KUDANKULAM NUCLEAR PLANT EXPLOSION SCENARIO AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT

KUDANKULAM NUCLEAR PLANT EXPLOSION SCENARIO

Prof.T.Shivaji Rao, Director, Environmental Studies, GITAM University, Visakhapatnam
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/25/world/asia/25myth.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all
[New York Times on Big Money power behind spreading lies on Safety of Nuclearpower,inJapan]

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/31/world/asia/31japan.html?pagewanted=allted=all

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/27/world/asia/27collusion.html?pagewan

http://tshivajirao.blogspot.in/2012/02/kudankulam-nuclear-bomb-over-tamilnadu.html

 http://tshivajirao.blogspot.in/2011/10/violation-of-nuclear-accident-emergency.html
(Kudankulam nuclear plant violates environmental and safety standards)

http://www.thehindu.com/multimedia/archive/00841/Expert_Group_report_841167a.pdf
E.I.A.Report for Kudankulam Nuclear Plant by NEERI-insufficient
http://www.i-sis.org.uk/French_Nuclear_Power_Not_Safe.php [French Reactors Unsafe]
http://www.i-sis.org.uk/The_True_Costs_of_French_Nuclear_Power.php[French Reactors uneconomical]
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/jan/09/fukushima-cleanup-environmental-disaster
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article64688.ece?homepage=true (Nuclear Liability,Sorabji)
http://news.businessweek.com/article.asp?documentKey=1376-LU4JQ86KLVR601-51N8FTC8PJBPMDM4D0LHCJ4LUK
[Japan Disaster costs 4.5 Trillion Yen for victims  + 1.15 Trillion Yen for cleaning 1.0Yen= 0.65INR]
http://www.ieer.org/sdafiles/16-1.pdf  [Tritrium releases from Nuclear plants into Air and Water]
http://business.rediff.com/report/2009/jul/22/india-commits-rupees-180k-cr-to-nuclear-trade.htm
[Anti-Gandhian and Anti-people oriented Nuclear Policy of  a few Indian Bureaucrats ]

http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=IN (Nuclear share is 1% of total energy in India)

http://www.helio-international.org/Helio/anglais/reports/india.html  (Renewables high potential)

http://www.indiaenergyportal.org/energy_stats.php  (Energy sources in India)
http://earthtrends.wri.org/pdf_library/country_profiles/ene_cou_356.pdf   (Energy in India)

http://www.friendsofbruce.ca/Print%20Press%20Files/IndianCanduHealthSurvey.pdf  [Health impacts]
[Defects in Russian Reactors ]: :http://www.bellona.org/articles/articles_2011/rosatom_report
VVER-10000 MW Reactor-:http://www.elemash.ru/en/production/Products/NFCP/VVER1000/
HOT RUN Scheme  http://www.thehindu.com/news/states/tamil-nadu/article2077240.ece
https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/mragheb/www/NPRE%20402%20ME%20405%20Nuclear%20Power%20Engineering/Pressurized%20Water%20Reactors.pdf (Common and Advanced reactors)
http://www.tsunamisociety.org/273Pabat.pdf [ 10 meters high,extending to 1000meters inside]
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-11-07/news/30369521_1_kudankulam-tsunami-threat-reactor-building  [Dr.Kalam  under-estimates Tsunami potential ]
 http://www.nonuclear.in/anumukti  
[ Click on Vol.2,No.2&3,1988,Pages,43, 44 on  Nuclear  Plant safety lapses admitted by USSR]
 

,see Anticipated Nuclear Plant Explosion Calculations  for  an AMERICAN REACTOR,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Point_Energy_Center  [Details : INDIAN POINT REACTOR]

http://www.nirs.org/reactorwatch/aging/nrdcaccidentip1011.pdf  { INDIAN POINT REACTOR] 
http://www.nirs.org/reactorwatch/emergency/emergencyplanning71301.htm [ Danger Zones]

http://tshivajirao.blogspot.com/2010/04/nuclear-plant-risks-srikakulam-district.html
http://tshivajirao.blogspot.com/2011/10/violation-of-nuclear-accident-emergency.html 

http://bhujangam.blogspot.com/2011/08/economic-costs-of-nuclear-reactor_05.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cost_of_electricity_by_source (Nuclear power very costly)
 DAMAGING  COSTS  OF  JAPANESE NUCLEAR  REACTOR ACCIDENT :

AS  AN IRRITATED SNAKE  KILLS A MAN, NUCLEAR PLANTS SILENTLY  KILL  MANKIND AND NATURE FOR  FINANCIAL GAINS BY CONTRACTORS,OFFICIALS& POLITICIANS ?

Nuclear Plants are just silent killers of man and Nature created by the GOD. In nature the Uranium ore contains 99.3% of Uranium-238 and the remaining 0.7% is Uranium-235.  Uranium-238 and Uranium-235  in nature are least harmful.  But business people and other vested interests dig the iron ore and  convert  the least harmful Uranium-235  into the fuel form of Uranium-235  by purifying it to make a fuel by enriching it to about 4% of Uranium-235 that is packed in pellets and inserted into the core of the nuclear reactor for producing both electricity and material for making the bombs.   The reactor  when the nuclear atom is given a blow  by a neutron, enormous heat and other poisonous Radio-active atoms like Xenon, Barium, Cesium, Strontium, Plutonium and other dangerous radioactive substances are produced.  These radioactive substances are discharged into the air and water by several ways and  when they enter into the environment consisting of air, water and soil and foods like vegetables, fishes, prawns they ultimately get into human beings and produce cancers and birth defects in generations of people for many decades to come.  These poisonous radioactive substances  destroy natural and human life and culture and convert lands upto hundreds of kilometers into permanent nuclear burial grounds for ever.

How harmless Uranium ore materials in nature are converted into destructive and killer materials by man can be understood by the following simple example. For instance king cobras live in nature in anthills in forests and lead their normal life peacefully by catching their prey for food during nights But greedy people go and poke their iron rods into their abodes and disturb the Cobras when they become angry and bite the trespassers to inflict death over them by their poisons.   Similarly, the selfish people are mining the harmless Uranium and converting it into harmful  Enriched Uranium and then using it to produce electricity by means of the Nuclear plants and in the process they are producing Radioactive pollutants that poison man and nature slowly due to routine releases of radioactivity into the environment.  In course of time if an accident occurs in the Nuclear plant due to several reasons like in Fukushima or Chernobyl, the poisonous pollutants are thrown into the atmosphere and they kill thousands of people slowly and inflict cancer to millions of people living downstream upto hundreds of Kilometers as in case of Fukushima and Chernobyl accidents. The Nuclear plant operators are misleading the public by stating that Nuclear power is safe and cheap just like the medical representatives of various pharmaceutical companies praise before the doctors about the virtues of their medical tablets and tonics as part of their sale promotion activity the nuclear authorities are praising the nuclear plants as safe and cheap energy producers which is wrong.  This misinformation is dangerous to public health and welfare because in European states almost all people agree that safety of Nuclear (power is a Myth as accepted by Angela Merkel, Chancellor of Germany. She had consulted the genuine experts on nuclear plants and realized that nuclear safety is a myth and ordered for gradual closure of all the nuclear plants in Germany.  If Indian Prime Minister and Union Cabinet Ministers including the Chief Ministers of the state want to know the truth about the safety of the nuclear power plants they must go and visit advanced countries like Germany and Japan  and discuss the issue with foreign experts  so that they can refrain from promoting nuclear plants as is done by the peoples leader like Mamata Banerjee, Chief Minister of West Bengal.   For more scientific details see the above web sites on this topic prepared by independent experts.

Environmental Impact Analysis report are fabricated by consultants according to the national Green Tribunal and also according to the Chief Justice of India, S.H.Kapadia  who said “If you leave report preparation to the project proponent, I am sorry to say the person who pays will get the answers he asks for” and hence he called for a change in the system of preparation of EIA reports for the development projects.  See website:  http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article2886141.ece

 Tepco is expected  to pay 1.02 trillion yen up to March 31 in compensation to people affected by the accident, according to an October report of government investigation . The company finances. Compensation may total 4.5 trillion yen in the first2 years of the disaster,

Decommissioning  of the four damaged reactors   will cost about 1.15 trillion yen, according to the Expert Panel headed by bankruptcy lawyer  Shimokobe,the  head of the  fund to provide finances  to      TEPCO

The bill to clean up the contamination will be $14 billion over 30 years, as per the environment ministry

(For the socio-economic impacts of Kudankulam Nuclear accident analysis  be made as per guidelines  in the above website  containing the data for the nuclear accident at Sizewell reactor)

As per U.S.Expert on Nuclear plants,people should not live within 40 to 50 km.of kudankulam plant

 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/17/opinion/is-indian-point-the-next-fukushima.html

 

However unlikely, the possibility of a major meltdown at a plant in the United States can’t be dismissed. And yet Gregory B. Jaczko, the chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, told Bloomberg last week that there would be enough time for millions of people in the region to get away “because nuclear accidents do develop slowly, they do develop over time, and we saw that at Fukushima.”

Dr. Jaczko said it was unlikely that a nuclear accident would require prompt action beyond “more than a few miles.” That might be correct in terms of avoiding immediate health effects from radiation ,although after Fukushima, he advised United States citizens in Japan to stay at least 50 miles away from the reactors. But his remark does not begin to capture the human and economic devastation in Japan. At Fukushima, some areas more than 25 miles from the reactors were contaminated beyond the mandatory evacuation level.

The lack of attention to possible land contamination is a major gap in the American system of nuclear safety regulation. After Fukushima, it should be the main safety concern — and one that is not addressed by evacuation, no matter how efficient. 

NUCLEAR SAFETY CLEARENCES IGNORE COMBINED IMPACTS OF REACTORS.
http://jaitapur.wordpress.com/category/npcils-responses/

1] Safety for Each Reactor and not for Combined project. There are many sites world over having multiple reactors and the total nuclear power capacity at a park has no relation with safety which has to be ensured for each of the reactors separately.
1]EIA report does not address design/ safety concerns: Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) Study focused on the environmental aspects of the proposed nuclear power plant,
 2]The design and safety evaluation is the responsibility of the Atomic  Energy Regulatory Board (AERB).
3]Clearances of the Ministry of Environment & Forest from environmental angle and of AERB from safety angle are the two statutory clearances which a nuclear power project has to obtain.
4] The design/ features of the project in the EIA report, like environmental aspects in AERB safety evaluation, are thus to be considered as for- the- sake- of –completeness only.

Tamilnadu victims of Nuclear accident have to evacuate their homes for 1 to 20 years and return back  after decontamination:
A probable Kudankulam nuclear accident forces people of Tirunelveli and Palayamkot urban areas to runaway for safer places within 2 hours of the accident and return back home after 20 years after the fields, buildings and education institution of the cities are completely decontaminated.
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Accident victims in  Kerala have to evacuate all areas upto Trivandram for 20 years and for10, 5 and 1 year upto distances of 170km and above after decontamination of their houses, offices and agriculture fields:
If the Wind blows from South East during the accident,the Nuclear pollutants flow towards Kerala state when Trivandrum will be exposed to high levels of Radiation and the lakhs of people will be forced to vacate their homes, offices, agriculture fields and industries and run to safer places at a distant within 2 days of the accident and then return again to Trivandrum after more than 10 years after decontamination of the residences, offices, fields, roads and other infrastructure facilities in Trivandrum.

SPECIAL APPEAL TO  THE PATRIOTIC PEOPLE OF INDIA:

The following risk analysis and disaster management preliminary report is made for the purpose of creating awareness among the general public that the environmental impact assessment report for establishing the Kudankulam Nuclear plant must contain all the enumerated detailed information because it will show that in case the inevitable maximum credible accident were to occur at Kudankulam nuclear plant either due to failure of electrical or mechanical systems or human failure or bombing or sabotage by the terrorists from enemy countries a nuclear accident may happen and it cannot be ruled out because according to Parkinsons law if something can happen it will certainly happen on day or the other Hence the people of Tamil Nadu should not blindly believe that nuclear power plants are safe infact the highly educated and very patriotic head of the state of West Germany Angela Mercal has considered the safety aspects of nuclear plants in the light of the Fukushima accident of March 2011 and the Chernobyl Accident of 1986 and affirmed that there is nothing like a 100% safety with the nuclear power plants and hence strongly decided to protect public interest by cancelling the nuclear power plants after consultisng eminent subject experts who honestly admitted about the myths of nuclear safety and suggested to her to take up alternate renewable energy sources like solar energy, wind energy, bio energy, natural gas or even coal based thermal plants in place of the most costly and the most hazardous nuclear power plants. The common people of India must educate the highly educated college students and teachers that like Mahatma Gandhi they must develop patriotism and experiment with the truths and should not remain silent when public health and welfare and national economy are going to be ruined because of ignorance about the safety and economic aspects of nuclear power and consequently they must discharge their responsibilities as envisaged under Article 51 A(g) of the constitution of India to protect public health and Environment by preventing the establishment of major development projects that are not ecologically sound, economically feasible and technically unviable and socially unacceptable.  It is high time that the people of India must educate the elected representatives in state Assemblies and the National Parliament including the state Ministers and Central Ministers on working for sustainable development of the nation by constantly interacting with the people and hold public demands on the advantages and disadvantages of all development projects by following the rules and regulations under the Environmental Protection Act, 1986 and prove that they are working to stand by the UN Slogan of Development without destruction and the Indian dharma upholding the theme of “SARVEJANA SUKHINOBHAVANTU”

Supreme Court judges Douglas and Black described Nuclear power as “a most deadly, a most dangerous process that man has ever conceived”.  In fact the radioactive pollutants are a million to billion times more toxic than many chemical poisons.  Many experts emphasize that nuclear power proliferation is a serious threat to mankind meriting comparison with nuclear war.  But some people believe that it holds the key to national energy and defence problems and is clean, safe and cheap.  However, the former head f U.S. Nuclear establishment David Lilienthal belatedly admitted in 1981 that “nuclear technology is not really so advanced; it is not dependable enough; it is not safe enough”.  Even the Russian expert Legasov posed the questions: “Is not the development of nuclear energy on an industrial scale premature?  Will it not be fatal to our civilization, to the eco-system of our planet?

The Chernobyl disaster  and the Fukushima Reactor explosions actually proved that even highly disciplined developed nations like Russia and Japan could destroy their own human and natural resources and those of other neighbouring nations without a war just by accidental mismanagement of the so called peaceful uses of the atom.

In the light of the harrowing experiences from Chernobyl and Fukushima disasters most of the countries in Europe have decided against nuclear power in preference to renewable energy sources like wind, solar, and biomass and some countries like Japan and Germany have chosen to close down the existing reactors in a phased programme.  At this juncture, the Government of India has launched a major expansion programme in nuclear power.  Karnataka, Maharashtra, Andhra and Tamil Nadu will be affected by this project.

1. REACTORS AT KUDANKULAM:  As a part of this nuclear development programme the Government of India  proposes to establish a nuclear plant at Kudankulam in Tirunelvi District, Tamil Nadu  with an initial capacity of 2 x 1,000 MW inspite of continuing public agitations in the locality against the nuclear power plants.  In this context  it is proposed to highlight the highly damaging impacts of the proposed nuclear plant at Kudankulam so that the state and central Governments can plan for alternate sources of electricity development by making use of renewable energy  resources  as per the suggestions continued in the Greenpeace report the European countries and also the natural gas that is abundantly available on the East and West coast of India as can be seen under the websites:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Koodankulam_Nuclear_Power_Plant

http://www.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/publications/climate/2011/battle%20of%20the%20grids.pdf  [Alternate Renewable Energy Sources available for European countries]

http://www.pravasitoday.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Facts-on-Kudankulam-Nuclear-Power-Project.pdf

Nuclear power stations produce unusual amount of heat by means of nuclear reactions of Uranium fuel particles  bundled in packets and placed in reactor core where neutrons bombard the fuel and thereby abnormal heat and new radioactive particles which damage living tissues are produced.  If the nuclear fuel gets overheated and the packed radioactive particles are blown into the air the surrounding areas including the air, water, soil get highly poisoned and the cost of such an accident will be very high. 

Firstly the local population would be exposed to radiation from the radioactive plume from the reactor and the local soils and buildings also will be contaminated causing deaths including cancer even for future generations. Crops and agriculture products  exposed to radioactive pollutants will be poisoned and people and animals have to be evacuated from the local areas to safer places for several years.  This report attempts to evaluate some of the consequences caused by radioactive pollutants arising from  accidents in nuclear power plants. 

A nuclear reactor produces 3100 MW  of heat at full power the nuclear reaction is driven in 100 tonnes of Uranium Oxide fuel in 50,000 packed fuel rods are tubes of Zirconium alloy, ½ inch in diameter. The reactor core sits in a thick steel pressure vessel, through which 18 tonnes of is   pumped every second to carryaway the heat  which is used for generation of high pressure steam that drives the turbine that is linked with the generator that produces electricity.  During operations fuel rods are kept at 340^oC by circulating cooling water that removes heat from the rods and if this flow of cooling water is blocked for any reason fuel temperature rises to 1200^oC and the Zirconium tubes began to melt and with the core getting melted the fuel along with massive quantities radioactivity breaches all the barriers and forces its way into the atmosphere.  Reactor systems will be provided with means to flood the reactor core in emergencies to avoid core meltdown and to maintain the integrity of the containment. If the emergency core cooling system fails a cloud of radioactivity will enter the atmosphere and will carried by the wind, depositing fission products of the core in a ribbon downwind of the reactor in decreased concentration for hundreds of miles from the reactor. Health hazards occur due to this radioactive contamination of air, water and soil causing physical, economic and social damages in the zone of influence.  The dosages of radioactivity in the environment are estimated and necessary steps are taken as preventive and curative measures in sheltering the people administering medicines and evacuating people to safe zones within specified time schedules.  Similarly the damage to agricultural crops, milk products are also assessed for taking public health protection measures.  Some of the details of this emergency response system of the Nuclear  reactor are presented in the following paragraphs.

EXPOSURE PATHWAYS:

Contact with radioactivity can lead to exposure to radiation through a number of exposure pathways, for instance direct exposure ingestion or inhalation.   Direct exposure refers to a situation where exposure occurs from radiation emitted by radioactive substances outside the body.  After a nuclear accident, for example, this may result from radioactivity which is suspended in the air, from radioactive contamination of the ground or the surface of buildings.  Ingestion of radioactivity will occur if contaminated foodstuffs are eaten or drunk, and will result in the incorporation of radioactivity into the body.  Inhalation will result in radioactive particles lodging in the lungs, causing radiation exposure to the lungs, and certain radioactive elements passing through the lungs into the blood.

When radioactive elements are inhaled or ingested, the body will treat them in the same way as normal elements.  Since particular elements tend to be concentrated in particular organs, the same increased concentration will occur if these elements are radioactive. Normal iodine, for example, is concentrated in the thyroid  gland, and if radioactive iodine is ingested or inhaled, this causes a high concentration of radioactive iodine in the thyroid, and a correspondingly high chance of contracting thyroid cancer.

The amount of iodine ingested is of particular importance to the calculation of the consequences of nuclear accidents, since a large amount of radioactive iodine is produced in nuclear reactors, and it is very volatile which means it will be released in large quantities.  Similar effects will result from ingestion of other radioactive elements; for instance plutonium, if ingested, tends to concentrate in the bones.

HARMFUL EFFECTS OF RADIATION

Effects	Dose/Effect Relationship
Early effects -Death - Lung damage(fibrosis) - Radiation sickness (prodomal vomiting) -Sterility - Cataracts - Skin damage, hair loss	High dose (> 200 rads) to bone marrow (or lungs, etc.); depends on dose and dose rate Depends on dose and dose rate
Late Effects -Malignant diseases (fatal cancers, leukemia, non-fatal cancers to organs such as breast, thyroid, etc. -Hereditary effects -Developmental effects	‘Risk factors’ determined for different organs and for the whole body.  Normally assumed risk of fatal cancer ~ 1 per 10,000 rems collective dose (to a population). Risk factors determined (~ 2 effects per 10,000 rems gonad irradiation). Results from irradiation of embryo before birth.  Effects unknown.

REACTOR FAILURE MODES:

Emission factors known as source terms are essential to evaluate moment of poisonous nuclear radioactivity between the core of the reactor and the external environment downwind of the reactor.  Figure shows types of barriers in the nuclear plant which must be broken to permit the escape of pollutants in the environment.  Fuel matrix is the first barrier and fuel cladding is the second barrier and these fail when heated upto 2000^oC  or more.  The coolant system is the 3^rd barrier and the containment building is the 4^th barrier.  In Light Water Reactor (LWR) and  Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR).  The reactors are housed in strong buildings.  Pollutants sometimes by-pass the containment also.  At Chernobyl first 3 barriers failed in the initiating reactivity excursion and as there was no strong containment building flimsy reactor housing was promptly thrown out.  At Three Mile Island first 3 barriers were damaged and the containment is the 4^th barrier retained most of the pollutants except for a trace of reactivity that escaped from the core.  An example of the various stages of failure, grouping together the individual sequences of system failures, plant damage, accident phenomena and similar source terms are  presented hereby a containment Event Tree  (Fig) for a nuclear  Reactor.  Core of an 1000 MW Reactor contains several thousand million curies of radioactivity at the onset of an accident and many powerful barriers must be breached before the pollutants escape into the atmosphere and establishing the timing and nature of breaches is essential part of source term analysis which is linked to sequence definition.  The reactor safety study methodology used by Westinghouse source term analysis for the nuclear Reactor includes nil treatment of transport through the reactor coolant system and the Event Tree and categorization deal only with events of the reactor containment and behavior of its safety systems.  Five nodes deal how containment response by examining the time and mode of its failure or by-pass.  Remaining 3 nodes deal with behavior  of the radio-nuclides, questioning whether they release mechanisms of steam explosion or vaporization occur or whether operation of containments sprays is washing radioactivity out of the containment atmosphere.  The characteristics of 4 of the 12 release categories for Sizewell reactor are presented in the table for a comparision, 1)containment by-pass (UK1), or 2) Early failure UK2 3) delayed failure UK5, 4) Intact containment UK11.  The accidents are 1)Large Break, LOCA, 2)small break LOCA, 3) Transient initiated accident.  Three Mile Island had transient type accident with core cooling being recovered.

Table    RELEASE CATEGORIES AND THEIR CHARACTERISTIC PARAMETERS FOR SIZEWELL REACTOR

Timing Characteristic

Release Category	Frequency of occurrence (Y-1)1	Time before release2 (h)	Duration of release3 (h)	Warning time 4 (h)
UK1	2.4   10-9	1	3	0
UK1C	1.4   10-9	1	3	0
UK9	5.2   10-9	2	10	1
UK11	6.2   10-7	2	Long9	1

Physical Characteristics

Release Category	Energy of release (106 Btu/h)	Elevation of release (m)	Fraction of core inventory released to environemnt5
			Xe-Kr	Organic I	Inorganic I-Br6	Cs-Sb	Te-Sb	Ba-Sr	Ru7	La8
UK1	0.3	10	9  10-1	7   10-3	7  10-1	5  10-1	3  10-1	6   10-2	2 10-2	9  10-1
UK1C	0.3	10	9  10-1	7   10-3	1.3  10-1	1.3 10-1	7.5 10-2	1.5  10-2	5 10-3	1  10-3
UK9	0	0	3  10-1	2  10-3	8   10-4	8  10-4	1  10-3	9  10-5	7 10-5	1  10-5
UK11	0	10	6  10-2	3  10-5	3  10-5	3  10-5	3  10-5	3  10-6	2 10-6	4  10-7

NOTES FOR TABALE 1:

1.       As estimated in studies done / commissioned by, the CEGB (Central Electricity Generation Board)

2.       The time between reactor shut-down and the release of radioactivity to the environment

3.       For the purposes of this assessment the duration of releases UK1 and UK1C are taken as 1 hour, as over 90% of the activity released occurs within this time

4.       The warning time is the time available for the initiation of counter measures before the release of activity to the environment.  It has been evaluated conservatively as the time between vessel melt through and the release of activity to the environment.

5.       The specified fractions of the core are assumed to be released uniformly over the specified release during (See note3) . The release fractions apply to stable isotopes of the specified elements.

6.       The iodine and bromine are assumed to be released in an elemental form

7.       Includes Ru, Rh, Co, Mo and Tc

8.        Includes Y, La, Zr, Nb, Ce, Pr, Nd, Np, Pu, Am and Cm

9.       For this category the releases of Xe-Kr and organic I are protracted and may continue over some tens of days.  The assumption is made in this study that the total release occurs in 10 hours.

Source: D.Charles, S.M.Haywood  & G.N Kelly, ‘The Radiological Consequences of Postulated Accidental Releases from the Sizewell PWR in Particular Meteorological Conditions’, NRPB-M84, May 1983.

Table    METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS USED  FOR THE ACCIDENT  SCENARIOS FOR SIZEWELL-B

Code Name	Atmospheric stability	Duration (h)	Pasquill category	Windspeed1 (m s-1)	Mixing layer depth1(m)	Rainfall rate (mm h-1)
D5	Neutral	Total	D	5	800	0
FD	Stable	t < 4 h t > 4 h	F D	2 5	100 800	0 0
DR	Neutral (Rain)	Total	D	5	800	1.0

Note:  The Values assigned to the wind speed and mixing  layer depth are representatives values for the corresponding Pasquill stability categories and have been taken from: R.H Clarke, ‘The First Report of a Working Group on Atmospheric Dispersion:  A model for short and medium range dispersion of radio nuclides released to the atmosphere’, NRPB, Harwell, NRPB-R91, 1979.  Pasquill categories are used to classify the degree of stability of weather conditions in order to distinguish the main atmospheric dispersion patterns of clouds emitted from land-based source.

EXAMPLES OF ACCIDENT SOURCE TERMS FOR DIFFERENT REACTORS

Sizewell B PRA Release Categories	Start	Duration	Fraction of Core Inventory Released
			Xe	I	Cs	Te	Ba	Ru	La
UK1	1 hr	3 hr	0.9	0.7	0.5	0.3	6(-2)	2(-2)	4(-3)
UK2	1 hr	0.5 hr	0.9	0.7	0.4	0.35	5(-2)	0.2	3(-3)
UK5	8 hr	0.5 hr	1.0	0.3*	0.3	0.5	4(-2)	3(-2)	6(-3)
UK11	2 hr	>24 hr	6(-2)	6(-5)	3(-5)	3(-5)	3(-6)	2(-6)	4(-7)
*Revised first estimate
Chernobyl	0 hr	10 d	1.0	0.4	0.25	>0.1	4(-2)	5(-2)	3(-2)
TMI-2	3 hr	1 hr	<8(-2)	2(-7)	0	0	0	0	0
Note: 3(-3) = 3 x 10-3

IMPORTANT RADIONUCLIDES AND TYPICAL CORE INVENTORIES FOR SIZEWELL

Group	Nuclides	T ½	Core Inventory, 1100MWe Reactor Mega-Curies
			Thermal	LMFBR
Xe	Xell-113	502d	185	173
I	I-131	8.04d	91	95
	I-133	20.8h	184	169
Cs	Cs-134	2.06y	10.4	1.7
	Cs-137	30.0y	6.2	2.6
Te	Sb-127	3.9d	7.9	8.9
	Te-132	3.2d	131	125
Ba	Sr-89	50.5d	91	48
	Sr-90	29.1y	4.7	1.0
	Ba-140	12.7d	166	133
Ru	Mo-99	66h	174	52
	Ru-103	39.4d	142	72
	Ru-106	368d	35	49
	Rh-105	1.5d	86	38
La	Y-91	58.6d	122	68
	Zr-95	65.5d	159	19
	Nb-95	35.1 d	157	16
	La-140	40.3 d	171	136
	Ce-141	32.5 d	160	143
	Ce-143	33.0 d	147	118
	Ce-144	285 d	97	41
	Pr-143	13.6 d	146	118
	Nd-147	11.0 d	64	55
	Np-239	2.36 d	1976	1966
	Pu-241	14.4 d	8.6	24
	Cm-242	153 d	1.8	5.8

EFFECT OF LOCATION ON THE NUMBER OF FATAL CANCERS: SOME EXAMPLES FROM NRPB SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS⁽⁰⁾ FOR SIZEWELL REACOTR

Type of release	Weather conditions (wind direction:270o)	Relocation limited to evacuation area			Relocation extended to areas in which reference dose criteria is reached
		No. of late cancer	Time interval of relocated people (person-years)	No.of  people relocated (persons)	No. of late cancers	Time interval of relocated people (person-years)	No.of  people relocated (persons)
R1(1)	M1(3) M2(2)	4,936(5) 25,450	108,000 5,570,000	12,900(6) 198,000	4,760 12,040	150,000(7) 10,200,000	22,000 718,000
R2(2)	M1 M2	2,067 14,730	36,800 1,470,000	4,740 44,000	2,045 10,990	580,000 5,630,000	9,400 360,000

Source: NRPB-M103, tables 8,9,10, pp39-41

(0)methodology and parameters comparable to those used in this study

(1)comparable to UK1

(2)of the same type as UK1c,but with different parameters

(3)M1 is the same as D5 used here

(4)M2 is equivalent to M1, but with 1mm x h^-1rain after 3 hours

(5)in the NRPB estimate for this study, this figure is 7,050

(6)in our estimates (See Appendix 1, Table 3) the number of people evacuated in 14,000

(7)Our estimate is 265,000 because of slightly different return criterion and different geographical distribution

      grid

(8)our estimate is 18,500

THE CONSEQUENCES OF SPECIFIED RADIOACTIVE RELEASES FROM THE SIZEWELL ‘B’ NUCLEAR STATION ON THE POPULATION: Main results of the countermeasures scenario, using the MARC model

TABLE -3                                                                                                                                            TYPE OF ACCIDENT: (UK-1)

Wind direction (North:0o, clockwise)		Weather Conditions:D5			Weather Conditions: FD			Weather Conditions: DR
		270o	240o	210o	270o	240o	210o	270o	240o	210o
1*.Sheltering1:    Surface area2 Maxi. distance from reactor Population concerned	Sq.km Km Persons	2,700 160  450,000	2,700 160 245,000	1,450 160 115,000	820 74 110,000	820 74 205,000	415 74 130,000	4,350 170 725,000	4,350 170 4,500,000	2,600 170 1,000,000
- Evacuation:  :   Surface area Maxidistance from reactor Population concerned	Sq.km Km Persons	100 28.5  14,000	100 28.5 18,500	89 28.5 6,500	255 37 22,000	255 37 72,000	190 37 25,500	880 85 115,000	880 85 225,000	335 62 110,000
2.* - Relocation : Surface area Max.distance from reactor Population concerned	Sq.km Km Persons	200 46 18,500	200 46 93,000	145 37.5 25,000	385 41 28,000	385 41 150,000	260 38.5 32,000	2,700 140 420,000	2,700 140 1,500,000	1,400 140 545,000
3* Decontamination Surface area Max. distance from reactor Population concerned	Sq.km Km Persons	75 28.5 13,000	75 28.5 11,000	73 28.5 4,650	330 41 25,000	330 41 145,000	220 38.5 30,500	1,900 115 295,000	1,900 115 500,000	760 115 235,000
4* :Decontamination Surface area Max.distance from reactor Population concerned	Sq.km Km Persons	14.5 13 6,200	14.5 13 1,700	14.5 13 1,950	175 31.5 17,500	175 31.5 23,500	145 31.5 8,500	700 76.5 99,000	700 76.5 200,000	315 62 57,500
Time-integral of relocation :  Surface area Population concerned	Sq.km-years Persons years	1.45 x 103 2.65 x 105	1.45 x 103 3.85 x 105	1.4 x 103 1.45 x105	6.9 x 103 7.2 x 105	6.9 x 103 1.95 x 106	5.5 x 103 5.9 x 105	3.7 x 104 5.25 x 106	3.7 x 104 1.2 x 107	1.7 x 104 5.3 x 106
5*. Health effects   early  deaths - late deaths (cancer)		44 7,050	792 20,500	23 3,600	725 5,650	4,610 14,300	342 2,920	431 9,670	2,840 39,700	151 8,310

1*Potential Sheltering¹: Consequences of emergency counter-measures

2*Consequences of emergency counter-measures:Relocation of population prior to 3*decontamination:Decontaminated area still not re-inhabited after 5 years 
4* Decontaminated area still not re-inhabited after 20  years

5*Health effects – as estimated by NRPB³:    -

 NOTES FOR TABLE 3:   1. This ‘potential sheltering’ corresponds to the application of NRPB countermeasures recommendations in ERL-2.  In the calculation of health consequences, sheltering is considered only in the evacuation area, prior to evacuation. 2. ‘Surface areas’ in this Table are land areas only.  3.  These health effects have been  computed by the NRPB considering only evacuation as a counter-measure.  Sheltering is assumed to be required only for evacuated people, prior to evacuation.  No specific relocation model is used, but it is assumed that source after evacuation (this implicitly corresponds, relocation).  

BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COUNTERMEASURES MODEL

ZONE	Criterion for countermeasures	Extent of Zone	Distance downwind	Time taken to execute countermeasure1
				Shelter 2, 5 in evacuated areas	Evacuate 3,5	Relocate 5
A	Major release of activity to containment	60o sector extending 2km downwind	0-2km	1h	2h	-
B	Major release of activity containment	60o sector extending 2 to 5 km  downwind	2-5km	1h	5h	--
C	Bone marrow dose from all exposure pathways exceeds 0.25 Sv in 7 days4	Determined by area over which criterion exceeded	5-25 km 25-75km > 75 km	6h 6h 6h	12h 1d 2d	- - -
D	Whole body y dose from deposited material exceeds 0.25Sv in first year	Determined by area over which criterion exceeded	5-50km >50km	-- --	-- --	2d 2d

NOTES FOR FIGURE1:

1.       The times specified are the intervals between the inititation of the countermeasures and their completion. For areas A and B the time is measured relative to the beginning of the warning time (the beginning of the warning time is taken as the occurrence of vessel melt-through and the durationof the warning time is the period between vessel melt-through and a significant release of activity to the environment (see Table 1 in Appendix)

For area C the time is measured relative to the release of activity to the environment (i.e. no credit taken for warning time)

2.       For areas A, B, and C, 90% of the population are assumed indoors and 10% outdoors at the time of the release.  Sheltering considered here (which affects only the population which would be evacuated) is assumed to cover the whole population, at the specified time.  However, it is possible that, following the NRPB official recommendations expressed in ERL 2, the extent of shelterisng would be far wider and cover more than the population to be evacuated in the following hours or day.  In Table 3 of Appendix 1,  for instance figures are presented on the possible extent of sheltering order using an exposure criteria of 15 mSv to the bone marrow in 7 days.  (this criteria is in the middle of the range recommended by NRPB in ERL2, as shown in Table3, Chapter2).  The extent of sheltering would in this case be obviously far wider than the alternative in which only the population to be vacuated would be asked to take shelter.  Note that the health effects calculated by the NRPB do not take into account this possible supplementary cou8ntermeasures, nor the intake of iodine tablets.

3.       The exposure during evacuation is taken to be approximately that which would have been received outdoors in the following hour had evacuation not occurred.

4.       The dose to be used in conjunction with this criterion is evacuated assuming people to be outdoors during the passage of the plume and subsequently to spend 90% of their time indoors and 10% outdoors.

5.       Those evacuated or relocated are returned to the affected area when the annual wholedboy v dose from deposited material is less than 10mSv per year after decontamination (assumed to reduce radioactivity levels by a factor of 3)

Source: G.N.Kelly, L.Ferguson, D.Charles,’the Influence of countermeasures on the Predicted Consequences of Degraded Core Accidents for the Sizewell PWRm NRPB-R163, December 1983, p42 Fig.1

 OFFICIAL NRPB RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY MEASURES: EMERGENCY REFERENCE LEVELS (ERLs)

(dose equivalent levels in mSV)⁽¹⁾

Counter-measures	Lower Value to:			Upper Value to:
	Whole body	Thyroid, lung or other single organ	skin	Whole body	Thyroid, lung or other single organ	skin
Evacuation	100	300	1,000	500	1,500	5,000
Sheltering	5	50	50	25	250	250
Distribution of stable iodine tablets	--	50	50	--	250	--

(1)    : 1mSv = 0.1rem; 1Sv=100 rems

Source: NRPB, Emergency Reference levels: Criteria for limiting doses to the Public in the Event of Accidental Exposure to Radiation, ERL-2, July 1981, p.4

SHORT TERM EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE ON POPULATION HEALTH AND THE EFFECTS OF EMERGENCY COUNTERMEASURES: FOUR EXAMPLES OF SELECTED SCENARIOS ⁽¹⁾

Release type	Weather condi-tions	Wind direc-tion	No. of early deaths	No. of prodomal vomiting (2)	Area evacuated (sq.km)	Max. distance (A)	people evacua-ted (B)	shelter- Area (3) (C )	persons sheltered  (3) (D)
UK1	FD	270O	725	2,300	255	35	22,000	820	205,000
Uk1c	D5	240O	0	2	17.5	8.6	5,350	325	155,000
Uk9	DR	210O	0	0	12.5	5	1,100	23	3,200
UK11	D5	240O	0	0	13	5	4,750	13	4,750

A)     Max. distance of evacuation(km)

B)      No. of people evacuated

C)      Area of sheltering using NRPB’s ERL-2 criteria

D)     Total No. of persons sheltering using NRPB’s ERL-2 criteria

(1): Results for all 36 scenarios can be found in Appendix1, Tables 3 and 5.  Criteria for countermeasures described in Table 4.

(2)  Not estimated by NRPB; evaluated by using the ratio between early deaths and prodomal vomiting in each type of release in NRPB –R137.  The number of people suffering from prodomal vomiting includes those who will die.  Figures are estimated after taking into account counter-measures implementation.

(3) Includes the number of people or area which will be evacuated some hours afterwards (shown in above columns 8 and 6) as well as those people or areas for which no evacuation will take place but for which the exposure dose is within the range defined in NRPB’s ERLs for sheltering.  The latter group taking shelter are not considered in estimating early health effects.

Note-1: Small accidents like UK9 and UK11 according to calculations do not cause early deaths but cause a few cases of prodomal vomiting.

Note-2: In case of large accidental releases like UK1 and UK1C early health effects are same for UK1 with weather conditions FD (Low wind, high pressure, cloudy summer) Easterly wind causes 725 deaths in a short time and 2300 people suffer serious effects or die and many people in Leiston would become sick a few hours with passage of the plume.  For small releases of UK9 and UK11 evacuation and sheltering  is done as a precautionary measure upto 5km and emergency plans made upto 3km

Note-3:  For large releases like UK1 and UK1C evacuation is done for a few thousand people to more than 2 lakh population. If winds blowout towards London at 240^oC 45 lakh people need counter measures.

For Chernobyl accident largest releases occurred.  All of the noble gas and major fractions of volatile fission products were released on 26^th April in Stage-I the initiating in-core transient blew off the pile cap and ejected fragments of hot fuel along with volatile fission   products directly into the  environment.  5% of core elementary of volatile fission products and 0.3% to 0.4% of the non-volatile nuclides were released to the atmosphere.  In second stage from 26^th April to 2^nd May in-core fires mainly of the moderative graphite promoted continuing releases from 26^th to 27^th.  On 27^th dumping of lead, dolomite, clay and sand heaps on to the core debris caused steady reduction in radioactive releases until 2^nd May and the fuel temperatures were around 800^oC .  But in the 3^rd stage from 3^rd to 5^th May core temperatures rose to 2000^oC caused by decay heat when a second peak release occurred on May 5^th.  Revolatalisation of material trapped earlier in the filter bed perhaps caused high releases.  During the 4^th stage on May 6^th radioactive release reduced due to injection of high flows of nitrogen under the core debris and termination of fuel oxidation drastically reduce emissions of 50 mega curies of released radioactivity was present in the environment

CONSEQUENCES OF RADIOACTIVE RELEASES FROM KUDANKULAM NUCLEAR STATION ON THE POPULATION:

 Main results of the countermeasures scenario, using the MARC model

( For weather conditions referred to the table presented below)

                                                                                                           TYPE OF ACCIDENT: UK1              

Wind direction (Southern winds with slight variation on either side)		Weather Conditions: DR   240o
1. Consequences of emergency counter-measures - Potential Sheltering1:    Surface area2 Maximum distance from reactor Population concerned	Sq.km Km Persons	3,000 170 30,00,000
- Evacuation:  :   Surface area Maximum distance from reactor Population concerned	Sq.km Km Persons	800 85 15,00,000
2. Consequences of emergency counter-measures - Relocation of population prior to decontamination: Surface area Maximum distance from reactor Population concerned	Sq.km Km Persons	2,000 115 20,00,000
Decontaminated area still not re-inhabited after 5 years : Surface area Maximum distance from reactor Population concerned	Sq.km Km Persons	1,500 115 500,000
Decontaminated area still not re-inhabited after 20  years : Surface area Maximum distance from reactor Population concerned	Sq.km Km Persons	700 80 10,00,000
3. Health effects – as estimated by NRPB3:    - early  deaths - late deaths (cancer)		3,000 50,000

(Approximate values have been presented due to non-availability of latest population data)

NOTES FOR TABLE 3:   1. This ‘potential sheltering’ corresponds to the application of NRPB countermeasures recommendations in ERL-2.  In the calculation of health consequences, sheltering is considered only in the evacuation area, prior to evacuation. 2. ‘Surface areas’ in this Table are land areas only.  3.  These health effects have been  computed by the NRPB considering only evacuation as a counter-measure.  Sheltering is assumed to be required only for evacuated people, prior to evacuation.  No specific relocation model is used, but it is assumed that source after evacuation (this implicitly corresponds, relocation).  

METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS USED IN ESTABLISHING THE ACCIDENT SCENARIOS

Code Name	Atmospheric stability	Duration (h)	Pasquill category	Windspeed1 (m s-1)	Mixing layer depth1(m)	Rainfall rate (mm h-1)
D5	Neutral	Total	D	5	800	0
FD	Stable	t < 4 h t > 4 h	F D	2 5	100 800	0 0
DR	Neutral (Rain)	Total	D	5	800	1.0

Note:  The Values assigned to the wind speed and mixing  layer depth are representatives values for the corresponding Pasquill stability categories and have been taken from: R.H Clarke, ‘The First Report of a Working Group on Atmospheric Dispersion:  A model for short and medium range dispersion of radio nuclides released to the atmosphere’, NRPB, Harwell, NRPB-R91, 1979.  Pasquill categories are used to classify the degree of stability of weather conditions in order to distinguish the main atmospheric dispersion patterns of clouds emitted from land-based source.

RISK ANALYSIS OF KUDANKULAM REACTOR ACCIDENT : REMEDIAL MEASURES SCENARIO FOR TAMILNADU STATE

(Due to the reactor accident at Kudankulam  the following villages and towns will be facing the risks of poisonous radioactive pollution)

Distance from reactor	Time taken to execute counter measures		Places effected due to UK1/DR/240 (For weather conditions see table above with the modification that  the wind direction is taken as South )
	Sheltering	Evacuation
0 - 5 km	1 hr	2 hr	Ponnarkulam, Erukkandurai, Nakkaneri, Panaivilai, Sanganeri, Vairavikinaru, Idintakarai, ThilaivaranThoppu, Kudankulam
5  - 30 km Zone-A	6 hr	12 hr	Nagercoil, Marungoor, Anjugramam, Aralvaimozhi, Ramapuram, Therur, Rajavoor, Shankaranputhoor, Vadasery, Thirupattisaram, Vellamadam, Kothaigrammam
30 - 85 km (20 years) Zone-A	6 hr	1 day	Kayathar, Ithikulam, Paneerkulam, Thalayalnadanthankulam, Ayyanaruthu, Nellai, Kandheeswarampudur, Pallikottai, Alavanthankulam, Thenkalam Pudur, Periyarnagar, Thathanuthu, Thalaiyuthu, Senthimangalam, Thachanallur, Balabagyanagar, Tirunelveli, Vanarapettai, Palayamkottai, Naranammalapuram, Kattudayar, Kudiyiruppa, Kurichikulam, Vengadasalapuram, Kollankinar, Maniyachi, Gangaikondan, Savalaperi, Rayavallipuram, Melapattam, Burkitmangaram, Reddiarpatti, Sivanthipatti, Panayankulam, Maruthakulam, Caussanelpuram, Perinbapuram, Kandinthakulam, Tharuvai, Keeloomanallur, Pannankulam, Nellaiyappapuram, Mulaikkaraipatti
85– 110 km (10 years) Zone-B	6 hr	2 days	Akhilandapuram, Sivagnanpuram, Chettikurichi, Naickerpatti, Kattalankulam, Kalampatti, Sayamalai Madhuthupatti, Kokkukulam, Karadikulam, K.Velayuthapuram, Meenthulli, Valikandapuram, Kalugumalai, Vanaramutti, Alangulam, Zamin Devarakulam, Vagaikulam, Alaganer, Azhakunachiapuram, Maruthankinaru,
110 – 140 km          (5 Years) Zone-C	6 hr	2 days	Srivilliputtur, Sivakasi, Sattur, Rajapalayam, Poolavoorani, Madathupatti, Samsigapuram, Thenmalai, Mamsapuram, Ayyaneri, Venkatachalapuram, Ilayarasanendal, Elayiramapanni, Thiruvengadam, Melachthiram, Sankaramurthipatti, Viswanadham, Meenampatti, Vadamalapuram, Anaikuttam, Thiruthangal, Thlukankulam.
140- 170 km and above (1 Year) Zone-D	6 hr	2 days	Peraiyur, Vannivelampatti, Villur, Thaaniparai, Watrap, Kallikudi, Sengapadi, Virudnagar, Kumapatti, Mangalam, Amathur, Maharajapuram, Ayankarisalkuam, Kilankualm vandapuli, Mallapuram,Karaikeni, Solaipatti, Maravankulam, Usilampatti, Madurai.

 The details given above are approximate because the relevant detailed maps are not available with the author and they will be improved as soon as more details are received.

Note: Intervals between evacuation and reoccupation of original houses and lands after decontamination

Since the radio-active pollutants seriously pollute the lands, buildings and equipment, the people duly evacuated and rehabilitated in safer places, can return along with their cattle to their original homes in their native places only

1) after one year upto 170km and above from the reactor

2) after 5 years upto 135km from the reactor

3) after 10years upto  120km from the reactor and

4) after 20 years upto 80km from the reactor. 

Depending upon the vagaries of the weather, some places may be more polluted than others.

RISK ANALYSIS OF KUDANKULAM REACTOR ACCIDENT : REMEDIAL MEASURES SCENARIO FOR KERALA STATE

(Due to the reactor accident at Kudankulam  the following villages and towns will be facing the risks of poisonous radioactive pollution)

Distance from reactor	Time taken to execute counter measures		Places effected due to UK1/DR/240 (For weather conditions see table above with the modification that  the wind direction is taken as Southeast )
	Sheltering	Evacuation
0 - 5 km	1 hr	2 hr	Ponnarkulam, Erukkandurai, Nakkaneri, Panaivilai, Sanganeri, Vairavikinaru, Idintakarai, ThilaivaranThoppu
5  - 30 km Zone-A	6 hr	12 hr	Nagercoil, Marungoor, Anjugramam, Aralvaimozhi, Ramapuram, Therur, Rajavoor, Shankaranputhoor, Vadasery, Thirupattisaram, Vellamadam, Kothaigrammam
30 - 85 km Zone-A	6 hr	1 day	Trivandram, Nedumangad, Kalliyoor, Poovar, Neyyattinkara, Karkonam, Arumanal, Kuzhithurai, Eraviputhenthurai, Keeriparai, Thuckalay, Colachel, Asaripallam, Santhapuram, Manavalakuruchi, Prasery, Vallivaram, Thirunainar Kurichi, Eraniel, Thiruvithamcode, Karungal, Mangalakuntu, Verkilambi, Nattalam, Vencode, Irenipuram, Munchrai, Thiruvattaru, Chellanthurithy, Arumanal, Arayur, Pozhiur, Puthiyathura, Chenkal, Vellarada, Maruthamparai, Ariyancode, Perumpazhuthoor, Amboori, Vilappilsala, Balarampuram, Poovachal, Puliyarakonam, Pachalloor, Kulasekharam, Kuttichal, Arayanad, Vellanad.
85– 110 km (10 years) Zone-B	6 hr	2 days	Vattapara, Irinchayam, Anad, Alamkuli, Palode, Elavttaom, Chettachal, Idinjar, Braemore, Bharathannur, Kollayil, Palode, Nanniyode, Pirappancode, Mithirmala, Pangodu, Avanavancheri, Attingal, Azhoor, Chirayinkeezhu, Kadakkavoor, Anjengo, Thattathumala
110 – 140 km          (5 Years) Zone-C	6 hr	2 days	Varkkallai, Kallambalam, Paripally, Kollam, Kureepuzha, Punalur, Kottarakkara, Kunnicode, Vayackal, Kokkad, Ottakal, Odanavattom, Perinad
140- 170 km and above (1 Year) Zone-D	6 hr	2 days	Bharanikavu, Edakulangara, Parayakadavu, Paranthal, Pathanamthitta, Vettiyar, Pandanad, Pamba, Mallappally, Mannamaruthi, RannyPerunad, Vechoochira, Manimala, Chittar, Karur, Thiruvalla, Pulliyoor, Kozhenchery, Ezhumattoor, Cherukolpuzha, Naranganam, Edamuri, Kakkudunoon, Athikayam, Chethakkal, Kanamala, Laha, Mukkoottutharta, Eraviperoor, Thiruvanvandur, Pandy, Niranam, Muttar, Karuvatta, Vezhapra, Edathua, Changanaserry, Takazhi, Cheppad, Haripad, Chingoli, Mavelikkara, Muthukulam, Pathiyoorkala, Kareelakulangara, Kayankulam, Kattanam,Kannakuzhi, Kappil, Vedraplavu.

The details given above are approximate because the relevant detailed maps are not available with the author and they will be improved as soon as more details are received.

Note: Intervals between evacuation and reoccupation of original houses and lands after decontamination

Since the radio-active pollutants seriously pollute the lands, buildings and equipment, the people duly evacuated and rehabilitated in safer places, can return along with their cattle to their original homes in their native places only

1) after one year upto 170km and above from the reactor

2) after 5 years upto 135km from the reactor

3) after 10years upto  120km from the reactor and

4) after 20 years upto 80km from the reactor. 

Depending upon the vagaries of the weather, some places may be more polluted than others.

Kudankulam reactor accident scenario during South-Easterly winds at the plant site.

 http://www.gitam.edu/GIS/shivajirao_dckn.htm%20

For more details see the following website(on a larger scale)

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/ams/india/nc-43-16a.jpg

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/ams/india/nc-44-09a.jpg

 EMERGENCY EVACUATION ZONES UPTO 70Km FROM THE REACTORS IN CANADA:

1.  Planning zones  for nuclear accidents in Ontario state of Canada

The planning zones used by the Province of Ontario are each generically described as being a certain radial distance from the NPP, but in practice they are defined in a geographically logical manner. For NPPs in Ontario, the following planning zones are used:

Contiguous zone is the offsite area immediately surrounding the nuclear facility where an increased level of preparedness and response is required (nominally 3 km).

Primary zone is the area around the nuclear facility where exposure control measures may be required (nominally 10 km). The approximate population is 7,500 in the Bruce primary zone, 122,000 in the Darlington primary zone and 261,000 in the Pickering primary zone.

Secondary zone is the area where ingestion control measures may be required (50 km).

2.   Planning zones  for nuclear accidents in Quebec  state of Canada

The planning zones used by the Province of Quebec are each generically described as being a certain radial distance from the NPP, but in practice they are defined in a geographically logical manner. The planning zones defined by the provincial plan (PMUNE-G2) are as follows:

Plume exposure planning zone (Zone de planification d’urgence pour l’exposition au panache: ZPU-P) is an area around the NPP where the emphasis is on exposure control measures (nominally 8 km). The approximate population in the G2 ZPU-P is 10,000.

Ingestion planning zone (Zone de planification d’urgence pour l’exposition par ingestion: ZPU-I) is an area around the NPP where the emphasis is on the ingestion control measures (nominally 70 km).

http://nuclearsafety.gc.ca/pubs_catalogue/uploads/October-2011-CNSC-Fukushima-Task-Force-Report_e.pdf