JAITAPUR NUCLEAR PLANT EXPLOSION SCENARIO AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT

Prof.T.Shivaji Rao, Director, Environmental Studies, GITAM University, Visakhapatnam

http://www.nirs.org/reactorwatch/licensedtokill/LiscencedtoKill.pdf 

(Killing fishes and marine life due to reactor effluents, 

cheating by nuclear industry pages 101 and 104) 

http://tshivajirao.blogspot.com/2010/04/nuclear-plant-risks-srikakulam-district.html

http://bhujangam.blogspot.com/2011/08/economic-costs-of-nuclear-reactor_05.html
http://tshivajirao.blogspot.com/2011/09/why-indian-nuclear-plants-are-bound-to.html  
http://tshivajirao.blogspot.com/2011/08/diaster-consequences-of-kovvada-nuclear.html 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cost_of_electricity_by_source  
www.morehead.unc.edu/revitalise/feb/envsciexcel.html  (Software of Gaussian Plume Model)
Click on  :Download the Excel model. (software used for calculations of accident scenario)

http://saarc-sdmc.nic.in/pdf/india/file6.pdf  ( (Disaster Management,NIDM,GOI)

http://saarc-sdmc.nic.in/pdf/india/file2.pdf  (Disaster Management, Advise to states,NIDM,GOI))

http://cwc.gov.in/main/downloads/EAPChapters.pdf  (EAP report for dam burst scenario,GOI) 

(For the socio-economic impacts of Jaitapur Nuclear accident analysis must be made on the guidelines provided in the above website that contains the data for the nuclear accident at Sizewell reactor)

AS  AN IRRITATED SNAKE  KILLS A MAN, NUCLEAR PLANTS SILENTLY  KILL  MANKIND AND NATURE FOR  FINANCIAL GAINS BY CONTRACTORS,OFFICIALS& POLITICIANS ?

Nuclear Plants are just silent killers of man and Nature created by the GOD. In nature the Uranium ore contains 99.3% of Uranium-238 and the remaining 0.7% is Uranium-235.  Uranium-238 and Uranium-235  in nature are least harmful.  But business people and other vested interests dig the iron ore and  convert  the least harmful Uranium-235  into the fuel form of Uranium-235  by purifying it to make a fuel by enriching it to about 4% of Uranium-235 that is packed in pellets and inserted into the core of the nuclear reactor for producing both electricity and material for making the bombs.   The reactor  when the nuclear atom is given a blow  by a neutron, enormous heat and other poisonous Radio-active atoms like Xenon, Barium, Cesium, Strontium, Plutonium and other dangerous radioactive substances are produced.  These radioactive substances are discharged into the air and water by several ways and  when they enter into the environment consisting of air, water and soil and foods like vegetables, fishes, prawns they ultimately get into human beings and produce cancers and birth defects in generations of people for many decades to come.  These poisonous radioactive substances  destroy natural and human life and culture and convert lands upto hundreds of kilometers into permanent nuclear burial grounds for ever.

How harmless Uranium ore materials in nature are converted into destructive and killer materials by man can be understood by the following simple example. For instance king cobras live in nature in anthills in forests and lead their normal life peacefully by catching their prey for food during nights But greedy people go and poke their iron rods into their abodes and disturb the Cobras when they become angry and bite the trespassers to inflict death over them by their poisons.   Similarly, the selfish people are mining the harmless Uranium and converting it into harmful  Enriched Uranium and then using it to produce electricity by means of the Nuclear plants and in the process they are producing Radioactive pollutants that poison man and nature slowly due to routine releases of radioactivity into the environment.  In course of time if an accident occurs in the Nuclear plant due to several reasons like in Fukushima or Chernobyl, the poisonous pollutants are thrown into the atmosphere and they kill thousands of people slowly and inflict cancer to millions of people living downstream upto hundreds of Kilometers as in case of Fukushima and Chernobyl accidents. The Nuclear plant operators are misleading the public by stating that Nuclear power is safe and cheap just like the medical representatives of various pharmaceutical companies praise before the doctors about the virtues of their medical tablets and tonics as part of their sale promotion activity the nuclear authorities are praising the nuclear plants as safe and cheap energy producers which is wrong.  This misinformation is dangerous to public health and welfare because in European states almost all people agree that safety of Nuclear (power is a Myth as accepted by Angela Merkel, Chancellor of Germany. She had consulted the genuine experts on nuclear plants and realized that nuclear safety is a myth and ordered for gradual closure of all the nuclear plants in Germany.  If Indian Prime Minister and Union Cabinet Ministers including the Chief Ministers of the state want to know the truth about the safety of the nuclear power plants they must go and visit advanced countries like Germany and Japan  and discuss the issue with foreign experts  so that they can refrain from promoting nuclear plants as is done by the peoples leader like Mamata Banerjee, Chief Minister of West Bengal.   For more scientific details see the above web sites on this topic prepared by independent experts.

Environmental Impact Analysis report are fabricated by consultants according to the national Green Tribunal and also according to the Chief Justice of India, S.H.Kapadia  who said “If you leave report preparation to the project proponent, I am sorry to say the person who pays will get the answers he asks for” and hence he called for a change in the system of preparation of EIA reports for the development projects.  See website:  http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article2886141.ece

Supreme Court judges Douglas and Black described Nuclear power as “a most deadly, a most dangerous process that man has ever conceived”.  In fact the radioactive pollutants are a million to billion times more toxic than many chemical poisons.  Many experts emphasize that nuclear power proliferation is a serious threat to mankind meriting comparison with nuclear war.  But some people believe that it holds the key to national energy and defence problems and is clean, safe and cheap.  However, the former head f U.S. Nuclear establishment David Lilienthal belatedly admitted in 1981 that “nuclear technology is not really so advanced; it is not dependable enough; it is not safe enough”.  Even the Russian expert Legasov posed the questions: “Is not the development of nuclear energy on an industrial scale premature?  Will it not be fatal to our civilization, to the eco-system of our planet?

The Chernobyl disaster  and the Fukushima Reactor explosions actually proved that even highly disciplined developed nations like Russia and Japan could destroy their own human and natural resources and those of other neighbouring nations without a war just by accidental mismanagement of the so called peaceful uses of the atom.

In the light of the harrowing experiences from Chernobyl and Fukushima disasters most of the countries in Europe have decided against nuclear power in preference to renewable energy sources like wind, solar, and biomass and some countries like Japan and Germany have chosen to close down the existing reactors in a phased programme.  At this juncture, the Government of India has launched a major expansion programme in nuclear power.  Karnataka, Maharashtra, Andhra and Tamil Nadu will be affected by this project.

1. REACTORS AT JAITAPUR:  As a part of this nuclear development programme the Government of India  proposes to establish a nuclear plant at Jaitapur in Ratnagiri District, Maharashtra  with an initial capacity of 9,900 MW inspite of continuing public agitations in the locality against the nuclear power plants.  In this context  it is proposed to highlight the highly damaging impacts of the proposed nuclear plant at Jaitapur so that the state and central Governments can plan for alternate sources of electricity development by making use of renewable energy  resources  as per the suggestions continued in the Greenpeace report the European countries and also the natural gas that is abundantly available on the East and West coast of India as can be seen under the websites: http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/article1770465.ece

http://www.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/publications/climate/2011/battle%20of%20the%20grids.pdf  [Alternate Renewable Energy Sources available for European countries]

Nuclear power stations produce unusual amount of heat by means of nuclear reactions of Uranium fuel particles  bundled in packets and placed in reactor core where neutrons bombard the fuel and thereby abnormal heat and new radioactive particles which damage living tissues are produced.  If the nuclear fuel gets overheated and the packed radioactive particles are blown into the air the surrounding areas including the air, water, soil get highly poisoned and the cost of such an accident will be very high. 

Firstly the local population would be exposed to radiation from the radioactive plume from the reactor and the local soils and buildings also will be contaminated causing deaths including cancer even for future generations. Crops and agriculture products  exposed to radioactive pollutants will be poisoned and people and animals have to be evacuated from the local areas to safer places for several years.  This report attempts to evaluate some of the consequences caused by radioactive pollutants arising from  accidents in nuclear power plants. 

For this purpose the proposed Jaitapur Nuclear  Plant  with  9,900 MW Nuclear reactors is taken as model from France.  http://www.npcil.nic.in/main/jaitapur-atomic-power-plant.aspx

This reactor produces 3100 MW  of heat at full power the nuclear reaction is driven in 100 tonnes of Uranium Oxide fuel in 50,000 packed fuel rods are tubes of Zirconium alloy, ½ inch in diameter. The reactor core sits in a thick steel pressure vessel, through which 18 tonnes of is   pumped every second to carryaway the heat  which is used for generation of high pressure steam that drives the turbine that is linked with the generator that produces electricity.  During operations fuel rods are kept at 340^oC by circulating cooling water that removes heat from the rods and if this flow of cooling water is blocked for any reason fuel temperature rises to 1200^oC and the Zirconium tubes began to melt and with the core getting melted the fuel along with massive quantities radioactivity breaches all the barriers and forces its way into the atmosphere.  Reactor systems will be provided with means to flood the reactor core in emergencies to avoid core meltdown and to maintain the integrity of the containment. If the emergency core cooling system fails a cloud of radioactivity will enter the atmosphere and will carried by the wind, depositing fission products of the core in a ribbon downwind of the reactor in decreased concentration for hundreds of miles from the reactor. Health hazards occur due to this radioactive contamination of air, water and soil causing physical, economic and social damages in the zone of influence.  The dosages of radioactivity in the environment are estimated and necessary steps are taken as preventive and curative measures in sheltering the people administering medicines and evacuating people to safe zones within specified time schedules.  Similarly the damage to agricultural crops, milk products are also assessed for taking public health protection measures.  Some of the details of this emergency response system of the Nuclear  reactor are presented in the following paragraphs.

EXPOSURE PATHWAYS:

Contact with radioactivity can lead to exposure to radiation through a number of exposure pathways, for instance direct exposure ingestion or inhalation.   Direct exposure refers to a situation where exposure occurs from radiation emitted by radioactive substances outside the body.  After a nuclear accident, for example, this may result from radioactivity which is suspended in the air, from radioactive contamination of the ground or the surface of buildings.  Ingestion of radioactivity will occur if contaminated foodstuffs are eaten or drunk, and will result in the incorporation of radioactivity into the body.  Inhalation will result in radioactive particles lodging in the lungs, causing radiation exposure to the lungs, and certain radioactive elements passing through the lungs into the blood.

When radioactive elements are inhaled or ingested, the body will treat them in the same way as normal elements.  Since particular elements tend to be concentrated in particular organs, the same increased concentration will occur if these elements are radioactive. Normal iodine, for example, is concentrated in the thyroid  gland, and if radioactive iodine is ingested or inhaled, this causes a high concentration of radioactive iodine in the thyroid, and a correspondingly high chance of contracting thyroid cancer.

The amount of iodine ingested is of particular importance to the calculation of the consequences of nuclear accidents, since a large amount of radioactive iodine is produced in nuclear reactors, and it is very volatile which means it will be released in large quantities.  Similar effects will result from ingestion of other radioactive elements; for instance plutonium, if ingested, tends to concentrate in the bones.

HARMFUL EFFECTS OF RADIATION

Effects	Dose/Effect Relationship
Early effects -Death - Lung damage(fibrosis) - Radiation sickness (prodomal vomiting) -Sterility - Cataracts - Skin damage, hair loss	High dose (> 200 rads) to bone marrow (or lungs, etc.); depends on dose and dose rate Depends on dose and dose rate
Late Effects -Malignant diseases (fatal cancers, leukemia, non-fatal cancers to organs such as breast, thyroid, etc. -Hereditary effects -Developmental effects	‘Risk factors’ determined for different organs and for the whole body.  Normally assumed risk of fatal cancer ~ 1 per 10,000 rems collective dose (to a population). Risk factors determined (~ 2 effects per 10,000 rems gonad irradiation). Results from irradiation of embryo before birth.  Effects unknown.

REACTOR FAILURE MODES:

Emission factors known as source terms are essential to evaluate moment of poisonous nuclear radioactivity between the core of the reactor and the external environment downwind of the reactor.  Figure shows types of barriers in the nuclear plant which must be broken to permit the escape of pollutants in the environment.  Fuel matrix is the first barrier and fuel cladding is the second barrier and these fail when heated upto 2000^oC  or more.  The coolant system is the 3^rd barrier and the containment building is the 4^th barrier.  In Light Water Reactor (LWR) and  Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR).  The reactors are housed in strong buildings.  Pollutants sometimes by-pass the containment also.  At Chernobyl first 3 barriers failed in the initiating reactivity excursion and as there was no strong containment building flimsy reactor housing was promptly thrown out.  At Three Mile Island first 3 barriers were damaged and the containment is the 4^th barrier retained most of the pollutants except for a trace of reactivity that escaped from the core.  An example of the various stages of failure, grouping together the individual sequences of system failures, plant damage, accident phenomena and similar source terms are  presented hereby a containment Event Tree  (Fig) for a nuclear  Reactor.  Core of an 1000 MW Reactor contains several thousand million curies of radioactivity at the onset of an accident and many powerful barriers must be breached before the pollutants escape into the atmosphere and establishing the timing and nature of breaches is essential part of source term analysis which is linked to sequence definition.  The reactor safety study methodology used by Westinghouse source term analysis for the nuclear Reactor includes nil treatment of transport through the reactor coolant system and the Event Tree and categorization deal only with events of the reactor containment and behavior of its safety systems.  Five nodes deal how containment response by examining the time and mode of its failure or by-pass.  Remaining 3 nodes deal with behavior  of the radio-nuclides, questioning whether they release mechanisms of steam explosion or vaporization occur or whether operation of containments sprays is washing radioactivity out of the containment atmosphere.  The characteristics of 4 of the 12 release categories for Sizewell reactor are presented in the table for a comparision, 1)containment by-pass (UK1), or 2) Early failure UK2 3) delayed failure UK5, 4) Intact containment UK11.  The accidents are 1)Large Break, LOCA, 2)small break LOCA, 3) Transient initiated accident.  Three Mile Island had transient type accident with core cooling being recovered.

Table    RELEASE CATEGORIES AND THEIR CHARACTERISTIC PARAMETERS FOR SIZEWELL REACTOR

Timing Characteristic

Release Category	Frequency of occurrence (Y-1)1	Time before release2 (h)	Duration of release3 (h)	Warning time 4 (h)
UK1	2.4   10-9	1	3	0
UK1C	1.4   10-9	1	3	0
UK9	5.2   10-9	2	10	1
UK11	6.2   10-7	2	Long9	1

Physical Characteristics

Release Category	Energy of release (106 Btu/h)	Elevation of release (m)	Fraction of core inventory released to environemnt5
			Xe-Kr	Organic I	Inorganic I-Br6	Cs-Sb	Te-Sb	Ba-Sr	Ru7	La8
UK1	0.3	10	9  10-1	7   10-3	7  10-1	5  10-1	3  10-1	6   10-2	2 10-2	9  10-1
UK1C	0.3	10	9  10-1	7   10-3	1.3  10-1	1.3 10-1	7.5 10-2	1.5  10-2	5 10-3	1  10-3
UK9	0	0	3  10-1	2  10-3	8   10-4	8  10-4	1  10-3	9  10-5	7 10-5	1  10-5
UK11	0	10	6  10-2	3  10-5	3  10-5	3  10-5	3  10-5	3  10-6	2 10-6	4  10-7

NOTES FOR TABALE 1:

1.       As estimated in studies done / commissioned by, the CEGB (Central Electricity Generation Board)

2.       The time between reactor shut-down and the release of radioactivity to the environment

3.       For the purposes of this assessment the duration of releases UK1 and UK1C are taken as 1 hour, as over 90% of the activity released occurs within this time

4.       The warning time is the time available for the initiation of counter measures before the release of activity to the environment.  It has been evaluated conservatively as the time between vessel melt through and the release of activity to the environment.

5.       The specified fractions of the core are assumed to be released uniformly over the specified release during (See note3) . The release fractions apply to stable isotopes of the specified elements.

6.       The iodine and bromine are assumed to be released in an elemental form

7.       Includes Ru, Rh, Co, Mo and Tc

8.        Includes Y, La, Zr, Nb, Ce, Pr, Nd, Np, Pu, Am and Cm

9.       For this category the releases of Xe-Kr and organic I are protracted and may continue over some tens of days.  The assumption is made in this study that the total release occurs in 10 hours.

Source: D.Charles, S.M.Haywood  & G.N Kelly, ‘The Radiological Consequences of Postulated Accidental Releases from the Sizewell PWR in Particular Meteorological Conditions’, NRPB-M84, May 1983.

Table    METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS USED  FOR THE ACCIDENT  SCENARIOS FOR SIZEWELL-B

Code Name	Atmospheric stability	Duration (h)	Pasquill category	Windspeed1 (m s-1)	Mixing layer depth1(m)	Rainfall rate (mm h-1)
D5	Neutral	Total	D	5	800	0
FD	Stable	t < 4 h t > 4 h	F D	2 5	100 800	0 0
DR	Neutral (Rain)	Total	D	5	800	1.0

Note:  The Values assigned to the wind speed and mixing  layer depth are representatives values for the corresponding Pasquill stability categories and have been taken from: R.H Clarke, ‘The First Report of a Working Group on Atmospheric Dispersion:  A model for short and medium range dispersion of radio nuclides released to the atmosphere’, NRPB, Harwell, NRPB-R91, 1979.  Pasquill categories are used to classify the degree of stability of weather conditions in order to distinguish the main atmospheric dispersion patterns of clouds emitted from land-based source.

EXAMPLES OF ACCIDENT SOURCE TERMS FOR DIFFERENT REACTORS

Sizewell B PRA Release Categories	Start	Duration	Fraction of Core Inventory Released
			Xe	I	Cs	Te	Ba	Ru	La
UK1	1 hr	3 hr	0.9	0.7	0.5	0.3	6(-2)	2(-2)	4(-3)
UK2	1 hr	0.5 hr	0.9	0.7	0.4	0.35	5(-2)	0.2	3(-3)
UK5	8 hr	0.5 hr	1.0	0.3*	0.3	0.5	4(-2)	3(-2)	6(-3)
UK11	2 hr	>24 hr	6(-2)	6(-5)	3(-5)	3(-5)	3(-6)	2(-6)	4(-7)
*Revised first estimate
Chernobyl	0 hr	10 d	1.0	0.4	0.25	>0.1	4(-2)	5(-2)	3(-2)
TMI-2	3 hr	1 hr	<8(-2)	2(-7)	0	0	0	0	0
Note: 3(-3) = 3 x 10-3

IMPORTANT RADIONUCLIDES AND TYPICAL CORE INVENTORIES FOR SIZEWELL

Group	Nuclides	T ½	Core Inventory, 1100MWe Reactor Mega-Curies
			Thermal	LMFBR
Xe	Xell-113	502d	185	173
I	I-131	8.04d	91	95
	I-133	20.8h	184	169
Cs	Cs-134	2.06y	10.4	1.7
	Cs-137	30.0y	6.2	2.6
Te	Sb-127	3.9d	7.9	8.9
	Te-132	3.2d	131	125
Ba	Sr-89	50.5d	91	48
	Sr-90	29.1y	4.7	1.0
	Ba-140	12.7d	166	133
Ru	Mo-99	66h	174	52
	Ru-103	39.4d	142	72
	Ru-106	368d	35	49
	Rh-105	1.5d	86	38
La	Y-91	58.6d	122	68
	Zr-95	65.5d	159	19
	Nb-95	35.1 d	157	16
	La-140	40.3 d	171	136
	Ce-141	32.5 d	160	143
	Ce-143	33.0 d	147	118
	Ce-144	285 d	97	41
	Pr-143	13.6 d	146	118
	Nd-147	11.0 d	64	55
	Np-239	2.36 d	1976	1966
	Pu-241	14.4 d	8.6	24
	Cm-242	153 d	1.8	5.8

EFFECT OF LOCATION ON THE NUMBER OF FATAL CANCERS: SOME EXAMPLES FROM NRPB SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS⁽⁰⁾ FOR SIZEWELL REACOTR

Type of release	Weather conditions (wind direction:270o)	Relocation limited to evacuation area			Relocation extended to areas in which reference dose criteria is reached
		No. of late cancer	Time interval of relocated people (person-years)	No.of  people relocated (persons)	No. of late cancers	Time interval of relocated people (person-years)	No.of  people relocated (persons)
R1(1)	M1(3) M2(2)	4,936(5) 25,450	108,000 5,570,000	12,900(6) 198,000	4,760 12,040	150,000(7) 10,200,000	22,000 718,000
R2(2)	M1 M2	2,067 14,730	36,800 1,470,000	4,740 44,000	2,045 10,990	580,000 5,630,000	9,400 360,000

Source: NRPB-M103, tables 8,9,10, pp39-41

(0)methodology and parameters comparable to those used in this study

(1)comparable to UK1

(2)of the same type as UK1c,but with different parameters

(3)M1 is the same as D5 used here

(4)M2 is equivalent to M1, but with 1mm x h^-1rain after 3 hours

(5)in the NRPB estimate for this study, this figure is 7,050

(6)in our estimates (See Appendix 1, Table 3) the number of people evacuated in 14,000

(7)Our estimate is 265,000 because of slightly different return criterion and different geographical distribution

      grid

(8)our estimate is 18,500

THE CONSEQUENCES OF SPECIFIED RADIOACTIVE RELEASES FROM THE SIZEWELL ‘B’ NUCLEAR STATION ON THE POPULATION: Main results of the countermeasures scenario, using the MARC model

TABLE -3                                                                                                                                            TYPE OF ACCIDENT: (UK-1)

Wind direction (North:0o, clockwise)		Weather Conditions:D5			Weather Conditions: FD			Weather Conditions: DR
		270o	240o	210o	270o	240o	210o	270o	240o	210o
1*.Sheltering1:    Surface area2 Maxi. distance from reactor Population concerned	Sq.km Km Persons	2,700 160  450,000	2,700 160 245,000	1,450 160 115,000	820 74 110,000	820 74 205,000	415 74 130,000	4,350 170 725,000	4,350 170 4,500,000	2,600 170 1,000,000
- Evacuation:  :   Surface area Maxidistance from reactor Population concerned	Sq.km Km Persons	100 28.5  14,000	100 28.5 18,500	89 28.5 6,500	255 37 22,000	255 37 72,000	190 37 25,500	880 85 115,000	880 85 225,000	335 62 110,000
2.* - Relocation : Surface area Max.distance from reactor Population concerned	Sq.km Km Persons	200 46 18,500	200 46 93,000	145 37.5 25,000	385 41 28,000	385 41 150,000	260 38.5 32,000	2,700 140 420,000	2,700 140 1,500,000	1,400 140 545,000
3* Decontamination Surface area Max. distance from reactor Population concerned	Sq.km Km Persons	75 28.5 13,000	75 28.5 11,000	73 28.5 4,650	330 41 25,000	330 41 145,000	220 38.5 30,500	1,900 115 295,000	1,900 115 500,000	760 115 235,000
4* :Decontamination Surface area Max.distance from reactor Population concerned	Sq.km Km Persons	14.5 13 6,200	14.5 13 1,700	14.5 13 1,950	175 31.5 17,500	175 31.5 23,500	145 31.5 8,500	700 76.5 99,000	700 76.5 200,000	315 62 57,500
Time-integral of relocation :  Surface area Population concerned	Sq.km-years Persons years	1.45 x 103 2.65 x 105	1.45 x 103 3.85 x 105	1.4 x 103 1.45 x105	6.9 x 103 7.2 x 105	6.9 x 103 1.95 x 106	5.5 x 103 5.9 x 105	3.7 x 104 5.25 x 106	3.7 x 104 1.2 x 107	1.7 x 104 5.3 x 106
5*. Health effects   early  deaths - late deaths (cancer)		44 7,050	792 20,500	23 3,600	725 5,650	4,610 14,300	342 2,920	431 9,670	2,840 39,700	151 8,310

1*Potential Sheltering¹: Consequences of emergency counter-measures

2*Consequences of emergency counter-measures:Relocation of population prior to 3*decontamination:Decontaminated area still not re-inhabited after 5 years 
4* Decontaminated area still not re-inhabited after 20  years

5*Health effects – as estimated by NRPB³:    -

 NOTES FOR TABLE 3:   1. This ‘potential sheltering’ corresponds to the application of NRPB countermeasures recommendations in ERL-2.  In the calculation of health consequences, sheltering is considered only in the evacuation area, prior to evacuation. 2. ‘Surface areas’ in this Table are land areas only.  3.  These health effects have been  computed by the NRPB considering only evacuation as a counter-measure.  Sheltering is assumed to be required only for evacuated people, prior to evacuation.  No specific relocation model is used, but it is assumed that source after evacuation (this implicitly corresponds, relocation).  

BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COUNTERMEASURES MODEL

ZONE	Criterion for countermeasures	Extent of Zone	Distance downwind	Time taken to execute countermeasure1
				Shelter 2, 5 in evacuated areas	Evacuate 3,5	Relocate 5
A	Major release of activity to containment	60o sector extending 2km downwind	0-2km	1h	2h	-
B	Major release of activity containment	60o sector extending 2 to 5 km  downwind	2-5km	1h	5h	--
C	Bone marrow dose from all exposure pathways exceeds 0.25 Sv in 7 days4	Determined by area over which criterion exceeded	5-25 km 25-75km > 75 km	6h 6h 6h	12h 1d 2d	- - -
D	Whole body y dose from deposited material exceeds 0.25Sv in first year	Determined by area over which criterion exceeded	5-50km >50km	-- --	-- --	2d 2d

NOTES FOR FIGURE1:

1.       The times specified are the intervals between the inititation of the countermeasures and their completion. For areas A and B the time is measured relative to the beginning of the warning time (the beginning of the warning time is taken as the occurrence of vessel melt-through and the durationof the warning time is the period between vessel melt-through and a significant release of activity to the environment (see Table 1 in Appendix)

For area C the time is measured relative to the release of activity to the environment (i.e. no credit taken for warning time)

2.       For areas A, B, and C, 90% of the population are assumed indoors and 10% outdoors at the time of the release.  Sheltering considered here (which affects only the population which would be evacuated) is assumed to cover the whole population, at the specified time.  However, it is possible that, following the NRPB official recommendations expressed in ERL 2, the extent of shelterisng would be far wider and cover more than the population to be evacuated in the following hours or day.  In Table 3 of Appendix 1,  for instance figures are presented on the possible extent of sheltering order using an exposure criteria of 15 mSv to the bone marrow in 7 days.  (this criteria is in the middle of the range recommended by NRPB in ERL2, as shown in Table3, Chapter2).  The extent of sheltering would in this case be obviously far wider than the alternative in which only the population to be vacuated would be asked to take shelter.  Note that the health effects calculated by the NRPB do not take into account this possible supplementary cou8ntermeasures, nor the intake of iodine tablets.

3.       The exposure during evacuation is taken to be approximately that which would have been received outdoors in the following hour had evacuation not occurred.

4.       The dose to be used in conjunction with this criterion is evacuated assuming people to be outdoors during the passage of the plume and subsequently to spend 90% of their time indoors and 10% outdoors.

5.       Those evacuated or relocated are returned to the affected area when the annual wholedboy v dose from deposited material is less than 10mSv per year after decontamination (assumed to reduce radioactivity levels by a factor of 3)

Source: G.N.Kelly, L.Ferguson, D.Charles,’the Influence of countermeasures on the Predicted Consequences of Degraded Core Accidents for the Sizewell PWRm NRPB-R163, December 1983, p42 Fig.1

OFFICIAL NRPB RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY MEASURES: EMERGENCY REFERENCE LEVELS (ERLs)

(dose equivalent levels in mSV)⁽¹⁾

Counter-measures	Lower Value to:			Upper Value to:
	Whole body	Thyroid, lung or other single organ	skin	Whole body	Thyroid, lung or other single organ	skin
Evacuation	100	300	1,000	500	1,500	5,000
Sheltering	5	50	50	25	250	250
Distribution of stable iodine tablets	--	50	50	--	250	--

(1)    : 1mSv = 0.1rem; 1Sv=100 rems

Source: NRPB, Emergency Reference levels: Criteria for limiting doses to the Public in the Event of Accidental Exposure to Radiation, ERL-2, July 1981, p.4

SHORT TERM EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE ON POPULATION HEALTH AND THE EFFECTS OF EMERGENCY COUNTERMEASURES: FOUR EXAMPLES OF SELECTED SCENARIOS ⁽¹⁾

Release type	Weather condi-tions	Wind direc-tion	No. of early deaths	No. of prodomal vomiting (2)	Area evacuated (sq.km)	Max. distance (A)	people evacua-ted (B)	shelter- Area (3) (C )	persons sheltered  (3) (D)
UK1	FD	270O	725	2,300	255	35	22,000	820	205,000
Uk1c	D5	240O	0	2	17.5	8.6	5,350	325	155,000
Uk9	DR	210O	0	0	12.5	5	1,100	23	3,200
UK11	D5	240O	0	0	13	5	4,750	13	4,750

A)     Max. distance of evacuation(km)

B)      No. of people evacuated

C)      Area of sheltering using NRPB’s ERL-2 criteria

D)     Total No. of persons sheltering using NRPB’s ERL-2 criteria

(1): Results for all 36 scenarios can be found in Appendix1, Tables 3 and 5.  Criteria for countermeasures described in Table 4.

(2)  Not estimated by NRPB; evaluated by using the ratio between early deaths and prodomal vomiting in each type of release in NRPB –R137.  The number of people suffering from prodomal vomiting includes those who will die.  Figures are estimated after taking into account counter-measures implementation.

(3) Includes the number of people or area which will be evacuated some hours afterwards (shown in above columns 8 and 6) as well as those people or areas for which no evacuation will take place but for which the exposure dose is within the range defined in NRPB’s ERLs for sheltering.  The latter group taking shelter are not considered in estimating early health effects.

Note-1: Small accidents like UK9 and UK11 according to calculations do not cause early deaths but cause a few cases of prodomal vomiting.

Note-2: In case of large accidental releases like UK1 and UK1C early health effects are same for UK1 with weather conditions FD (Low wind, high pressure, cloudy summer) Easterly wind causes 725 deaths in a short time and 2300 people suffer serious effects or die and many people in Leiston would become sick a few hours with passage of the plume.  For small releases of UK9 and UK11 evacuation and sheltering  is done as a precautionary measure upto 5km and emergency plans made upto 3km

Note-3:  For large releases like UK1 and UK1C evacuation is done for a few thousand people to more than 2 lakh population. If winds blowout towards London at 240^oC 45 lakh people need counter measures.

For Chernobyl accident largest releases occurred.  All of the noble gas and major fractions of volatile fission products were released on 26^th April in Stage-I the initiating in-core transient blew off the pile cap and ejected fragments of hot fuel along with volatile fission   products directly into the  environment.  5% of core elementary of volatile fission products and 0.3% to 0.4% of the non-volatile nuclides were released to the atmosphere.  In second stage from 26^th April to 2^nd May in-core fires mainly of the moderative graphite promoted continuing releases from 26^th to 27^th.  On 27^th dumping of lead, dolomite, clay and sand heaps on to the core debris caused steady reduction in radioactive releases until 2^nd May and the fuel temperatures were around 800^oC .  But in the 3^rd stage from 3^rd to 5^th May core temperatures rose to 2000^oC caused by decay heat when a second peak release occurred on May 5^th.  Revolatalisation of material trapped earlier in the filter bed perhaps caused high releases.  During the 4^th stage on May 6^th radioactive release reduced due to injection of high flows of nitrogen under the core debris and termination of fuel oxidation drastically reduce emissions of 50 mega curies of released radioactivity was present in the environment

  

CONSEQUENCES OF RADIOACTIVE RELEASES FROM JAITAPUR  NUCLEAR STATION ON THE POPULATION:

 Main results of the countermeasures scenario, using the MARC model

( For weather conditions referred to the table presented below)

                                                                                                           TYPE OF ACCIDENT: UK1              

Wind direction (East:85o, clockwise)		Weather Conditions: DR   240o
1. Consequences of emergency counter-measures - Potential Sheltering1:    Surface area2 Maximum distance from reactor Population concerned	Sq.km Km Persons	3,000 170 12,00,000
- Evacuation:  :   Surface area Maximum distance from reactor Population concerned	Sq.km Km Persons	800 85 6,00,000
2. Consequences of emergency counter-measures - Relocation of population prior to decontamination: Surface area Maximum distance from reactor Population concerned	Sq.km Km Persons	2,000 110 7,00,000
Decontaminated area still not re-inhabited after 5 years : Surface area Maximum distance from reactor Population concerned	Sq.km Km Persons	1,500 140 500,000
Decontaminated area still not re-inhabited after 20  years : Surface area Maximum distance from reactor Population concerned	Sq.km Km Persons	800 85 5,00,000
3. Health effects – as estimated by NRPB3:    - early  deaths - late deaths (cancer)		3,000 50,000

(Approximate values have been presented due to non-availability of latest population data)

NOTES FOR TABLE 3:   1. This ‘potential sheltering’ corresponds to the application of NRPB countermeasures recommendations in ERL-2.  In the calculation of health consequences, sheltering is considered only in the evacuation area, prior to evacuation. 2. ‘Surface areas’ in this Table are land areas only.  3.  These health effects have been  computed by the NRPB considering only evacuation as a counter-measure.  Sheltering is assumed to be required only for evacuated people, prior to evacuation.  No specific relocation model is used, but it is assumed that source after evacuation (this implicitly corresponds, relocation).   

METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS USED IN ESTABLISHING THE ACCIDENT SCENARIOS

Code Name	Atmospheric stability	Duration (h)	Pasquill category	Windspeed1 (m s-1)	Mixing layer depth1(m)	Rainfall rate (mm h-1)
D5	Neutral	Total	D	5	800	0
FD	Stable	t < 4 h t > 4 h	F D	2 5	100 800	0 0
DR	Neutral (Rain)	Total	D	5	800	1.0

Note:  The Values assigned to the wind speed and mixing  layer depth are representatives values for the corresponding Pasquill stability categories and have been taken from: R.H Clarke, ‘The First Report of a Working Group on Atmospheric Dispersion:  A model for short and medium range dispersion of radio nuclides released to the atmosphere’, NRPB, Harwell, NRPB-R91, 1979.  Pasquill categories are used to classify the degree of stability of weather conditions in order to distinguish the main atmospheric dispersion patterns of clouds emitted from land-based source.

      

RISK ANALYSIS OF JAITAPUR REACTOR ACCIDENT : REMEDIAL MEASURES SCENARIO

(Due to the reactor accident at Jaitapur  the following villages and towns will be facing the risks of pollution)

Distance from reactor	Time taken to execute counter measures		Places effected due to UK1/DR/240 (For weather conditions see table above with the modification that  the wind direction is taken as 85o East)
	Sheltering	Evacuation
0 - 5 km	1 hr	2 hr	Jaitapur,  Niveli,
5  - 30 km Zone-A	6 hr	12 hr	Rajpura, Bhu
30 - 85 km Zone-A	6 hr	1 day	Kolhapur, Kale, kokdi, Salevan, Raypatan, Anaskura, Panhala,
85– 110 km Zone-B	6 hr	2 days	Hatkatangda, Alta,Kumbhoj, Wadgam, Kudoli, Rukad,
110 – 140 km Zone-C	6 hr	2 days	Sangli, Miraj, Shirol, Bhudgaon, Shipari, Karanji, Dudhgaon, Kavathepiran, Malgaon
140- 170 km Zone-D	6 hr	2 days	Arag, Bedag, Narsoba, Wadi, Kirandwad, Hupari, Ratankodali, Aslaj, Salgare, Gundewadi, Ranji, Kavatemahankal, Bhose, Adumbar, Bhilawudi, Astha, Bagni, Itakare, Korla
170 and above Zone-E	6 hr	2 days	Athni, Umrani, Gugwad, Jath,

Note: Intervals between evacuation and reoccupation of original houses and lands after decontamination

Since the radio-active pollutants seriously pollute the lands, buildings and equipment, the people duly evacuated and rehabilitated in safer places, can return along with their cattle to their original homes in their native places only

1) after one year upto 150km and above from the reactor

2) after 5 years upto 135km from the reactor

3) after 10years upto  120km from the reactor and

4) after 20 years upto 80km from the reactor. 

Depending upon the vagaries of the weather, some places may be more polluted than others.

 JAITAPUR NUCLEAR REACTOR ACCIDENT FORCES ABANDONMENT OF CITIES LIKE KOLHAPUR FOR 20 YEARS AND SANGLI FOR 5 YEARS TO AVOID RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION INCLUDING HUNDREDS OF VILLAGES IN THESE DISTRICTS

 http://www.gitam.edu/GIS/shivajirao_dckn.htm 

The Non-Governsmental organsiations of Maharashtra who are working to save the lives of lakhs of people of Western Maharasthra must go through the following website pertainingto therisk analaysis and disaster managment problems highlighted by the author for the proposed Kovvada nuclear plant in Srikakulamd District of Andhra Pradesh.  The illustrations give more details by comparing the disaster scenarios of Chernobyl Nuclear accidents and Fukushima accident along with details of risk analysis and disaster management  proposals which should have been made part of the Environemntal Impact Assessment for any nuclear plant in India under the regulations of the Union Ministry of Environment and Forests under the Environmental Protection Act, 1986.  If only the nuclear plant proponents have prepared the risk analysis disaster management and the costs involved for the purpose they would have easily realised that the establishment of a nuclear power plant is much more costly than the alternative renewable energy sources that could have been developed in place of the nuclear power plant.  Infact the abandonment of nuclear plant proposals will be much more cheaper economically and ecologically sound in terms of national interests and the policy of sustainable development which envisages development without destruction .

WHY INDIAN NUCLEAR PLANTS ARE ACCIDENT-PRONE AND SOME MAY EXPLODE IN THE LONG RUN?

WHY INDIAN NUCLEAR PLANTS ARE ACCIDENT-PRONE AND SOME MAY EXPLODE IN THE LONG RUN?

Prof.T.Shivaji Rao, Director, Center for Environmental Studies, GITAM University
http://tshivajirao.blogspot.com/2011/10/why-nuclear-accidents-are-difficult-to.html

http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:CIoFFyPS040J:www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/meetings/PDFplus/2011/cn200/documentation/cn200_Final-Fukushima-Mission_Report.pdf+IAEA+expert+report+on+Fukushima+disaster,+June+2011&hl=en&gl=in&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEEShu3blUZ9pl6gmOgdPqoENw-smBhj7S5t7ZzCB_xXeGd2fiGFowFOWG7BwOgBHbiEQgtl8WdFT3I-2-mKV0BmNNPS8NKVCFPoHd8PLYb8h0uEb2xq_I5BCcXjFfVKRs5fyoCLTr&sig=AHIEtbR9asUD73EtD56ZBXDqh7qlS1tkhQ
The International Atomic Energy Agency expert committee enquiry report on Fukushima disaster clearly established that nuclear safety is bound to be impossible for sevral reasons as indicated in the report. 
For instance the experts warned that complicated structures and organisations during a nuclear accident can result in delays in urgent decision making. 

http://tshivajirao.blogspot.com/2010/04/nuclear-plant-risks-srikakulam-district.html

http://tshivajirao.blogspot.com/2011/08/diaster-consequences-of-kovvada-nuclear.html

http://bhujangam.blogspot.com/2011/08/probable-nuclear-reactor-1100-mw.html

http://bhujangam.blogspot.com/2011/08/economic-costs-of-nuclear-reactor_05.html
http://georgewashington2.blogspot.com/2011/04/ap-risk-of-nuclear-catastrophe-could.html 

 Are Nuclear Plant Accidents going to make a state or Nation go Economically BANKRUPT  ?
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/damian-carrington-blog/2011/jun/20/nuclearpower-nuclear-waste   [NUCLEAR POWER IS NEVER SAFE OR CHEAP}

(Note: British expert, Farmer, chose a source term of 5 million curies of Iodine-131 for a 10% core release and predicted high contamination upto 160km. from the reactor.  Beattie and Bell used a release of one million curies of Iodine-131 and predicted high contamination upto 144km. from the reactor.  Gomberg, an American expert considered the maximum core release under atmospheric inversion conditions and predicted very high levels of radio-active contamination upto 128km from the reactor.   All these studies indicate that an accident scenario for the 1100 MW Size-well reactor can be used to predict the socio-economic consequences of a nuclear accident for the different sites like Kovvada in Srikakulam and Jaitapur in Maharashtra to determine their suitability for establishing the proposed nuclear plants.)

AS  AN IRRITATED SNAKE  KILLS A MAN, NUCLEAR PLANTS SILENTLY  KILL  MANKIND AND NATURE FOR  FINANCIAL GAINS BY CONTRACTORS,OFFICIALS& POLITICIANS ?

Nuclear Plants are just silent killers of man and Nature created by the GOD. In nature the Uranium ore contains 99.3% of Uranium-238 and the remaining 0.7% is Uranium-235.  Uranium-238 and Uranium-235  in nature are least harmful.  But business people and other vested interests dig the iron ore and  convert  the least harmful Uranium-235  into the fuel form of Uranium-235  by purifying it to make a fuel by enriching it to about 4% of Uranium-235 that is packed in pellets and inserted into the core of the nuclear reactor for producing both electricity and material for making the bombs.   The reactor  when the nuclear atom is given a blow  by a neutron, enormous heat and other poisonous Radio-active atoms like Xenon, Barium, Cesium, Strontium, Plutonium and other dangerous radioactive substances are produced.  These radioactive substances are discharged into the air and water by several ways and  when they enter into the environment consisting of air, water and soil and foods like vegetables, fishes, prawns they ultimately get into human beings and produce cancers and birth defects in generations of people for many decades to come.  These poisonous radioactive substances  destroy natural and human life and culture and convert lands upto hundreds of kilometers into permanent nuclear burial grounds for ever.

How harmless Uranium ore materials in nature are converted into destructive and killer materials by man can be understood by the following simple example. For instance king cobras live in nature in anthills in forests and lead their normal life peacefully by catching their prey for food during nights But greedy people go and poke their iron rods into their abodes and disturb the Cobras when they become angry and bite the trespassers to inflict death over them by their poisons.   Similarly, the selfish people are mining the harmless Uranium and converting it into harmful  Enriched Uranium and then using it to produce electricity by means of the Nuclear plants and in the process they are producing Radioactive pollutants that poison man and nature slowly due to routine releases of radioactivity into the environment.  In course of time if an accident occurs in the Nuclear plant due to several reasons like in Fukushima or Chernobyl, the poisonous pollutants are thrown into the atmosphere and they kill thousands of people slowly and inflict cancer to millions of people living downstream upto hundreds of Kilometers as in case of Fukushima and Chernobyl accidents. The Nuclear plant operators are misleading the public by stating that Nuclear power is safe and cheap just like the medical representatives of various pharmaceutical companies praise before the doctors about the virtues of their medical tablets and tonics as part of their sale promotion activity the nuclear authorities are praising the nuclear plants as safe and cheap energy producers which is wrong.  This misinformation is dangerous to public health and welfare because in European states almost all people agree that safety of Nuclear (power is a Myth as accepted by Angela Merkel, Chancellor of Germany. She had consulted the genuine experts on nuclear plants and realized that nuclear safety is a myth and ordered for gradual closure of all the nuclear plants in Germany.  If Indian Prime Minister and Union Cabinet Ministers including the Chief Ministers of the state want to know the truth about the safety of the nuclear power plants they must go and visit advanced countries like Germany and Japan  and discuss the issue with foreign experts  so that they can refrain from promoting nuclear plants as is done by the peoples leader like Mamata Banerjee, Chief Minister of West Bengal.   For more scientific details see the above web sites on this topic prepared by independent experts.

Environmental Impact Analysis report are fabricated by consultants according to the national Green Tribunal and also according to the Chief Justice of India, S.H.Kapadia  who said “If you leave report preparation to the project proponent, I am sorry to say the person who pays will get the answers he asks for” and hence he called for a change in the system of preparation of EIA reports for the development projects.  See website:  http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article2886141.ece

According to the experts at least one nuclear incident and $332 millions damages every year are reported for the last 3 decades and most of these accidents are not due to natural disasters like the one at Fukushima.  Disasters can occur due to mechanical failures, human errors, terrorist attacks and several radiation spills occurred during operation, transportation and other factors.  Some of these events with lesser media coverage have potential to cause considerable damage.  About 57 accidents occurred since Chernobyl disaster in 1986 and in addition to about 124 hazardous accidents at Nuclear plants in India between 1993 and 1995.  Iodine leak in Tarapur with radiation levels 700 times more than the normal effected 3000 Indians in 1989.  Although contaminated soils due to Bhopal accident can be restored by spending money the long half lives of radioactive pollutants militate against the possibility of restoring lands subject to high levels of contamination by air and water sources and the nuclear waste storage treatment and disposal still is an unsolved problem and thereby nuclear energy has become the fourth most expensive of the alternative sources of energy in spite of the fact that the cost estimates of nuclear energy exclude the costs of safety, storage and decommissioning.  Consequently even the advanced passive safety nuclear plants have not coming to operation even in countries like USA.

REACTOR SAFETY:    The Nuclear Energy Lobby is very powerful all over the world.  In USA they are spending 7 to 8 million dollars on advertising for a return to nuclear power under the threat of Ozone depletion and green-house effect due to pollution from thermal power plants.  But a number of Nobel Laureates like Linus pauling, George wald, Hannes Alfven and James watt and eminent scientists like Rosalie Bertel and Willian Caldicott have been strongly opposing nuclear power due to radiation hazards. It is well known that the bombardment of Uranium fuel produces neutrons, heat energy, radio-active fission products and activation products.  Hence utmost care is taken to prevent this radiation from escaping into environment and harm the workers and the general public.  A 1000 MW Reactor contains several thousand million curies of radio-activity in its core and the radiation delivered nearby could be 100 million rems per hour against 5 rems per year allowed for occupational exposure by the authorities. 

Although nuclear radiation cannot be detected by man’s physical senses it gets into the air, water and soil and the food chains and food-webs in nature and gets biologically magnified to contaminate the environment and poison the life systems.  It cannot be considered to be clean just because it cannot be seen, smelled, tasted or touched by man. In fact many studies suggested increased cancer rates among workers exposed to radiation at the American nuclear weapon facilities.  In a 1984 study  report on excess cancer deaths, 9 out of 12 studies established the link between cancer and radiation.  One study reported very high death rates from Lymphatic cancer and cancer of cervix and uterus among 19000 women who worked at the Oak-ridge nuclear reservation in Tennessee.  Another study reported abnormal death rates from Leukemia and brain cancer among male workers at the Oak-ridge

Infact the recent reassessment of the Japanese bomb victims has proved that cancer risk is 15 times greater than the radiation risk factors accepted by the International Committee on Radiation Protection (ICRP) in 1977.   A reduction in radiation dose is bound to be opposed by the nuclear industry as it will make nuclear power very expensive.  However the national and international organizations that specify the standards cannot remain unconcerned about these crucial problems of life and death.  In Britain, the annual radiation dose limits have been revised in 1987  to 50 milli-rems to the general public.  In USA the dose limits were set at 25 milli-rems to the general public by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Energy Research and Development Agency has recommended for a drastic  reduction to 5 milli-rems. 

MODES OF REACTOR FAILURE:     Serious concern about the dangers of operating nuclear power plants created panic among the public due to an accident in 1979 at the Nuclear power plant k own as three Mile Island accident in Harrisburg of Pennsylvania, USA.  A series of equipment failures, misleading readings from the instruments and human errors caused the abnormal heating of the reactor core and these grave errors prevented emergency systems from operating properly.  Small amounts of radioactive gases from the plant escaped into the atmosphere and caused health risks to the public including a few excess cancer deaths among 20 lakhs of people living within 50 miles of the plant.  Sabotage, an earthquake, a human error or equipment failure can cause a reactor accident in which a main pipe in the primary cooling circuit can get fractured.  In such a case the control rods would switch off the reactor so that nuclear fission process is stopped immediately.  Even then the disintegration of the fission products cannot be stopped and there will be decay heat.  In a 650 MW power plant,   the heat formation by such disintegration will be 200MW for 3 seconds after the reactor  is switched-off and it will be 30 MW after one hour and 12 MW after 24 hours and the decay heat due to disintegration continues for several months.

Under normal working conditions in the reactor the fuel casing surface has a temperature of 350^oC (660^oF) while the interior of the fuel rods will be at 2,200^oC (4000^oF), approaching the melting point of the fuel.  If the cooling liquid is lost the surface of the fuel rods heats up rapidly and within 10 to 15 seconds fuel casing would breakdown and within a minute the casing would melt and the fuel rods also began to melt.  Unless the emergency core cooling system comes into operation within the first few minutes,  the reactor core and the fuel of about 100 tonnes and the supporting structure would melt and collapse on the floor of the inner-most fuel tank.  To meet such an accident due to loss of cooling agent,  the reactor is provided with several emergency cooling independent systems based on theoretical calculations.  During an experimental test the systems failed; the emergency coolant failed to cool the reactor core as it escaped through the leak in the cooling circuit and also owing to a layer of steam forming between the hot surface of the fuel rods and the emergency coolant,  and the remaining emergency coolant fluid could not carry away the heat generated by the fuel rods.     If the core cooling system fails to work in time, almost in a minute,  the reactor core melts and if the coolant water is added at this belated time,  it would make the situation worse.  The melted metals in the fuel reactor  react violently with this coolant water and produces great volume of heat and the steam and hydrogen thus produced would be released in such a great quantities and at such a high pressure that the pressure tank would burst and there will be no other technical control measure that can stop the melting process and the molten core would sink into the ground causing what is  known as China syndrome.  Practically all the gaseous fission products and some of the volatile and non-volatile products would be thrown into the atmosphere.  In a 1000 MW reactor the fission products accumulated after one year would approximate the amount that will be released by about 1000 atom bombs of the Hiroshima variety.

RESIDUAL HEAT FROM A 650MW REACTOR & LOSS OF COOLANT LEADING TO EXPLOSION

(Diminishing heat and sequence of  failures due to loss of coolant after the reactor is stopped.)

Time	Heat formation	Remarks
0	650 MW	Reactor stopped by control rods
3 Seconds	200 MW	Heat formation
15 Seconds	--	Fuel casing begans to fail
30 Seconds	--	Boiling layer of emergency coolant
45 Seconds	--	Reactor core melts
60 Seconds	--	Reactor core collapses
1 hour	30 MW	--
24 hours	12 MW	--
Months	Diminishing heat	--

RISK DUE TO ACCIDENTS:   For making a probabilistic safety assessment of a nuclear plant for a specified location, an estimate of the socio-economic consequences due to an unlikely severe accident must be made in 2 steps. Firstly, the magnitude and nature of release of toxic radio-isotopes  into the environment, known as, the “source term” must be determined.  Secondly, the source term must be used in modeling the atmospheric dispersion of radio-activity under different  stability conditions and the consequent impact in terms of health effects on people and damage to agriculture and animal husbandry, houses and properties must be assessed.  Even for reactor designs with strong containment structures, some kinds of accidents which can by-pass the containment occur.  In case of Chernobyl with the sudden failure of the first 3 barriers, namely the fuel-matrix, cladding and cooling system and the absence of a strong containment, the radio-isotopes immediately flashed out, escaped into the environment, and the emission continued for 10 days. In case of Three Mile Island, the 3 barriers failed on a longer time scale of 3 hours while the containment retained all but a trace of radio-activity that escaped from the core for a short duration.

For calculating the consequences of an accident for a 1100 MW pressurized water reactor at size-well in England, the Westing house corporation and the British authorities considered the source terms for containment by-pass for the maximum release of radio-isotopes from the core of the reactor.  They used the National Radiological Protection Board (NRPB) “MARC” suite of programmes for the atmospheric dispersion modeling.  Under the worst conditions, this model predicts that people have to be evacuated down-wind upto 140 to 170km from the reactor.  The damage due to an accident has been estimated at 2400 million pounds inclusive of health and housing costs, losses in agriculture and non-agriculture fields, cleaning and decommissioning expenses and supplementary costs of alternate power supply etc. Similar studies on socio-economic consequences of postulated accidents at nuclear plant sites were made by different experts to determine the suitable location.  For instance a British expert, Farmer, chose a source term of 5 million curies of Iodine-131 for a 10% core release and predicted high contamination upto 160km. from the reactor.  Beattie and Bell used a release of one million curies of Iodine-131 and predicted high contamination upto 144km. from the reactor.  Gomberg, an American expert considered the maximum core release under atmospheric inversion conditions and predicted very high levels of radio-active contamination upto 128km from the reactor.   

http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/emerg-preparedness/about-emerg-preparedness/planning-zones.html

If the American Nuclear Power plant managers are taking interest inprotecting public health and the environment by taking up emergency planning zones upto 50 miles or 80km from the nuclear plant site for estimating the peak levels of radiation exposure for evacuating people for and settling them in safer places the Indian Government and the nuclear plant managers are violating this standard in India and thereby are positively considering that the life of an Indian is far inferior than that of an American citizen and thereby are aoviding the public health norms in planning for nuclear power plants to ensure safety of the public and the environment and thereby the Indian people are not taken as co-partners as in other countries.

All these studies indicate that an accident scenario for the 1100 MW Size-well reactor can be used to predict the socio-economic consequences of a nuclear accident for the different sites like Kovvada in Srikakulam and Jaitapur in Maharashtra to determine their suitability for establishing the proposed nuclear plants.

SAFETY MEASURES:      In order to contain the radioactivity both during normal working and accident conditions, defence in depth philosophy expressed in terms of three levels of safety is adopted.  The first level of safety is to design the reactor and its components so well that the good quality standards and engineering practices are maintained.  Inspite of such standards often mal-functions do occur.  Hence the second level of safety is intended to provide protection to these systems that can fore-stall or cope with conceivable abnormal conditions or failures.  Finally, the third level of safety is provided through engineered safety systems so that the public is protected against a severe but highly unlikely accident. Redundancy is provided for some systems like instrumentation, shut-down control and emergency cooling so that if one of the units fails,  the duplicate or triplicate unit comes to the rescue.  However they are subjected to common mode of failure.  In order to overcome such failures,  diversity is provided by the use of 3 independent and different methods of achieving the objective such as maintaining the power supply or reactor shut-down during an emergency. For instance redundancy in power supply to the reactor is provided by having 5 stand-by diesel generators, each with adequate capacity to cope with a failure, and diversity is provided by ensuring power supply not only from the diesel generators but also from AC supply main and motor generators and inverters fed by storage batteries.  In addition to safety provisions for Emergency shut-down, core-cooling, fuel-matrix, cladding, pressure vessel and double containment, land barriers like exclusion zone, sterilized zone and out lying areas are expected to ensure that radiation dose due to accidents in the environment is within permissible limits to protect public health. 

WHY  INDIAN NUCLEAR REACTORS ARE ACCIDENT-PRONE AND SOME MAY FAIL  SOON?

The modern passive safe reactors proposed in places like Kovvada and other places in India are claimed to be safe even incase of failure of pumping and electrical power as they depend upon laws of nature as also on design and materials behavior on the assumptions the passive cooling systems work on gravity, draining, natural circulation and low thermo-syphoning.  The diesel generator sets are proposed at eleven meters elevation at Kovvada for cooling the reactors after they are shut down.

 But international nuclear experts state that safety risks may be the greatest when nuclear systems are the latest brands and operators have less operational and research experience with them.  Nuclear expert David Lochbanm argues that almost all serious accidents occurred with the latest versions of reactors at all time because firstly accident scenarios occur that are impossible to plan for in the simulation exercises and secondly workers often make mistakes because to err is human.  Safety culture in nuclear industry is the personal dedication and accountability of all workers and supervisors engaged in the fabrication, construction, operation and maintenance of reactors.  There is some evidence that operators almost never follow instructions and written procedures exactly and the violation of rules appears to be rational because operators often work under high stressed conditions.
INDIAN WORK CULTURE PROVIDES MILEAGE FOR PROMOTION OF DISASTERS
http://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/Delhi/article2229713.ece
The Indian National Capital,New Delhi, has been struck time and again by terrorists because of the mileage they are able to derive, but the disaster management mechanism in this highly sensitive city still remains mired in red-tape with bureaucratic ego, multiplicity of authority and a lackadaisical approach towards carrying out even basic tasks, like mock drills, making a mockery of the entire process.
Sources in the Delhi Government said despite Delhi having been targeted on numerous occasions, the disaster management mechanism here remains far from satisfactory. The problems plaguing it are many.
While the Disaster Management Act 2005 had led to the setting up of the Delhi Disaster Management Authority under the Lieutenant-Governor and the constitution of District Disaster Management Authority in each of the nine districts, these bodies continue to suffer on account of multiplicity of authority.
“The Delhi Police, which is the first responder in any disaster, be it manmade or natural, Delhi Traffic Police, Municipal Corporation of Delhi, New Delhi Municipal Council and Delhi Development Authority all come under the Union Government and so the Delhi Government has little say in case their officials do not adhere to any rules or directions. Only a report can be made out to the Centre against them and the matter rests there,” said a senior official.
MULTIPLE CAUSES FOR REACTOR FAILURES
  A reactor may be designed to be safe for a given magnitude of  earthquake and a Tsunami wave to withstand or to withstand both.  But if a third risky event like a terrorist attack that devastated the world trade center in NewYork http://architecture.about.com/od/disastersandcollapses/a/twintowerfall.htm, Bomb attacks that destroyed Dams in Germany during the second world War http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Dam_Busters_%28film%29 or a missile attack http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Orchard is experienced by a nuclear plant, nobody can guarantee the safety of the reactors.  Hence Nuclear Safety is a myth particularly under Indian nuclear industrial work culture and hence India must follow the Japanese Prime Minister in abandoning nuclear reactors and promote alternate sources of energy.  Nuclear reactor proliferation is the greatest threat to human life amounting to an undeclared nuclear war against mankind posing a threat to our civilization. 

http://www.climateandfuel.com/pages/generationfour.htm
Advanced  passive safety Reactors

Questioning the safety of nuclear reactors Dr.Hannes Alfven, a noble laureate said “although the nuclear experts devote more effort to safety problems than others, the real question is whether their blue-prints will work as expected by them in the real world and not only in their technological paradise” 
 The growing number of nuclear incidents show that it is impossible to ensure complete safety even the most modern passive safe reactors.  Decay heat  needs pumped cooling water for an year to prevent over heating nuclear plants are some of the most sophisticated and complex energy systems and no matter how will they are designed and engineered, they cannot be deemed fail-proof .

 Reactors are highly complex machines with an incalculable things including inter connected linkages that could go wrong.  In the Three Mile Island Reactor accident one malfunction led to another malfunction and then to a series of others until the core itself began to melt and even the best experts did not know how to respond .  A combination of electrical, mechanical and human failures can disable the reactor itself.  Indian work culture is not as reliable as the work culture of the nuclear plant operators of a highly technically advanced country like Japan where the Fukushima reactor accidents proved that nuclear accidents  cannot be forecast  and prevented  in time and hence under Indian work culture of unreliable dimensions and unfavourable circumstances like the growing social unrest due to political corruption that promotes terrorist activities including bombing, accidents as are occurring in major cities like New Delhi, Mumbai and Hyderabad  the nuclear plants are bound to fail in the long run.

http://www.parliament.uk/documents/post/postpn222.pdf 

Terrorist Attacks on Nuclear Plants-Report to U.K. Government

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_safety
http://www.deccanchronicle.com/channels/cities/hyderabad/kovvada-n-plant-be-safe-469

(Kovvada Nuclear Plant  claimed to be safe due to improvements)  

http://bravenewclimate.com/2011/03/13/fukushima-simple-explanation/

Finally demographic and Meteorological analysis are made to evaluate the reactor sites to restrict the exposed population in the unlikely event of a large scale release of radio-activity and thus safety standards must be made known to the people who ultimately have to make a choice between the economic benefits of the nuclear power  and its long term risks to the health and welfare of the present and future generations and the decision to opt for the nuclear power in preference tos the more economical and renewable energy resources must be left in the hands of the public who are the ultimate decision makers in a social welfare state. 

812. 1987, June - U.S.A.

More than 23,000 mishaps have occurred at US commercial reactor power plants since the

Three Mile Island accident in 1979, according to Public Citizen.

1979 - 2,310 accidents             1980 - 3,804 accidents          1981 - 4,060 accidents

1982 - 4,500 accidents             1983 - 5,000 accidents          1984 - 2,417 accidents

1985 - 2,974 accidents            1986 - 3,000 accidents.

(Public Citizen Critical Mass Energy Project WISE NC 275 June 87)857. 1987 - U.S.A.

http://www.ib.cnea.gov.ar/~protrad/biblioteca/3Accidentes.pdf

The Government and its officials are the public servants who have to work to promote peoples welfare and national progress by promoting the right methods of development in preference to the wrong methods of development which are ecologically unsound, economically ruinous and socially unacceptable and the Gandhian principles of sustainable development must be upheld because Indian ethos not only preaches but practices in letter and spirit the slogan of SARVEJANA SUKHINOBHAVANTU. 

WHY NUCLEAR REACTOR SAFETY IS CONSIDERED AS A MYTH BY GERMAN CHANCELLORANGELA MERKEL and JAPANESE  Ex- PRIME MINISTER,KAO NAOTO

When the Swiss Government wanted to buy the US Reactors in 1973 , they demanded experimental proof that the dome containment would retain the radioactive pollutants released during a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). Actual  Test is very expensive,Moreover, since an actual test would be more dangerous than nuclear bomb testing, assurances on reactor safety are entirely based on tests on paper using simulated mathematical models.

 As such test results can not take into account the different permutations and combinations of malfunctions from defective materials, mechanical or human errors, sabotage, bombing, terrorism, missile hits, aero-plane crashes etc. they become invalid.

In other words, nobody can do all the necessary testing nor even anticipate what kind of tests are needed. At best, the experts may be able to simulate and estimate the answers to some of the questions asked by the people but do the people know all the questions that are yet to be asked for making the reactors absolutely safe for all time for different Natural and Man-made errors? Hence the proof of reactor safety could not be given and still has not been demonstrated.

But when the tests on the Emergency core cooling system designed to flood the core during a loss of coolant Accident[LOCA] were run at the National Reactor Testing Station in Idaho, mechanical failures occurred. When the tests were run during 1970-71 all the six tests conducted by the Aero-jet Nuclear Company failed. Subsequent experiments at Oak-ridge National Laboratoreis indicated that the Zircaloy-clad fuel rods of the Light water reactors may swell, rupture and block the cooling channels, and thereby obstruct the emergency cooling water from reaching the core and such obstruction which holds back the emergency core cooling water leads to a catastrophe sometime or the other. Thus reactor safety is most often a myth!
Questioning the safety of nuclear reactors Dr.Hannes Alfven, a noble laureate said “although the nuclear experts devote more effort to safety problems than others, the real question is whether their blue-prints will work as expected by them in the real world and not only in their technological paradise” 

According to Brahma Chellany,[web site]
:http://www.rediff.com/news/column/india-corruption-nuclear-safety/20110318.htm,
Nuclear safety gets violated,....."
"The chain of incidents engulfing all six Fukushima reactors was triggered by their close proximity to each other.
With a flare-up at one reactor affecting systems at another, Japan has ended up with serial blasts, fires, spent-fuel exposures and other radiation leaks at the Fukushima complex.
The lesson: A string of events can quickly overwhelm emergency preparedness and safety redundancies built into reactor systems.This seriously calls into question India's decision to approve construction of six to 12 large reactors at each new nuclear park."
http://tshivajirao.blogspot.com/2011/10/why-nuclear-accidents-are-difficult-to.html 
[Why Nuclear Reactor accidents are complex and unavidable in india ....?]

http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/te_1624_web.pdf

 WHY NUCLEAR DISASTER RESPONSE FAILED EVEN IN A  COUNTRY LIKE JAPAN?
 http://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/article2755175.ece 

  

TOKYO (AP) — Japan's response to the nuclear crisis that followed the March 11 tsunami was confused and riddled with problems, including an erroneous assumption an emergency cooling system was working and a delay in disclosing dangerous radiation leaks, a report revealed Monday.

The disturbing picture of harried and bumbling workers and government officials scrambling to respond to the problems at Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant was depicted in the report detailing a government investigation.

The 507-page interim report, compiled by interviewing more than 400 people, including utility workers and government officials, found authorities had grossly underestimated tsunami risks, assuming the highest wave would be 6 meters (20 feet). The tsunami hit at more than double those levels.

The report criticized the use of the term "soteigai," meaning "outside our imagination," which it said implied authorities were shirking responsibility for what had happened. It said by labeling the events as beyond what could have been expected, officials had invited public distrust.

"This accident has taught us an important lesson on how we must be ready for soteigai," it said.

The report, set to be finished by mid-2012, found workers at Tokyo Electric Power Co., the utility that ran Fukushima Dai-ichi, were untrained to handle emergencies like the power shutdown that struck when the tsunami destroyed backup generators — setting off the world's worst nuclear disaster since Chernobyl.

There was no clear manual to follow, and the workers failed to communicate, not only with the government but also among themselves, it said.

Finding alternative ways to bring sorely needed water to the reactors was delayed for hours because of the mishandling of an emergency cooling system, the report said. Workers assumed the system was working, despite several warning signs it had failed and was sending the nuclear core into meltdown.
The report acknowledged that even if the system had kicked in properly, the tsunami damage may have been so great that meltdowns would have happened anyway.
But a better response might have reduced the core damage, radiation leaks and the hydrogen explosions that followed at two reactors and sent plumes of radiation into the air, according to the report.

Sadder still was how the government dallied in relaying information to the public, such as using evasive language to avoid admitting serious meltdowns at the reactors, the report said.

The government also delayed disclosure of radiation data in the area, unnecessarily exposing entire towns to radiation when they could have evacuated, the report found.

The government recommended changes so utilities will respond properly to serious accidents.
It recommended separating the nuclear regulators from the unit that promotes atomic energy, echoing frequent criticism since the disaster.

Japan's nuclear regulators were in the same ministry that promotes the industry, but they are being moved to the environment ministry next year to ensure more independence.

The report did not advocate a move away from nuclear power but recommended adding more knowledgeable experts, including those who would have been able to assess tsunami risks, and laying out an adequate response plan to what it called "a severe accident."

The report acknowledged people were still living in fear of radiation spewed into the air and water, as well as radiation in the food they eat. Thousands have been forced to evacuate and have suffered monetary damage from radiation contamination, it said.

"The nuclear disaster is far from over," the report said.

The earthquake and tsunami left 20,000 people dead or missing.