millions of people living downstream upto hundreds of Kilometers as in case of Fukushima and Chernobyl accidents. The Nuclear plant operators are misleading the public by stating that Nuclear power is safe and cheap just like the medical representatives of various pharmaceutical companies praise before the doctors about the virtues of their medical tablets and tonics as part of their sale promotion activity the nuclear authorities are praising the nuclear plants as safe and cheap energy producers which is wrong. This misinformation is dangerous to public health and welfare because in European states almost all people agree that safety of Nuclear (power is a Myth as accepted by Angela Merkel, Chancellor of Germany. She had consulted the genuine experts on nuclear plants and realized that nuclear safety is a myth and ordered for gradual closure of all the nuclear plants in Germany. If Indian Prime Minister and Union Cabinet Ministers including the Chief Ministers of the state want to know the truth about the safety of the nuclear power plants they must go and visit advanced countries like Germany and Japan and discuss the issue with foreign experts so that they can refrain from promoting nuclear plants as is done by the peoples leader like Mamata Banerjee, Chief Minister of West Bengal. For more scientific details see the above web sites on this topic prepared by independent experts.
Environmental Impact Analysis report are fabricated by consultants according to the national Green Tribunal and also according to the Chief Justice of India, S.H.Kapadia who said “If you leave report preparation to the project proponent, I am sorry to say the person who pays will get the answers he asks for” and hence he called for a change in the system of preparation of EIA reports for the development projects. See website: http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article2886141.ece
Supreme Court judges Douglas and Black described Nuclear power as “a most deadly, a most dangerous process that man has ever conceived”. In fact the radioactive pollutants are a million to billion times more toxic than many chemical poisons. Many experts emphasize that nuclear power proliferation is a serious threat to mankind meriting comparison with nuclear war. But some people believe that it holds the key to national energy and defence problems and is clean, safe and cheap. However, the former head f U.S. Nuclear establishment David Lilienthal belatedly admitted in 1981 that “nuclear technology is not really so advanced; it is not dependable enough; it is not safe enough”. Even the Russian expert Legasov posed the questions: “Is not the development of nuclear energy on an industrial scale premature? Will it not be fatal to our civilization, to the eco-system of our planet?
The Chernobyl disaster and the Fukushima Reactor explosions actually proved that even highly disciplined developed nations like Russia and Japan could destroy their own human and natural resources and those of other neighbouring nations without a war just by accidental mismanagement of the so called peaceful uses of the atom.
In the light of the harrowing experiences from Chernobyl and Fukushima disasters most of the countries in Europe have decided against nuclear power in preference to renewable energy sources like wind, solar, and biomass and some countries like Japan and Germany have chosen to close down the existing reactors in a phased programme. At this juncture, the Government of India has launched a major expansion programme in nuclear power. Karnataka, Maharashtra, Andhra and Tamil Nadu will be affected by this project.
1. REACTORS AT JAITAPUR: As a part of this nuclear development programme the Government of India proposes to establish a nuclear plant at Jaitapur in Ratnagiri District, Maharashtra with an initial capacity of 9,900 MW inspite of continuing public agitations in the locality against the nuclear power plants. In this context it is proposed to highlight the highly damaging impacts of the proposed nuclear plant at Jaitapur so that the state and central Governments can plan for alternate sources of electricity development by making use of renewable energy resources as per the suggestions continued in the Greenpeace report the European countries and also the natural gas that is abundantly available on the East and West coast of India as can be seen under the websites: http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/article1770465.ece
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/publications/climate/2011/battle%20of%20the%20grids.pdf [Alternate Renewable Energy Sources available for European countries]
Nuclear power stations produce unusual amount of heat by means of nuclear reactions of Uranium fuel particles bundled in packets and placed in reactor core where neutrons bombard the fuel and thereby abnormal heat and new radioactive particles which damage living tissues are produced. If the nuclear fuel gets overheated and the packed radioactive particles are blown into the air the surrounding areas including the air, water, soil get highly poisoned and the cost of such an accident will be very high.
Firstly the local population would be exposed to radiation from the radioactive plume from the reactor and the local soils and buildings also will be contaminated causing deaths including cancer even for future generations. Crops and agriculture products exposed to radioactive pollutants will be poisoned and people and animals have to be evacuated from the local areas to safer places for several years. This report attempts to evaluate some of the consequences caused by radioactive pollutants arising from accidents in nuclear power plants.
For this purpose the proposed Jaitapur Nuclear Plant with 9,900 MW Nuclear reactors is taken as model from France. http://www.npcil.nic.in/main/jaitapur-atomic-power-plant.aspx
This reactor produces 3100 MW of heat at full power the nuclear reaction is driven in 100 tonnes of Uranium Oxide fuel in 50,000 packed fuel rods are tubes of Zirconium alloy, ½ inch in diameter. The reactor core sits in a thick steel pressure vessel, through which 18 tonnes of is pumped every second to carryaway the heat which is used for generation of high pressure steam that drives the turbine that is linked with the generator that produces electricity. During operations fuel rods are kept at 340oC by circulating cooling water that removes heat from the rods and if this flow of cooling water is blocked for any reason fuel temperature rises to 1200oC and the Zirconium tubes began to melt and with the core getting melted the fuel along with massive quantities radioactivity breaches all the barriers and forces its way into the atmosphere. Reactor systems will be provided with means to flood the reactor core in emergencies to avoid core meltdown and to maintain the integrity of the containment. If the emergency core cooling system fails a cloud of radioactivity will enter the atmosphere and will carried by the wind, depositing fission products of the core in a ribbon downwind of the reactor in decreased concentration for hundreds of miles from the reactor. Health hazards occur due to this radioactive contamination of air, water and soil causing physical, economic and social damages in the zone of influence. The dosages of radioactivity in the environment are estimated and necessary steps are taken as preventive and curative measures in sheltering the people administering medicines and evacuating people to safe zones within specified time schedules. Similarly the damage to agricultural crops, milk products are also assessed for taking public health protection measures. Some of the details of this emergency response system of the Nuclear reactor are presented in the following paragraphs.
EXPOSURE PATHWAYS:
Contact with radioactivity can lead to exposure to radiation through a number of exposure pathways, for instance direct exposure ingestion or inhalation. Direct exposure refers to a situation where exposure occurs from radiation emitted by radioactive substances outside the body. After a nuclear accident, for example, this may result from radioactivity which is suspended in the air, from radioactive contamination of the ground or the surface of buildings. Ingestion of radioactivity will occur if contaminated foodstuffs are eaten or drunk, and will result in the incorporation of radioactivity into the body. Inhalation will result in radioactive particles lodging in the lungs, causing radiation exposure to the lungs, and certain radioactive elements passing through the lungs into the blood.
When radioactive elements are inhaled or ingested, the body will treat them in the same way as normal elements. Since particular elements tend to be concentrated in particular organs, the same increased concentration will occur if these elements are radioactive. Normal iodine, for example, is concentrated in the thyroid gland, and if radioactive iodine is ingested or inhaled, this causes a high concentration of radioactive iodine in the thyroid, and a correspondingly high chance of contracting thyroid cancer.
The amount of iodine ingested is of particular importance to the calculation of the consequences of nuclear accidents, since a large amount of radioactive iodine is produced in nuclear reactors, and it is very volatile which means it will be released in large quantities. Similar effects will result from ingestion of other radioactive elements; for instance plutonium, if ingested, tends to concentrate in the bones.
HARMFUL EFFECTS OF RADIATION
Effects | Dose/Effect Relationship |
Early effects -Death  - Lung damage(fibrosis)- Radiation sickness (prodomal vomiting) -Sterility - Cataracts - Skin damage, hair loss | High dose (> 200 rads) to bone marrow (or lungs, etc.); depends on dose and dose rate Depends on dose and dose rate |
Late Effects -Malignant diseases (fatal cancers, leukemia, non-fatal cancers to organs such as breast, thyroid, etc. -Hereditary effects -Developmental effects | ‘Risk factors’ determined for different organs and for the whole body. Normally assumed risk of fatal cancer ~ 1 per 10,000 rems collective dose (to a population). Risk factors determined (~ 2 effects per 10,000 rems gonad irradiation). Results from irradiation of embryo before birth. Effects unknown. |
REACTOR FAILURE MODES:
Emission factors known as source terms are essential to evaluate moment of poisonous nuclear radioactivity between the core of the reactor and the external environment downwind of the reactor. Figure shows types of barriers in the nuclear plant which must be broken to permit the escape of pollutants in the environment. Fuel matrix is the first barrier and fuel cladding is the second barrier and these fail when heated upto 2000oC or more. The coolant system is the 3rd barrier and the containment building is the 4th barrier. In Light Water Reactor (LWR) and Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR). The reactors are housed in strong buildings. Pollutants sometimes by-pass the containment also. At Chernobyl first 3 barriers failed in the initiating reactivity excursion and as there was no strong containment building flimsy reactor housing was promptly thrown out. At Three Mile Island first 3 barriers were damaged and the containment is the 4th barrier retained most of the pollutants except for a trace of reactivity that escaped from the core. An example of the various stages of failure, grouping together the individual sequences of system failures, plant damage, accident phenomena and similar source terms are presented hereby a containment Event Tree (Fig) for a nuclear Reactor. Core of an 1000 MW Reactor contains several thousand million curies of radioactivity at the onset of an accident and many powerful barriers must be breached before the pollutants escape into the atmosphere and establishing the timing and nature of breaches is essential part of source term analysis which is linked to sequence definition. The reactor safety study methodology used by Westinghouse source term analysis for the nuclear Reactor includes nil treatment of transport through the reactor coolant system and the Event Tree and categorization deal only with events of the reactor containment and behavior of its safety systems. Five nodes deal how containment response by examining the time and mode of its failure or by-pass. Remaining 3 nodes deal with behavior of the radio-nuclides, questioning whether they release mechanisms of steam explosion or vaporization occur or whether operation of containments sprays is washing radioactivity out of the containment atmosphere. The characteristics of 4 of the 12 release categories for Sizewell reactor are presented in the table for a comparision, 1)containment by-pass (UK1), or 2) Early failure UK2 3) delayed failure UK5, 4) Intact containment UK11. The accidents are 1)Large Break, LOCA, 2)small break LOCA, 3) Transient initiated accident. Three Mile Island had transient type accident with core cooling being recovered.
Table RELEASE CATEGORIES AND THEIR CHARACTERISTIC PARAMETERS FOR SIZEWELL REACTOR
Timing Characteristic
Release Category | Frequency of occurrence (Y-1)1 | Time before release2 (h) | Duration of release3 (h) | Warning time 4 (h) |
UK1 | 2.4 10-9 | 1 | 3 | 0 |
UK1C | 1.4 10-9 | 1 | 3 | 0 |
UK9 | 5.2 10-9 | 2 | 10 | 1 |
UK11 | 6.2 10-7 | 2 | Long9 | 1 |
Physical Characteristics
Release Category | Energy of release (106 Btu/h) | Elevation of release (m) | Fraction of core inventory released to environemnt5 | |||||||
Xe-Kr | Organic I | Inorganic I-Br6 | Cs-Sb | Te-Sb | Ba-Sr | Ru7 | La8 | |||
UK1 | 0.3 | 10 | 9 10-1 | 7 10-3 | 7 10-1 | 5 10-1 | 3 10-1 | 6 10-2 | 2 10-2 | 9 10-1 |
UK1C | 0.3 | 10 | 9 10-1 | 7 10-3 | 1.3 10-1 | 1.3 10-1 | 7.5 10-2 | 1.5 10-2 | 5 10-3 | 1 10-3 |
UK9 | 0 | 0 | 3 10-1 | 2 10-3 | 8 10-4 | 8 10-4 | 1 10-3 | 9 10-5 | 7 10-5 | 1 10-5 |
UK11 | 0 | 10 | 6 10-2 | 3 10-5 | 3 10-5 | 3 10-5 | 3 10-5 | 3 10-6 | 2 10-6 | 4 10-7 |
NOTES FOR TABALE 1:
1. As estimated in studies done / commissioned by, the CEGB (Central Electricity Generation Board)
2. The time between reactor shut-down and the release of radioactivity to the environment
3. For the purposes of this assessment the duration of releases UK1 and UK1C are taken as 1 hour, as over 90% of the activity released occurs within this time
4. The warning time is the time available for the initiation of counter measures before the release of activity to the environment. It has been evaluated conservatively as the time between vessel melt through and the release of activity to the environment.
5. The specified fractions of the core are assumed to be released uniformly over the specified release during (See note3) . The release fractions apply to stable isotopes of the specified elements.
6. The iodine and bromine are assumed to be released in an elemental form
7. Includes Ru, Rh, Co, Mo and Tc
8. Includes Y, La, Zr, Nb, Ce, Pr, Nd, Np, Pu, Am and Cm
9. For this category the releases of Xe-Kr and organic I are protracted and may continue over some tens of days. The assumption is made in this study that the total release occurs in 10 hours.
Source: D.Charles, S.M.Haywood & G.N Kelly, ‘The Radiological Consequences of Postulated Accidental Releases from the Sizewell PWR in Particular Meteorological Conditions’, NRPB-M84, May 1983.
Table METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS USED FOR THE ACCIDENT SCENARIOS FOR SIZEWELL-B
Code Name | Atmospheric stability | Duration (h) | Pasquill category | Windspeed1 (m s-1) | Mixing layer depth1(m) | Rainfall rate (mm h-1) |
D5 | Neutral | Total | D | 5 | 800 | 0 |
FD | Stable | t < 4 h t > 4 h | F D | 2 5 | 100 800 | 0 0 |
DR | Neutral (Rain) | Total | D | 5 | 800 | 1.0 |
Note: The Values assigned to the wind speed and mixing layer depth are representatives values for the corresponding Pasquill stability categories and have been taken from: R.H Clarke, ‘The First Report of a Working Group on Atmospheric Dispersion: A model for short and medium range dispersion of radio nuclides released to the atmosphere’, NRPB, Harwell, NRPB-R91, 1979. Pasquill categories are used to classify the degree of stability of weather conditions in order to distinguish the main atmospheric dispersion patterns of clouds emitted from land-based source.
EXAMPLES OF ACCIDENT SOURCE TERMS FOR DIFFERENT REACTORS
Sizewell B PRA Release Categories | Start | Duration | Fraction of Core Inventory Released | ||||||
Xe | I | Cs | Te | Ba | Ru | La | |||
UK1 | 1 hr | 3 hr | 0.9 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 6(-2) | 2(-2) | 4(-3) |
UK2 | 1 hr | 0.5 hr | 0.9 | 0.7 | 0.4 | 0.35 | 5(-2) | 0.2 | 3(-3) |
UK5 | 8 hr | 0.5 hr | 1.0 | 0.3* | 0.3 | 0.5 | 4(-2) | 3(-2) | 6(-3) |
UK11 | 2 hr | >24 hr | 6(-2) | 6(-5) | 3(-5) | 3(-5) | 3(-6) | 2(-6) | 4(-7) |
*Revised first estimate | |||||||||
Chernobyl | 0 hr | 10 d | 1.0 | 0.4 | 0.25 | >0.1 | 4(-2) | 5(-2) | 3(-2) |
TMI-2 | 3 hr | 1 hr | <8(-2) | 2(-7) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Note: 3(-3) = 3 x 10-3 | |||||||||
IMPORTANT RADIONUCLIDES AND TYPICAL CORE INVENTORIES FOR SIZEWELL
Group | Nuclides | T ½ | Core Inventory, 1100MWe Reactor Mega-Curies | |
Thermal | LMFBR | |||
Xe | Xell-113 | 502d | 185 | 173 |
I | I-131 | 8.04d | 91 | 95 |
I-133 | 20.8h | 184 | 169 | |
Cs | Cs-134 | 2.06y | 10.4 | 1.7 |
Cs-137 | 30.0y | 6.2 | 2.6 | |
Te | Sb-127 | 3.9d | 7.9 | 8.9 |
Te-132 | 3.2d | 131 | 125 | |
Ba | Sr-89 | 50.5d | 91 | 48 |
Sr-90 | 29.1y | 4.7 | 1.0 | |
Ba-140 | 12.7d | 166 | 133 | |
Ru | Mo-99 | 66h | 174 | 52 |
Ru-103 | 39.4d | 142 | 72 | |
Ru-106 | 368d | 35 | 49 | |
Rh-105 | 1.5d | 86 | 38 | |
La | Y-91 | 58.6d | 122 | 68 |
Zr-95 | 65.5d | 159 | 19 | |
Nb-95 | 35.1 d | 157 | 16 | |
La-140 | 40.3 d | 171 | 136 | |
Ce-141 | 32.5 d | 160 | 143 | |
Ce-143 | 33.0 d | 147 | 118 | |
Ce-144 | 285 d | 97 | 41 | |
Pr-143 | 13.6 d | 146 | 118 | |
Nd-147 | 11.0 d | 64 | 55 | |
Np-239 | 2.36 d | 1976 | 1966 | |
Pu-241 | 14.4 d | 8.6 | 24 | |
Cm-242 | 153 d | 1.8 | 5.8 | |
EFFECT OF LOCATION ON THE NUMBER OF FATAL CANCERS: SOME EXAMPLES FROM NRPB SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS(0) FOR SIZEWELL REACOTR
Type of release | Weather conditions (wind direction:270o) | Relocation limited to evacuation area | Relocation extended to areas in which reference dose criteria is reached | ||||
No. of late cancer | Time interval of relocated people (person-years) | No.of people relocated (persons) | No. of late cancers | Time interval of relocated people (person-years) | No.of people relocated (persons) | ||
R1(1) | M1(3) M2(2) | 4,936(5) 25,450 | 108,000 5,570,000 | 12,900(6) 198,000 | 4,760 12,040 | 150,000(7) 10,200,000 | 22,000 718,000 |
R2(2) | M1 M2 | 2,067 14,730 | 36,800 1,470,000 | 4,740 44,000 | 2,045 10,990 | 580,000 5,630,000 | 9,400 360,000 |
Source: NRPB-M103, tables 8,9,10, pp39-41
(0)methodology and parameters comparable to those used in this study
(1)comparable to UK1
(2)of the same type as UK1c,but with different parameters
(3)M1 is the same as D5 used here
(4)M2 is equivalent to M1, but with 1mm x h-1rain after 3 hours
(5)in the NRPB estimate for this study, this figure is 7,050
(6)in our estimates (See Appendix 1, Table 3) the number of people evacuated in 14,000
(7)Our estimate is 265,000 because of slightly different return criterion and different geographical distribution
grid
(8)our estimate is 18,500
THE CONSEQUENCES OF SPECIFIED RADIOACTIVE RELEASES FROM THE SIZEWELL ‘B’ NUCLEAR STATION ON THE POPULATION: Main results of the countermeasures scenario, using the MARC modelTABLE -3 TYPE OF ACCIDENT: (UK-1)
Wind direction (North:0o, clockwise) | Weather Conditions:D5 | Weather Conditions: FD | Weather Conditions: DR | |||||||
270o | 240o | 210o | 270o | 240o | 210o | 270o | 240o | 210o | ||
1*.Sheltering1: Surface area2 Maxi. distance from reactor Population concerned | Sq.km Km Persons | 2,700 160 450,000 | 2,700 160 245,000 | 1,450 160 115,000 | 820 74 110,000 | 820 74 205,000 | 415 74 130,000 | 4,350 170 725,000 | 4,350 170 4,500,000 | 2,600 170 1,000,000 |
- Evacuation: : Surface area Maxidistance from reactor Population concerned | Sq.km Km Persons | 100 28.5 14,000 | 100 28.5 18,500 | 89 28.5 6,500 | 255 37 22,000 | 255 37 72,000 | 190 37 25,500 | 880 85 115,000 | 880 85 225,000 | 335 62 110,000 |
2.* - Relocation : Surface area Max.distance from reactor Population concerned | Sq.km Km Persons | 200 46 18,500 | 200 46 93,000 | 145 37.5 25,000 | 385 41 28,000 | 385 41 150,000 | 260 38.5 32,000 | 2,700 140 420,000 | 2,700 140 1,500,000 | 1,400 140 545,000 |
3* Decontamination Surface area Max. distance from reactor Population concerned | Sq.km Km Persons | 75 28.5 13,000 | 75 28.5 11,000 | 73 28.5 4,650 | 330 41 25,000 | 330 41 145,000 | 220 38.5 30,500 | 1,900 115 295,000 | 1,900 115 500,000 | 760 115 235,000 |
4* :Decontamination Surface area Max.distance from reactor Population concerned | Sq.km Km Persons | 14.5 13 6,200 | 14.5 13 1,700 | 14.5 13 1,950 | 175 31.5 17,500 | 175 31.5 23,500 | 145 31.5 8,500 | 700 76.5 99,000 | 700 76.5 200,000 | 315 62 57,500 |
Time-integral of relocation : Surface area Population concerned | Sq.km-years Persons years | 1.45 x 103 2.65 x 105 | 1.45 x 103 3.85 x 105 | 1.4 x 103 1.45 x105 | 6.9 x 103 7.2 x 105 | 6.9 x 103 1.95 x 106 | 5.5 x 103 5.9 x 105 | 3.7 x 104 5.25 x 106 | 3.7 x 104 1.2 x 107 | 1.7 x 104 5.3 x 106 |
5*. Health effects early deaths - late deaths (cancer) | 44 7,050 | 792 20,500 | 23 3,600 | 725 5,650 | 4,610 14,300 | 342 2,920 | 431 9,670 | 2,840 39,700 | 151 8,310 | |
1*Potential Sheltering1: Consequences of emergency counter-measures
2*Consequences of emergency counter-measures:Relocation of population prior to 3*decontamination:Decontaminated area still not re-inhabited after 5 years 4* Decontaminated area still not re-inhabited after 20 years
5*Health effects – as estimated by NRPB3: -
NOTES FOR TABLE 3: 1. This ‘potential sheltering’ corresponds to the application of NRPB countermeasures recommendations in ERL-2. In the calculation of health consequences, sheltering is considered only in the evacuation area, prior to evacuation. 2. ‘Surface areas’ in this Table are land areas only. 3. These health effects have been computed by the NRPB considering only evacuation as a counter-measure. Sheltering is assumed to be required only for evacuated people, prior to evacuation. No specific relocation model is used, but it is assumed that source after evacuation (this implicitly corresponds, relocation).
NOTES FOR TABLE 3: 1. This ‘potential sheltering’ corresponds to the application of NRPB countermeasures recommendations in ERL-2. In the calculation of health consequences, sheltering is considered only in the evacuation area, prior to evacuation. 2. ‘Surface areas’ in this Table are land areas only. 3. These health effects have been computed by the NRPB considering only evacuation as a counter-measure. Sheltering is assumed to be required only for evacuated people, prior to evacuation. No specific relocation model is used, but it is assumed that source after evacuation (this implicitly corresponds, relocation).
BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COUNTERMEASURES MODEL
ZONE | Criterion for countermeasures | Extent of Zone | Distance downwind | Time taken to execute countermeasure1 | ||
Shelter 2, 5 in evacuated areas | Evacuate 3,5 | Relocate 5 | ||||
A | Major release of activity to containment | 60o sector extending 2km downwind | 0-2km | 1h | 2h | - |
B | Major release of activity containment | 60o sector extending 2 to 5 km downwind | 2-5km | 1h | 5h | -- |
C | Bone marrow dose from all exposure pathways exceeds 0.25 Sv in 7 days4 | Determined by area over which criterion exceeded | 5-25 km 25-75km > 75 km | 6h 6h 6h | 12h 1d 2d | - - - |
D | Whole body y dose from deposited material exceeds 0.25Sv in first year | Determined by area over which criterion exceeded | 5-50km >50km | -- -- | -- -- | 2d 2d |
NOTES FOR FIGURE1:
1. The times specified are the intervals between the inititation of the countermeasures and their completion. For areas A and B the time is measured relative to the beginning of the warning time (the beginning of the warning time is taken as the occurrence of vessel melt-through and the durationof the warning time is the period between vessel melt-through and a significant release of activity to the environment (see Table 1 in Appendix)
For area C the time is measured relative to the release of activity to the environment (i.e. no credit taken for warning time)
2. For areas A, B, and C, 90% of the population are assumed indoors and 10% outdoors at the time of the release. Sheltering considered here (which affects only the population which would be evacuated) is assumed to cover the whole population, at the specified time. However, it is possible that, following the NRPB official recommendations expressed in ERL 2, the extent of shelterisng would be far wider and cover more than the population to be evacuated in the following hours or day. In Table 3 of Appendix 1, for instance figures are presented on the possible extent of sheltering order using an exposure criteria of 15 mSv to the bone marrow in 7 days. (this criteria is in the middle of the range recommended by NRPB in ERL2, as shown in Table3, Chapter2). The extent of sheltering would in this case be obviously far wider than the alternative in which only the population to be vacuated would be asked to take shelter. Note that the health effects calculated by the NRPB do not take into account this possible supplementary cou8ntermeasures, nor the intake of iodine tablets.
3. The exposure during evacuation is taken to be approximately that which would have been received outdoors in the following hour had evacuation not occurred.
4. The dose to be used in conjunction with this criterion is evacuated assuming people to be outdoors during the passage of the plume and subsequently to spend 90% of their time indoors and 10% outdoors.
5. Those evacuated or relocated are returned to the affected area when the annual wholedboy v dose from deposited material is less than 10mSv per year after decontamination (assumed to reduce radioactivity levels by a factor of 3)
Source: G.N.Kelly, L.Ferguson, D.Charles,’the Influence of countermeasures on the Predicted Consequences of Degraded Core Accidents for the Sizewell PWRm NRPB-R163, December 1983, p42 Fig.1
OFFICIAL NRPB RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY MEASURES: EMERGENCY REFERENCE LEVELS (ERLs)
(dose equivalent levels in mSV)(1)
Counter-measures | Lower Value to: | Upper Value to: | ||||
Whole body | Thyroid, lung or other single organ | skin | Whole body | Thyroid, lung or other single organ | skin | |
Evacuation | 100 | 300 | 1,000 | 500 | 1,500 | 5,000 |
Sheltering | 5 | 50 | 50 | 25 | 250 | 250 |
Distribution of stable iodine tablets | -- | 50 | 50 | -- | 250 | -- |
(1) : 1mSv = 0.1rem; 1Sv=100 rems
Source: NRPB, Emergency Reference levels: Criteria for limiting doses to the Public in the Event of Accidental Exposure to Radiation, ERL-2, July 1981, p.4
SHORT TERM EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE ON POPULATION HEALTH AND THE EFFECTS OF EMERGENCY COUNTERMEASURES: FOUR EXAMPLES OF SELECTED SCENARIOS (1)
Release type | Weather condi-tions | Wind direc-tion | No. of early deaths | No. of prodomal vomiting (2) | Area evacuated (sq.km) | Max. distance (A) | people evacua-ted (B) | shelter- Area (3) (C ) | persons sheltered (3) (D) |
UK1 | FD | 270O | 725 | 2,300 | 255 | 35 | 22,000 | 820 | 205,000 |
Uk1c | D5 | 240O | 0 | 2 | 17.5 | 8.6 | 5,350 | 325 | 155,000 |
Uk9 | DR | 210O | 0 | 0 | 12.5 | 5 | 1,100 | 23 | 3,200 |
UK11 | D5 | 240O | 0 | 0 | 13 | 5 | 4,750 | 13 | 4,750 |
A) Max. distance of evacuation(km)
B) No. of people evacuated
C) Area of sheltering using NRPB’s ERL-2 criteria
D) Total No. of persons sheltering using NRPB’s ERL-2 criteria
(1): Results for all 36 scenarios can be found in Appendix1, Tables 3 and 5. Criteria for countermeasures described in Table 4.
(2) Not estimated by NRPB; evaluated by using the ratio between early deaths and prodomal vomiting in each type of release in NRPB –R137. The number of people suffering from prodomal vomiting includes those who will die. Figures are estimated after taking into account counter-measures implementation.
(3) Includes the number of people or area which will be evacuated some hours afterwards (shown in above columns 8 and 6) as well as those people or areas for which no evacuation will take place but for which the exposure dose is within the range defined in NRPB’s ERLs for sheltering. The latter group taking shelter are not considered in estimating early health effects.
Note-1: Small accidents like UK9 and UK11 according to calculations do not cause early deaths but cause a few cases of prodomal vomiting.
Note-2: In case of large accidental releases like UK1 and UK1C early health effects are same for UK1 with weather conditions FD (Low wind, high pressure, cloudy summer) Easterly wind causes 725 deaths in a short time and 2300 people suffer serious effects or die and many people in Leiston would become sick a few hours with passage of the plume. For small releases of UK9 and UK11 evacuation and sheltering is done as a precautionary measure upto 5km and emergency plans made upto 3km
Note-3: For large releases like UK1 and UK1C evacuation is done for a few thousand people to more than 2 lakh population. If winds blowout towards London at 240oC 45 lakh people need counter measures.
For Chernobyl accident largest releases occurred. All of the noble gas and major fractions of volatile fission products were released on 26th April in Stage-I the initiating in-core transient blew off the pile cap and ejected fragments of hot fuel along with volatile fission products directly into the environment. 5% of core elementary of volatile fission products and 0.3% to 0.4% of the non-volatile nuclides were released to the atmosphere. In second stage from 26th April to 2nd May in-core fires mainly of the moderative graphite promoted continuing releases from 26th to 27th. On 27th dumping of lead, dolomite, clay and sand heaps on to the core debris caused steady reduction in radioactive releases until 2nd May and the fuel temperatures were around 800oC . But in the 3rd stage from 3rd to 5th May core temperatures rose to 2000oC caused by decay heat when a second peak release occurred on May 5th. Revolatalisation of material trapped earlier in the filter bed perhaps caused high releases. During the 4th stage on May 6th radioactive release reduced due to injection of high flows of nitrogen under the core debris and termination of fuel oxidation drastically reduce emissions of 50 mega curies of released radioactivity was present in the environment
CONSEQUENCES OF RADIOACTIVE RELEASES FROM JAITAPUR NUCLEAR STATION ON THE POPULATION:
Main results of the countermeasures scenario, using the MARC model
( For weather conditions referred to the table presented below)
TYPE OF ACCIDENT: UK1
Wind direction (East:85o, clockwise) | Weather Conditions: DR 240o | |
1. Consequences of emergency counter-measures - Potential Sheltering1: Surface area2 Maximum distance from reactor Population concerned | Sq.km Km Persons | 3,000 170 12,00,000 |
- Evacuation: : Surface area Maximum distance from reactor Population concerned | Sq.km Km Persons | 800 85 6,00,000 |
2. Consequences of emergency counter-measures - Relocation of population prior to decontamination: Surface area Maximum distance from reactor Population concerned | Sq.km Km Persons | 2,000 110 7,00,000 |
Decontaminated area still not re-inhabited after 5 years : Surface area Maximum distance from reactor Population concerned | Sq.km Km Persons | 1,500 140 500,000 |
Decontaminated area still not re-inhabited after 20 years : Surface area Maximum distance from reactor Population concerned | Sq.km Km Persons | 800 85 5,00,000 |
3. Health effects – as estimated by NRPB3: - early deaths - late deaths (cancer) | 3,000 50,000 |
(Approximate values have been presented due to non-availability of latest population data)
NOTES FOR TABLE 3: 1. This ‘potential sheltering’ corresponds to the application of NRPB countermeasures recommendations in ERL-2. In the calculation of health consequences, sheltering is considered only in the evacuation area, prior to evacuation. 2. ‘Surface areas’ in this Table are land areas only. 3. These health effects have been computed by the NRPB considering only evacuation as a counter-measure. Sheltering is assumed to be required only for evacuated people, prior to evacuation. No specific relocation model is used, but it is assumed that source after evacuation (this implicitly corresponds, relocation).
METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS USED IN ESTABLISHING THE ACCIDENT SCENARIOS
Code Name | Atmospheric stability | Duration (h) | Pasquill category | Windspeed1 (m s-1) | Mixing layer depth1(m) | Rainfall rate (mm h-1) |
D5 | Neutral | Total | D | 5 | 800 | 0 |
FD | Stable | t < 4 h t > 4 h | F D | 2 5 | 100 800 | 0 0 |
DR | Neutral (Rain) | Total | D | 5 | 800 | 1.0 |
Note: The Values assigned to the wind speed and mixing layer depth are representatives values for the corresponding Pasquill stability categories and have been taken from: R.H Clarke, ‘The First Report of a Working Group on Atmospheric Dispersion: A model for short and medium range dispersion of radio nuclides released to the atmosphere’, NRPB, Harwell, NRPB-R91, 1979. Pasquill categories are used to classify the degree of stability of weather conditions in order to distinguish the main atmospheric dispersion patterns of clouds emitted from land-based source.
RISK ANALYSIS OF JAITAPUR REACTOR ACCIDENT : REMEDIAL MEASURES SCENARIO
(Due to the reactor accident at Jaitapur the following villages and towns will be facing the risks of pollution)
Distance from reactor | Time taken to execute counter measures | Places effected due to UK1/DR/240 (For weather conditions see table above with the modification that the wind direction is taken as 85o East) | |
Sheltering | Evacuation | ||
0 - 5 km | 1 hr | 2 hr | Jaitapur, Niveli, |
5 - 30 km Zone-A | 6 hr | 12 hr | Rajpura, Bhu |
30 - 85 km Zone-A | 6 hr | 1 day | Kolhapur, Kale, kokdi, Salevan, Raypatan, Anaskura, Panhala, |
85– 110 km Zone-B | 6 hr | 2 days | Hatkatangda, Alta,Kumbhoj, Wadgam, Kudoli, Rukad, |
110 – 140 km Zone-C | 6 hr | 2 days | Sangli, Miraj, Shirol, Bhudgaon, Shipari, Karanji, Dudhgaon, Kavathepiran, Malgaon |
140- 170 km Zone-D | 6 hr | 2 days | Arag, Bedag, Narsoba, Wadi, Kirandwad, Hupari, Ratankodali, Aslaj, Salgare, Gundewadi, Ranji, Kavatemahankal, Bhose, Adumbar, Bhilawudi, Astha, Bagni, Itakare, Korla |
170 and above Zone-E | 6 hr | 2 days | Athni, Umrani, Gugwad, Jath, |
Note: Intervals between evacuation and reoccupation of original houses and lands after decontamination
Since the radio-active pollutants seriously pollute the lands, buildings and equipment, the people duly evacuated and rehabilitated in safer places, can return along with their cattle to their original homes in their native places only
1) after one year upto 150km and above from the reactor
2) after 5 years upto 135km from the reactor
3) after 10years upto 120km from the reactor and
4) after 20 years upto 80km from the reactor.
Depending upon the vagaries of the weather, some places may be more polluted than others.
JAITAPUR NUCLEAR REACTOR ACCIDENT FORCES ABANDONMENT OF CITIES LIKE KOLHAPUR FOR 20 YEARS AND SANGLI FOR 5 YEARS TO AVOID RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION INCLUDING HUNDREDS OF VILLAGES IN THESE DISTRICTS
The Non-Governsmental organsiations of Maharashtra who are working to save the lives of lakhs of people of Western Maharasthra must go through the following website pertainingto therisk analaysis and disaster managment problems highlighted by the author for the proposed Kovvada nuclear plant in Srikakulamd District of Andhra Pradesh. The illustrations give more details by comparing the disaster scenarios of Chernobyl Nuclear accidents and Fukushima accident along with details of risk analysis and disaster management proposals which should have been made part of the Environemntal Impact Assessment for any nuclear plant in India under the regulations of the Union Ministry of Environment and Forests under the Environmental Protection Act, 1986. If only the nuclear plant proponents have prepared the risk analysis disaster management and the costs involved for the purpose they would have easily realised that the establishment of a nuclear power plant is much more costly than the alternative renewable energy sources that could have been developed in place of the nuclear power plant. Infact the abandonment of nuclear plant proposals will be much more cheaper economically and ecologically sound in terms of national interests and the policy of sustainable development which envisages development without destruction .
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